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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCI'ION
UNIFICATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Quansheng Zhao

This book brings together the first major collection of research on
politics of current or formerly divided nations - China, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam. There is a wide range of diversity among the four
countries in terms of historical backgrounds, geographic locations,
and the international roles that they have played. But, they have all
shared at least one common characteristic: these divided nations are
products of the Cold War, dividing along political and ideological
lines: communist v. capitalist. Therefore, they all have to answer a
series of questions with regard to conflict resolution and political development in each society: How should the current political and economic systems on both sides be dealt with? What kind of relationship
should exist between communist and non-communist political forces?
And how can national unification be achieved by peaceful means?
Hence, the issue of national unification can be effectively linked to
broader research topics such as conflict resolution and political development. Studies on conflict and conflict resolution have increasingly
drawn attention from specialists in international relations, whereas
political development (process of democratization, for example) has
remained a favorite topic among scholars of comparative politics. The
divided nation cases of China, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam will certainly provide useful examples for the examination of these theoretical
as well as practical issues.
The evolution of the Cold War (from the peak in the 1950s and
1960s to its end in the late 1980s and the post-Cold War era in the
1990s) and the changing international environment have inevitably
played a significant, if not a decisive, role in the internal and external
politics of the divided nations. The radical changes in the Soviet
Union, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the internal upheaval of China, the increasing demands for unification within both
North and South Korea have all had a great impact on the politics of
divided nations and the issue of unification. One may conclude that a
(I)
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peaceful and favorable international environment is crucial for the resolution of conflicts such as those arising out of national divisions that
were caused primarily by external powers.
At the same time, domestic factors have proved to be extremely
important. All of these divided countries have developed different
political and economic systems, as a direct result of either the Cold
War (in the cases of Korea and Germany), or a civil war between
communist and non-communist forces (in the case of China). These
separations are long-standing: The shortest is the 22-year division of
Vietnam, the others have existed for more than four decades. These
long separations inevitably have had a great impact on the political
development of both sides and have inspired different interpretations
of the issue of unification.
In addition to examining the past experiences and future directions of unification between PRC-Taiwan, North-South Korea, EastWest Germany, and North-South Vietnam, this comparative analysis
will contribute to a strengthening of the understanding of how domestic political developments shape the attitude toward unification in each
country, and the impact of changing global and regional international
relations on these countries.
Each country study in this volume reviews unification politics in
both domestic and international terms. Attention to these countries,
however, is not equally distributed. More discussion and examination
are devoted to China and Korea, the two countries that have so far
remained divided. There are two chapters on China and three on Korea, and one chapter each for Germany and Vietnam, the two countries that have already achieved national unification.
The first two chapters examine the issue of China - the Mainland and Taiwan. Both articles provide detailed discussions of the relationship between unification and domestic politics. Hungdah Chiu
surveys the evolutionary process of Beijing's peaceful unification overture toward Taiwan and the responses from Taipei. In addition to the
main themes of his paper, Chiu touches upon several sensitive issues,
such as the development of the Taiwan independent movement, the
"ADB (Asian Development Bank) formula" for Taiwan's future activities in the international communities, and the Taiwan authority's new
mainland policies including one that deals with members of the Chinese Communist Party. Quansheng Zhao concentrates on the likely
impact of the unification process on China's political development and
democratization. He argues that the unification policy of "one country, two systems" proposed by Beijing, may well lead to the creation of
"one country, two (or more) parties," which is an unintended conse-
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quence of unification. Therefore, the prolonged evolutionary process
of unification is likely to promote China's political pluralization. Zhao
also discusses the suitability of a federal system for China, including
the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macao.
The second group of chapters discusses North-South relations in
Korea and the prospects for unification. George Totten and Yunghwan Jo review North-South relations for the last several decades in
detail, and raise three possible scenarios for the future development.
By making a brief comparison with the case of Germany, Totten and
Jo argue that a collapse of North Korea (the kind that happened to
East Germany) would not be in the interests of South Korea. Byungjoon Ahn argues that both the international environment and the situation in the South favor negotiations for unification, whereas the
North is ambivalent regarding negotiations. Sung-Joo Han believes
that South Korea has undergone a political transformation (for example, the merger of three parties into one large ruling party), which
makes it receptive to any reasonable proposals about improving
North-South Korea relations that the North can offer. Han further
discusses the new South Korean proposal, "a dual track plan": The
reunification of the people will precede the restoration of a unified
state.
The third country study is concerned with German politics and
unification. As Germany is a newly unified country, its experience
may provide a useful example to examine the prolonged, evolutionary
process of unification. Dirk Verheyen analyzes the issue of Germany
from a broad range of perspectives: German identity, German unity,
and the management of German power. Verheyen surveys not only
the current political development, but also its historical and cultural
roots, thereby providing a comprehensive picture of the German question and its likely development in the future.
Vietnam, the only country among the four to achieve unification
through military conquest after decades of war, is the focus of Gerard
Mare's chapter. Mare convincingly argues that even though Vietnam
achieved its goal of unification in 1975, a deep north-south cleavage
continues to skew and divide Vietnamese political life, and the two
societies remain distinct. This cleavage was caused by Hanoi's economic incompetence and political inability to penetrate and remold
the Southern society. Mare warns that other divided countries should
draw a lesson from the case of Vietnam - unification may bring not
only national unity but also a long period of self-absorption, frustration, dialectical adjustment, and electoral volatility, which may alter
the country's regional and international orientation.
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Finally, the concluding chapter focuses on possible outcomes and
implications for American foreign policy. Robert Sutter analyzes U.
S. interests in three dimensions: political-security, economic, and
political-ideological. While fundamentally optimistic about the future,
Sutter calls for a more prudent course for U.S. policy-makers that
would keep enough American strength available to deal with possible
contingencies and to check potentially adverse trends before they become major crises.
In sum, there are different paths leading to national unification
and conflict resolution. One is unification through military force
where one side takes over the other side entirely. This happened to
Vietnam in 1975, when the North took over the South and eliminated
all opposition forces. Another path to unification is peaceful evolution, which is a long process involving political, economic and cultural
exchanges between the two sides. These exchanges will eventually create an environment in which new political forces may emerge to promote further mutual understanding. This is the case of Germany,
where the goal of national unification was reached in 1990.
In the cases of China and Korea, the second path of unification peaceful evolution - is apparently the choice desired by the peoples of
both sides. Even though one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of
military action between Beijing and Taipei or Pyongyang and Seoul,
there are encouraging signs that the two countries may realize their
unification through peaceful and evolutionary means. The recent developments in Germany demonstrate that peaceful unification is a prolonged and evolutionary process. Political change and unification as
two different yet closely related processes may take place simultaneously. As several authors in this book point out, the process of unification itself may create a new environment for political development,
thereby promoting political pluralization.
There are close linkages between political and economic development. Enormous capital, advanced administrative personnel, and
technologies from the non-communist side (such as West Germany,
Taiwan, and South Korea) are increasingly needed by the communist
side. It is probable that mutual economic benefits, together with the
close cultural and geographic connection, will push bilateral private
economic exchanges to new levels. More importantly, economic development will stimulate each society's demand for political development. This pressure is one of the basic foundations of political
pluralization. Pluralistic development in the non-political fields of economics and culture will foster future political pluralization. Meanwhile, the development and consolidation of various political forces
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will provide favorable conditions for future political development,
leading to a gradual accommodation between the two sides. The process of unification, therefore, may have the unique function of serving
as a catalyst for political pluralization in the divided nations.
One important point worthy of a closer examination by future
studies, the achievement of the goals for national unification, as
demonstrated by the on-going experiences of Germany and Vietnam,
does not necessarily mean the end of conflict between the formerly
divided parts. Unification may only solve conflict in political and legal
dimensions, but not in economic, psychological, and cultural dimensions. The need for continuing work on conflict resolution has thus
remained.
The original idea for this collection arose during the course of the
1989 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Atlanta, where several authors of this volume participated in a panel
on the politics of divided nations. The panel was organized by Quansheng Zhao for the Asian Political Scientists Group. The chapters
written by Sung-Joo Han and Byung-joon Ahn on Korea were originally presented at the Asian-Pacific Dialogue in Honolulu sponsored
by the East-West Center and the University of Hawaii, and subsequently appeared in an East-West Center publication. The permission
from Charles Morrison of the East-West Center for the inclusion of
these two articles in this volume is appreciated. I would also like to
thank Jim McAdams and Wonmo Dong for valuable inputs at the
earlier stages, Paula Smith for research assistance, and Old Dominion
University, the East-West Center, and the United States Institute of
Peace for research support.

CHAPTER II
CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN AND
THE PROSPECT OF UNIFICATION*

Hungdah Chiu
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 1981, Marshall Yeh Jianyin, then Chairman of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and de
facto head of state of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 1 made a
specific nine-point proposal to Taiwan on unification. The proposal
offers Taiwan "a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative
region" after unification with the PRC. Taiwan can also retain its
armed forces. It also renewed its 1979 call for establishing "three
links" (mail, air and shipping services, and trade) and "four exchanges" (relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups,
and sports representatives) with Taiwan as a first step toward the ultimate goal of unification. 2 This proposal set forth the basic principles
of the Chinese Communists' unification policy toward Taiwan.
At a panel on unification of China of the 35th Annual Meeting of
the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) held at San Francisco, March
25-27, 1983, I made the following personal comments on Yeh's proposal as follows:
credible terms [for unification] should contain at least the
• The Wade-Giles system is used for Republic of China (Taiwan) names, places and
others, the Pinyin system is used for People's Republic of China (Mainland) na:nes, places
and others. This paper was originally published in Issues & Studies, Vol. 27, No. I
(January 1991), pp. 13-38 and reprinted with revisions for publication here with the
permission of the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University,
Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.
1. There is no head of state under the 1978 Chinese Constitution. According to Article 26, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress in fact exercises the function of the head of state. In 1982,
China enacted a new Constitution.
2. "Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaboration on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to
Motherland and Peaceful Reunification," Beijing Review, Vol. 24, No. 40 (October 5,
1981), p. 10. See "N.P.C. Standing Committee Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 5, 1979), pp. 16-17 for PRC's call for "three-links" and
"four exchanges."

(7)
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right to self-defense, including the right to purchase adequate defensive weapons, before and after unification; no
possibility of unilateral alteration of the settlement terms after unification; complete, not just "a high degree" of autonomy, and appropriate international status in foreign relations
and international organizations. If these terms could be offered, if the mainland could attain a certain degree of political stability and economic development, and if the people
there could enjoy considerable political and economic freedom, then the Chinese people in Taiwan would definitely be
willing to consider peaceful unification. 3
After the AAS meeting, one of the panelists, Professor Winston
L.Y. Yang of Seton Hall University, visited the Chinese mainland and
had a two-hour interview with Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission - the most powerful position in the PRC.
Deng said that after unification, Taiwan could continue to buy weapons abroad to sustain its own defense capability, "so long as they do
not constitute a threat to the mainland." Taiwan would also keep its
own judicial system, which would not be subject to control or review
by the PRC's Supreme Court. Deng, however, rejected the concept of
"complete autonomy" and placed two important limitations on the
"high degree of autonomy" offered by the PRC: (1) Taiwan can no
longer be called the "Republic of China" but would be called ChinaTaipei or China-Taiwan and (2) the PRC would be the sole representative for foreign affairs and international relations. On one specific issue, Deng said that "Taiwan" can remain a member of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) under the name "China-Taipei," after the
PRC's admission to that organization. 4
On June 22 and 23, 1984, during the period of Sino-British nego3. Hungdah Chiu, "Prospects for the Unification of China, An Analysis of the Views
of the Republic of China on Taiwan," Asian Survey, Vol. XXIII, No. 10 (October 1983), p.
1094.
4. Li-yu Yang (Winston Yang), "Deng Xiaoping's New Idea on Peaceful Unification
-A Two Hour Talk with Deng Xiaoping," Qishi Niandai (The Seventies), 1983, No. 8,
pp. 17-19. Reported in Michael Weisskopf, "New Proposals From Peking Being Offered to
Taiwan," Washington Post, July 30, 1983, p. A20; Edward A. Gargan, "Taiwan Could Buy
Arms Abroad After Unification, Deng Asserts," New York Times, August 21, 1983, p. 20
and commented on in Allen Whiting, "Deng's Bait to Taiwan," New York Times, August
23, 1983, p. 23. An excerpt of this interview, which omits the ADB issue and Taiwan's
right to purchase arms after unification but emphasizes rejection of "complete autonomy,''
is published in [Deng Xiaoping], Jianshe you Zhongguo tese di shehui zhuyi (On constructing socialism with distinctive Chinese features), Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1987,
pp. 15-17 [hereinafter On Constructing Socialism].

CHAPTER II

9

tiation on the question of returning Hong Kong to China in 1997,
Deng Xiaoping referred to its policy toward Hong Kong and Taiwan
as "one country, two systems," i.e., allowing both places to continue
their "capitalist system" after unification. 5
Despite the rejection by the Republic of China (ROC) of the
PRC's terms for unification, which is preconditioned on the ROC's
giving up its sovereignty, the PRC decided to implement its "one
country, two systems" policy with Hong Kong and is attempting to
use that as a model for unification with Taiwan.

II. THE HONG KONG MODEL FOR UNIFICATION AND
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S RESPONSE
On September 26, 1984, the United Kingdom (UK) and the PRC
initialed, after almost two years of negotiation, a Joint Declaration on
the Question of Hong Kong. 6 From the PRC's point of view, this
agreement is an example of successful implementation of the "one
country, two systems" policy advocated by Deng Xiaoping to serve as
the basis for incorporating Taiwan into the PRC. 7
The Joint Declaration spelled out in detail the PRC's policy toward Hong Kong, the post-1997 Hong Kong regime and its international relations. The highlights of the Declaration are as follows:
(1) After 1997, Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the PRC under Article 31 of the PRC
Constitution. It will enjoy a "high degree of autonomy" except in foreign and defense affairs.
5. On Constructing Socialism, ibid., pp. 41-42.
6. For the text of the agreement and related documents, see Hong Kong 1985, Hong
Kong: Government Publication Center, n.d., pp. 1-16; International Legal Materials, Vol.
23, No.6 (November 1984), pp. 1366-87; and, Hungdah Chiu, Y.C. Jao and Yuan-li Wu,
eds., The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond, Westport, Connecticut: The
Greenwood Press, 1987, pp. 181-196. The agreement was signed on December 19, 1984
and instruments of ratification were exchanged on May 27, 1985. Facts on File, 1985, Vol.
45, No. 2323 (May 31, 1985), p. 412, Col. A3.
7. See, Michael Weisskopf, "Peking Eyes Taiwan as Accord is Initialed," The Washington Post, September 27, 1984, p. A21. On November 6, 1984, in his report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian
said: "The nature of the Taiwan question and Hong Kong question is different, but the
idea of 'one country, two systems' is equally applicable to the settlement of the Taiwan
question. The settlement of the Hong Kong question will produce a far-reaching impact on
the Taiwan authorities and the Taiwan people and thus is beneficial to the promotion of the
early completion of the unification of the motherland." Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongbao (Gazette of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress), No. 5 (November 22, 1984), p. 10.
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(2) Hong Kong will be vested with executive, legislative
and independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication.
(3) Hong Kong's chief executive will be appointed by
the PRC after elections or consultation in Hong Kong. The
government of Hong Kong will be composed of local people.
(4) Hong Kong shall maintain the capitalist economic
and trade systems for 50 years after 1997.
( 5) The existing social and economic system will remain unchanged. Freedoms of speech, of movement, of the
press, of assembly, to strike, of religion, and others will be
protected by law. Similarly, private property rights will be
protected.
(6) Apart from displaying the national flag and national
emblem of the PRC, Hong Kong may use a regional flag and
emblem of its own.
(7) Hong Kong may participate in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements. It
may establish official and semi-official economic and trade
missions in foreign countries, using the name "Hong Kong,
China" to maintain and develop relations and to conclude
and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant
international organizations in appropriate fields.
(8) The PRC defense force stationed in Hong Kong
shall not interfere in the internal affairs of Hong Kong and
the expenditures for these military forces shall be borne by
the PRC's Central People's Government.
Under the above arrangements, Hong Kong will enjoy on the surface a "high degree of autonomy," but a closer analysis of the Declaration and the PRC's 1982 Constitution casts serious doubt on the
durability and credibility of such autonomy. First, under Article 1 of
Annex 1 of the Declaration, the PRC's National People's Congress
(NPC) shall enact a basic law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to guarantee the continuation of Hong Kong's capitalist
system and lifestyle for 50 years and other matters as provided in the
Joint Declaration. While under the PRC's law, Hong Kong may elect
roughly 40 delegates to the NPC; 8 the practical use and strength of 40
8. According to PRC law, city residents can elect one delegate for every 130,000 persons, while rural residents can elect one delegate for every 1,040,000 persons. See 1983
Zhongguo baike nianjian (1983 Yearbook of the Encyclopedia of China), Shanghai:
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Hong Kong delegates among the 3,000 delegates 9 in the NPC's decision-making process would be insignificant. Moreover, Article 67,
paragraph 4, of the 1982 Constitution 10 provides that the Standing
Committee of the NPC shall have the power "to interpret statutes,"
thus both legislative and interpretative powers regarding the basic law
for Hong Kong are in the hands of the NPC. Under such circumstances, the persistence of the so-called "high degree of autonomy" is
at the mercy of the NPC, and thus the commitment lacks a credible
guarantee.
Second, under Article 2, paragraph 1, of Annex 1 of the Declaration, "after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong . . . shall be
maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law. . . . " As
stated above, the Standing Committee of the NPC has the right to
"interpret statutes;" therefore, the Standing Committee could annul
those local Hong Kong laws it dislikes on the ground that they contravene the Basic Law.
Third, while Article 2, paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the Declaration
provides that the Hong Kong "Legislature may on its own authority
enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and
legal procedure," Article 67, paragraph 8 of the PRC Constitution
provides that the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power "to
annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state power
of .... _autonomous regions ... that contravene the Constitution, the
statutes or the administrative rules and regulations," thus effectively
placing a severe restraint on the power of the Hong Kong legislature.
Fourth, under Article 89, paragraph 14, of the PRC Constitution,
the State Council (Cabinet) has the power "to alter or annul inappropriate decisions and orders issued by local organs of state administration at different levels." Therefore, the PRC's State Council can
interfere, based on this legal foundation, with the Hong Kong government's administrative function at anytime if it chooses to do so.
Fifth, Article 1, paragraph 3 of Annex 1 of the Declaration provides that the "chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultation held
locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government." Since
the PRC has the final say on the appointment of their chief executive,
Xinhua Press, 1983, p. 226. Assuming all Hong Kong residents are considered city resi·
dents, its 5,147,900 population can elect roughly 40 delegates.
9. See, 1983 Yearbook of the Encyclopedia of China, supra, note 8, p. 227.
10. For the English translation of this constitution, see The Constitution of the People's
Republic of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983.
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to what extent the Hong Kong people can exercise their free will to
choose is open to serious doubt. In a country with a federal system
such as the United States, the election of the chief executive of a member state is the sole decision of the people of that state without any
participation of the central government. For instance, in the United
States, a governor of a state is elected by the people of that state, and
there is no way for the President or federal government to block that
selection.
In view of the above analysis, it is clear that the so-called "high
degree of autonomy" for Hong Kong has no credible guarantee and
the PRC can legally interfere with the legislative and administrative
operation of Hong Kong any time it chooses to do so.
On September 27, 1984, a day after the announcement of the
Joint Declaration, an editorial in the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that the Hong Kong
Declaration will "promote Taiwan's return to the motherland," and
noted that the same formula could be applicable to Taiwan. 11 The
ROC government and public opinion in Taiwan immediately rejected
this statement. On October 4, 1984, the Foreign Minister of the ROC,
Chu Fu-sung, told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative
Yuan (Congress) that the so-called theory of "one country, two systems" is nothing but a guise used to confuse foreign nations as the
Chinese Communists pursue their political plots. 12 He thus categorically rejected the Hong Kong model as the basis for unification. The
reason for this rejection is very simple. By agreeing to become a "special administrative region" of the PRC, the ROC would immediately
lose its sovereignty and international personality. Without sovereignty
and an international personality, there would be no legal restraints to
prevent the PRC from taking away what it promised Taiwan at the
time of unification.
In the case of Taiwan, the PRC leaders have stated that no military or administrative personnel will be sent to Taiwan after unification. There is, however, no credible guarantee to prevent the PRC
from doing so. During the Hong Kong negotiation, PRC leaders first
announced that no troops would be sent to Hong Kong after 1997, but
they later changed their minds. 13 Commenting on the credibility of
11.
12.
Service,
VI.
13.
3.

Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), September 27, 1984, pp. 1, 4.
"Foreign Minister Rejects Hong Kong Solution," Foreign Broadcast Information
Daily Report, China (hereinafter referred to as "FBIS, China"), October 5, 1984, p.

"Troops in Hong Kong in '97, China Says," The New York Times, May 26, 1984, p.
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the Chinese Communists, then ROC Premier Kuo-hua Yu said on
September 26, 1984:
To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hong Kong, the
Chinese Communists - fearful of resistance from the Chinese in Hong Kong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and
democracy - went out of their way to embellish an illusion
of "one country, two systems." They "promised that the
present Hongkong system would remain unchanged for 50
years, in order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of
Hongkong and Kowloon.
It is no secret that throughout the history of the Communists, there has never been any record established of their
good faith nor any "agreement" that was not later trashed.
No matter what the illusion the Chinese Communists attempt to create today, the basic policy identified in their
"four principles" [socialist road, people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought] is a sharp illustration of
the fact that Communism's totalitarian nature will never
change.
Freedom cannot be faked, nor can it be divided, nor
confined in fences. What the whole Chinese people seek is
an eternal, perfected, and fully realized state of well-being
nourished in freedom and democracy. 14
On April 28, 1988, PRC's Basic Law Drafting Committee published the "Draft Basic Law for Solicitation of Opinions," which undercuts the promise of a "high degree of autonomy" provided in the
1984 Joint Declaration. For instance, Article 17, paragraph 3, of the
Draft authorizes the PRC's State Council to apply Chinese laws in
Hong Kong in case of an "emergency" as decided by that Council,
thus effectively ending Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy." 15
The ROC government was not even interested in making an official denunciation of the Draft, and only the ruling Nationalist Party
made some comments in an editorial in its party newspaper:
14. Republic of China, A Reference Book, 1986, New York: Highlight International
New York, Inc., 1986, p. 469. See also, Yu-ming Shaw, "An ROC View on the Hong
Kong Question," in Jiirgen Domes and Yu-ming Shao, eds., Hong Kong: A Chinese and
International Concern, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 95-109.
15. For a comprehensive analysis of the Draft, see, Hungdah Chiu, ed., The Draft Basic
Law of Hong Kong: Analysis and Documents, Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 5-1988 (88).
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The basic principles of the [Draft Basic Law for Hong Kong]
are: (1) Adopting a comparatively free and open policy in
economic aspects; (2) taking strict control of [Hong Kong's]
politics; and (3) explicitly allowing freedoms of speech, publications and others, but subject to restrictions.... Moreover,
[Article 39] of the Draft states that those freedoms provided
in the Draft may be restricted on the ground of national security, public order, public health and public morals.... The
"one country, two systems" concept [to be implemented by]
the Chinese Communists in Hong Kong is aimed at Taiwan.
However, the tactics used by the Chinese Communists in
Hong Kong only make the Chinese in Taiwan know the true
face of Chinese Communists' "one country, two systems"
and therefore more resolutely resist Chinese Communists'
[attempt to unify Taiwan and the mainland]. 16
In February 1989, the Standing Committee of the PRC's National People's Congress published the Basic Law (Draft),t 7 which,
after further consultation and comments, would be revised and redrafted for submission to the National People's Congress for adoption.
The ROC government and the ruling Nationalist Party totally ignored
this document because it was absolutely unacceptable to them.
On April 4, 1990, the Basic Law was adopted by the PRC's National People's Congress.l 8 On April 20, 1990, then ROC Premier Li
Huan (the Premier spells his surname Lee) announced that the ROC
Government will not recognize this Law. 19

III. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S "THREE
LINKS" AND "FOUR EXCHANGES" AND THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S RESPONSE
The PRC's overture for "three links" and "four exchanges" has
great appeal to many people in Taiwan. Those who have family ties
16. "Editorial: More Restriction on Hong Kong by the Chinese Communists: Comment on the Draft Basic Law of Hong Kong," Chung-yang jih-pao (Central Daily News),
int'l. edition, May 9, 1988, p. 1.
17. Text published by the Secretariat of the Basic Law Consultation Committee.
18. For a summary of this law, see Ruan Ping, "Hong Kong Basic Law Guarantees
'One Country, Two Systems,'" Beijing Review, Vol. 33, No. 15 (April 9-15, 1990); pp. 7, 9
and Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Backs Some Autonomy in Hong Kong Code,'' New York
Times, April 5, 1990, p. A6. Complete text in Chinese is printed in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Overseas edition, April 7, 1990, pp. 1-2, 4.
19. Chung-yan Jih-pao (Central Daily News), international edition, April 22, 1990, p.
l.
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with people on the mainland would naturally like to visit their relatives. For others, who only learned about China from books, there is a
natural curiosity and nationalistic feeling toward visiting the Chinese
mainland. Taiwan businessmen are attracted by the opportunity of
opening a vast new market on the mainland. Under such circumstances, the ROC government is in a dilemma. If it categorically rejects the overture, this definitely would cause popular discontent in
Taiwan. If it responds positively to this overture, it may be seen as
impliedly acceding to the PRC's sovereign claim to Taiwan. There is
also the security concern that extensive contacts with the mainland
may facilitate the Communists' infiltration of Taiwan and undercut
the people's anti-communist will and vigilance. This concern is especially important, from the ROC's point of view, because the Chinese
Communists have refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.
Moreover, on August 17, 1982, under PRC pressure, the United States
signed a joint communique to limit the quality and quantity of its arm
sales to Taiwan. 20 In view of this dilemma, the ROC has taken an
indirect and limited, yet positive, response to the PRC's overture for
"three links" and "four exchanges."
In the early 1980's, the ROC quietly allowed indirect trade between Taiwan and the mainland to develop and finally legitimized
such trade in 1985. It also permitted scientists and others from Taiwan to sit down with their PRC counterparts at international meetings. The ROC allowed indirect mail exchanges and did not prosecute
ordinary people who quietly visited their relatives on the mainland.
On March 23, 1981, the ROC agreed to have the Republic of China's
Olympic Committee renamed as the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee,21 thus making it possible for athletes from both the mainland and
Taiwan to compete in international sports activities.
After the signing of the August 17, 1982 Taiwan arm sales restriction communique, the ROC confronted a serious security problem.
One can expect the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to gradually
shift in the PRC's favor as Taiwan's weaponry ages and the PRC gains
access to U.S. and European weaponry. This concern was partially
resolved in 1985-1986 when the U.S. permitted its industries to transfer military technology to Taiwan. 22
With the resolution of this basic security issue and generally
favorable response from indirect contacts with the mainland, the ROC
20. New York Times, August 18, 1982, p. A12.
21. See Chinese Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 1 (1981), pp. 145-146.
22. "U.S. Industry Aiding Taiwan in Developing National Fighter to Meet Threat
from the PRC, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 31, 1986, p. 31.
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moves toward a more positive response to PRC's "three links" and
"four exchanges."
On July 16, 1987, the ROC government formally lifted the ban on
direct tourist visits to Hong Kong to facilitate people from Taiwan
meeting their relatives from the mainland.23 On October 15, 1987, the
Central Standing Committee of the ruling Nationalist Party approved
a new policy to allow people living in Taiwan to visit their relatives on
the Chinese mainland. On November 2, 1987, the Red Cross Society
of the Republic of China began to handle the applications for mainland visits and to provide assistance to people who want to locate their
relatives on the mainland. 24 Soon after, mail exchanges through Hong
Kong were permitted. On June 10, 1989, direct mail exchanges with
the mainland began. 25 In 1988, the ROC began to allow a limited
number of mainland Chinese to visit their sick relatives in Taiwan or
to attend their funeral services. 26
Trade between the mainland and Taiwan has flourished since the
early 1980's. The total volume of trade between 1979 to 1986 was
about 4 billion U.S. dollars. In 1987 alone it was 1.6 billion, and in
1988 it jumped to 2.4 billion. 27
In April 1989, the ROC began to allow its reporters to visit the
mainland and considered allowing mainland reporters to visit
Taiwan. 28
23. "Restrictions Lifted on HK Travel in Wake of ROC's 'Momentous Day,'" The
Free China Journal, Vol. IV, No. 28 (July 20, 1987), p. 1.
24. See, "Mainland Visits Policy Comes from 'Heart,'" FBIS. China, October 19,
1987, p. 38; "Red Cross Begins Mainland Contacts Service," ibid., October 21, 1987, p. 30;
Ma Hsia-mian, "Thousands of Taiwan Residents Packing for Trip to Mainland," The Free
China Journal, Vol. IV, No. 42 (October 26, 1987), p. 1; and Mei Hsin-ti, "Red Cross
Society Starts Check on Thousands of Mainland Kin," ibid., No. 44 (November 9, 1987), p.
3.
25. Shao-nian chung-kuo cheng-pao (China Daily News), Monterey Park, California,
July 29, 1989, p. 4.
26. In 1988, there were 389 Chinese from the mainland who went to Taiwan to visit
their sick relatives or attend funerals. See "Press Conference of Ding Guangen, Director of
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council," Taisheng (Voice of Taiwan), 1989, No. 3,
p.6.

27. Ibid.
28. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989, the ROC decided to postpone its decision to allow PRC reporters to visit Taiwan. After the massacre it became
clear that mainland reporters were under the total control of the PRC government and
could not report Taiwan's situation in a reasonably objective way. Chung-yang Jih-pao
(Central Daily News), international edition, August 7, 1989, p. 1. On August 1, 1990, the
ROC lifted the ban on PRC reporters visiting Taiwan. However, it still requires those
reporters to renounce their membership in the Chinese Communist Party before being ad-

CHAPTER II

17

In view of the above stated development, it appears that the
PRC's "three links" and "four exchanges" peace overture to Taiwan
has been relatively successful. But, would such developments lead, as
the PRC expects, to unification under Yeh's nine-point proposal and
Deng's "one country, two systems" formula?

IV. THE PROSPECT OF UNIFICATION UNDER THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S TERMS
Increasing contacts and reduction of tensions between Taiwan
and the mainland under the so-called "three links" and "four exchanges" definitely have created an atmosphere beneficial to the unification goal. However, such a development alone will not lead to
political unification under the PRC's terms as will be analyzed and
explained below.
The PRC's terms for unification and its promise for a "high degree of autonomy" after unification are preconditioned on the ROC's
relinquishment of its sovereignty and its agreement to become a "special administrative region" of the PRC. There is no credible guarantee
to prevent the PRC from repudiating its promise after unification.
The so-called guarantee of the Basic Law and Article 31 of the 1982
PRC Constitution, 29 as demonstrated by the history of the drafting of
the Hong Kong Basic Law, is nothing but a farce. As a matter offact,
how long any PRC Constitution will last is highly questionable; the
present Constitution is the fifth official text since the establishment of
the PRC. 30
Moreover, since 1979, PRC leaders have spoken of using force
mitted to Taiwan. As a result, none of them have applied to visit Taiwan yet. See "M'land
Media Still Shy," Free China Journal, Vol. VII, No. 60 (August 9, 1990), p. 1.
29. a. following comment by an ROC writer:
Article 31 of Communist China's Constitution is the base melody in the Communists' orchestrated effort to solve the "Taiwan problem," i.e., destroy the Republic
of China and establish Communist China's "sovereignty" over Taiwan. What
deserves special notice is this: the "special administrative districts" are to be established "when necessary" and when the necessity is no longer operative, they
may be abolished. The entire system to be practiced there will be "stipulated by
law" by the Chinese Communists. In due course it may be revised or eliminated
"by law." The strategy employed here is one of absolutely gradual, step-by-step
encroachment. The ambition and the cunning that lie behind it need no
comment.
ICM Staff Writer, "Some Key Points in the New Constitution," Inside China Mainland
Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, January 1983, Supplement, p. 2.
'
30. The following table will illustrate this point:
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against Taiwan on a number of occasions. 31 On June 10, 1982, then
Premier Sun Yun-suan responded, quoting President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, that the ROC would never negotiate out of
fear. 32 On February 22, 1988, President Li Teng-hui (the President
spells his surname Lee) also stated at a press conference:
Stability on the Taiwan Straits is not a unilateral issue. The
mainland side, while continuing to follow the "four cardinal
principles," has never rejected the use of force as a means to
liberate or reunify Taiwan, or to maintain the status quo. I
believe that if the well-being of the one billion Chinese peol) 1949 Common Program

of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative
Conference (Provisional
Constitution)
2) 1954 Constitution

Replaced by the 1954 Constitution

When the Great Proletarian Cultural Resolution
broke out in 1966, this Constitution was in fact
suspended and later formally replaced by the
1975 Constitution.
This draft was allegedly put out by Lin Biao,
3) Draft 1970
then Defense Minister and Vice-Chairman of the
Constitution
Party. It was distributed nationwide for discussion but was recalled after the failure of the
alleged Lin Biao coup against Mao in the fall of
1971.
This was later called the "Gang of Four" Consti4) 1975 Constitution
tution and after the fall of the "Gang" in October 1976, it appeared to be ignored. In fact it
lasted less than 2 years (17 January 1975 to
October 1976). It was replaced by the 1978 Constitution.
Adopted by the National People's Congress on 5
5) 1978 Constitution
March 1978. On 1 July 1979, Articles 34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 42, and 43 were amended. The present
Constitution replaced it on 4 December 1982. It
thus lasted only 4 years and 9 months.
December 4, 1982 - present
6) 1982 Constitution
Hungdah Chiu, "The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law," Review
of Socialist Law, Vol. 11 (1985), pp. 144-145.
31. Between January 1979 and July 1981, Chinese leaders and official sources at least
spoke ten times on the use of force against Taiwan. See Chinese Yearbook of International
Law and Affairs, Vol. 1 (1981), pp. 14-16. On October 11, 1984, Chinese Communist
leader Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) said that the PRC could institute a military
blockade against Taiwan. "Deng Warns of 'Eruption' in U.S.-China Ties Over Taiwan,"
The New York Times, October 12, 1984, p. AS. On April3, 1987, Chinese Deputy Minister
Qian Qisheng again said that the PRC cannot promise to rule out "non-peaceful means" to
resolve the Taiwan question. Beimei Ribao (Peimei News), New York, April 4, 1987, p. l.
32. Lien Ho-pao (United Daily News), international edition, June 12, 1982, p. 3; English translation in The China Issue and China's Reunification, published by the ROC Government Information Office.
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pie is taken into account, the old concept of using force to
coerce the other side into reunification must be abandoned.
Taiwan, as a complex area, will react to whatever pressure
befalls it. Thus I don't believe this question can be resolved
by the use of pressure, and this is very important. 33
Furthermore, there are wide political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the mainland and Taiwan; unless such gaps narrow
with the passage of time, the conditions for peaceful unification can
never gradually mature. Unfortunately, since the suppression of the
student movement for more democracy and press freedom in late
1986, 34 which culminated in June 1989 massacre of student demonstrators in Beijing, 35 the gaps between the mainland and Taiwan have
been widening rather than narrowing.
Finally, the ROC has been steadily moving toward a multiparty
democratic system, 36 and the ROC government cannot ignore public
opinion and popular will when reaching a unification agreement on the
PRC terms. There has been almost no popular support for Yeh's ninepoint proposal for unification or Deng's "one-country, two systems"
concept in Taiwan.
V. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S POLICY TO
ISOLATE TAIWAN FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AND THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA'S COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
While the PRC has taken positive steps to increase contacts and
to improve mutual understandings with Taiwan, it nevertheless has
not ceased its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. In March
1982, the PRC Foreign Ministry notified many countries that they
should not establish representative agencies in Taiwan and vice
33. "Text of President Li's 22 Feb. News Conference," FBIS, China, March 1, 1988, p.
34.
34. E.g., see Edward A. Gargan, "Thousands Stage Rally in Shanghai Demanding
Rights," New York Times, December 21, 1986, pp. 1, 19; "China Denounces Student Protests as 'Illegal Acts,'" ibid., December 22, 1986, pp. A1, A14; "Beijing Imposes Rules
Banning Protests in City," ibid., December 27, 1986, pp. 1, 4; "Chinese Officials Criticize
Protests,'' ibid., December 30, 1986, p. AS; and "Chinese Students End Their Marches,''
ibid., December 31, 1986, p. AS.
35. See, infra, note 44 and accompanying text.
36. See John F. Copper, A Quiet Revolution, Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public
Policy Center, 1988 and Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, Political and Social Change
in the Republic of China, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1989.
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versa. 37 Since Taiwan's economy relies heavily on international trade,
the lack of foreign representative agencies in Taiwan will be a great
inconvenience for businessmen. Moreover, the PRC, which has successfully driven Taiwan from all United Nations' affiliated international organizations, has continued to exert pressure on other
international organizations to oust the ROC.
In 1983, Deng Xiaoping appeared to be willing to reconsider this
policy of isolating Taiwan from the international community when he
told Professor Winston L.Y. Yang that, after the admission of the
PRC to the ADB, Taiwan can retain its seat under "Taipei, China." 38
In March 1986, the PRC was admitted to the ADB without ousting
the ROC, though the latter had to change its name to "Taipei,
China." 39 The ROC, then under late President Chiang Ching-kuo,
protested this change of its name, but did not withdraw from the
ADB. In May 1989, when the ADB held its annual meeting in Beijing, the ROC's new President, Li Teng-hui, approved its delegation to
participate, though still protesting the change of the ROC's name. 40
Many in Taiwan hope that the ADB formula can be applied similarly to Taiwan's participation in other international organizations, so
as to resolve one of the basic issues of unification. However, a statement issued by the PRC's Foreign Ministry on December 19, 1988,
explicitly said:
Back in 1971, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution which restored the legitimate seat of the
People's Republic of China in this world body. Accordingly,
the United Nations has expelled Taiwan from all its organizations, and the offices of organizations of the UN system
must not have any dealings with Taiwan. This principle also
applies to other inter-governmental, international organizations. As for individual intergovernmental international organizations, for instance, the Asian Development Bank, the
Taiwan authorities are allowed to join it in the name of
"Taipei, China," subject to agreement reached through consultations between the Chinese Government and the international organization concerned. This is only a kind of special
37. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), March 19, 1982, reprinted in Xinhua Yuebao (New
China Monthly), 1982, No. 3, p. 195.
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
39. People's Daily, May 2-3, 1986, reprinted in New China Monthly, 19S6, No. 5, pp.
193-194.
40. "ROC Officials Going to Mainland Meeting of ADB," Free China Journal, Vol.
VI, No. 25 (April 10, 1989), p. 1.

CHAPTER

II

21

arrangement and cannot be regarded as a model universally
applicable to other intergovernmental, international
organizations. 41
The PRC's policy to exclude Taiwan from international organizations is undercutting its attempt to win over Chinese people in Taiwan
for the cause of unification. This is because many people in Taiwan
feel, as long as Taiwan maintains its "one China" policy and accepts
the ultimate goal of unification, there is no reason to exclude their
participation in international organizations. Many of the international
organizations in which Taiwan wishes to participate are non-political,
but essential to Taiwan's economic and social development (such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Civil
Aviation Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization
and many others). Arrangements can be made, as in the ADB
formula, to avoid the "two Chinas" issues in which the PRC has a
legitimate concern.
The PRC also blocks Taiwan's participation in multilateral international conventions. For instance, the ROC on Taiwan is the thirteenth leading trading country of the world, but it is unable to become
a contracting party to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods. 42
Furthermore, the PRC uses economic aid to solicit countries one
by one to establish diplomatic relations with it and to sever diplomatic
relations with the ROC. In 1981, there were only 23 countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC. 43 However, since the early
1980's the rapid economic development of the ROC has attracted the
attention of some third world countries that have diplomatic relations
with the PRC. A few of them were interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC in order to get some economic and technical assistance. Ironically, the ROC insisted that they must sever
relations with the PRC before establishing diplomatic relations with
the ROC in order to avoid a "two Chinas" situation. This condition
was unacceptable to those countries. 44 This policy was criticized se41. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), overseas edition, December 20, 1988, p. 1; English
translation in Press Release of the PRC Embassy, Washington, D.C., No. 24 (December
20, 1988).
42. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 19
(1980), pp. 671-695.
43. See, Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 1 (1981), p. 13.
44. Surinam was interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1980,
but could not accept the ROC condition of severing diplomatic relations with the PRC
first.
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verely by legislators and scholars in the ROC. 45 In the meantime, the
PRC stepped up its diplomatic offensive against the ROC. Between
1983 and 1987, four countries severed diplomatic relations with the
ROC and established diplomatic relations with the PRC, i.e., Lesotho,
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Uruguay. Under strong domestic pressure, the
ROC in 1989 changed its policy and estaolished diplomatic relations
with Grenada, Liberia and Belize46 without demanding the severance
of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC, however, considered
that such a situation would create "two Chinas" and thus suspended
its diplomatic relations with these countries. 47 The PRC also accused
the ROC of pursuing a "two Chinas" policy, 48 which the ROC categorically denied. 49
The PRC's policy to isolate Taiwan from the international community would ironically help the elements of the "Taiwan Independence Movement" to promote their cause. They can make a
seemingly convincing, though unrealistic, argument that only when
Taiwan becomes independent, can it break its present international
isolation, as will be discussed in the last part of this paper.
45. At the hearings on foreign policy of the ROC at the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the Legislative Yuan held on April 13 and 14, 1988, almost all scholars who testified opposed the ROC government's policy of requiring a country to sever its diplomatic relations
with the PRC before it could establish diplomatic relations with the ROC. Almost all
legislators shared this view. For the text of the testimonies and discussions of the hearings,
see Chung-kuo kuo-chi-fa yu kuo-chi shi-wu nien-pao (Chinese Yearbook of International
Law and Affairs), Vol. 3 (1987-1988), Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1989, pp. 107177.
46. On July 20, 1989, Grenada established diplomatic relations with the ROC; on October 9, 1989, Liberia resumed its diplomatic relations with the ROC which were suspended on February 24, 1979; and, on October 11, 1989, Belize established diplomatic
relations with the ROC. See "Diplomatic Ties Established with Grenada," FBIS, China,
July 21, 1989, pp. 50-51; Lien-ho pao (United Daily News), overseas edition, October 3,
1989, p. 1 (Liberia) and Shih-jiejih-pao (World Journal), October 13, 1989, p. 1 (Belize),
respectively.
47. On August 8, 1989, the PRC suspended its diplomatic relations with Grenada; on
October 10, 1989, with Liberia and on October 23, 1989, with Belize. See, Renmin Ribao,
overseas edition, October 8, 1989, p. 1 (Grenada); "Diplomatic Relations with Liberia Suspended," FB/S, China, October 10, 1989, p. 17 and World Journal, October 24, 1989, p. 1
(Belize), respectively.
48. E.g., see, "Government's 'Flexible' Foreign Policy Criticized," FB/S, China, November 6, 1989, p. 65 and "Taiwan's 'Silver Bullet Diplomacy' Viewed," [Yuan Yang,
"Comment on Taiwan Authorities' 'Silver Bullet Diplomacy,'" Liaowang Overseas Edition, No. 44, October 30, 1989), FB/S, China, November 17, 1989, pp. 49-50.
49. E.g., see, President Li Teng-hui's National Day message of October 10, 1989,
where he severely condemned the concept of Taiwan independence. Central Daily News,
int'l. ed., October 11, 1989, p. 1.
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VI. THE TIANANMEN SQUARE MASSACRE AND ITS
INFLUENCE ON TAIWAN-MAINLAND RELATIONS
As analyzed in previous sections, before the June 4, 1989,
Tiananmen massacre, there already had existed several almost irreconcilable differences between the PRC and the ROC on the terms of unification. Although the PRC's "three links" and "four exchanges"
overture and the resulting ROC step-by-step positive response to it
gradually have reduced tensions between Taiwan and the mainland,
this creates a false impression that both sides are moving toward rapprochement and the unification goal.
The two basic issues between the PRC and the ROC are: (1) the
ROC considers the PRC's promise unreliable and the so-called constitutional guarantee a farce; and (2) political, economic and social development in Taiwan and the mainland are moving in opposite
directions. Taiwan under the ROC is moving in the direction of Westem style democracies with free trade and a free enterprise economy,
while the PRC decides to retain its dictatorial system and allows only
very limited economic freedom.
On June 4, 1989, when Chinese students were exercising their
constitutional rights of freedom of speech, assembly and demonstration50 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the Chinese Communist government ordered its military forces to use tanks and machine guns to
massacre them, resulting in thousands of casualties. 51 Moreover, after
this tragedy, the PRC has engaged in a large scale disinformation campaign to distort the facts, 52 claiming at first that not a single student
was killed and then saying only a few students were killed. 53 This
atrocity shocked the whole world and further proves, from the ROC's
point of view, that the Chinese Communists are totally unreliable.
50. Article 35 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution provides: "Citizens of the People's
Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
procession and of demonstration." The Laws of the People's Republic of China, Vol. 1
(1979-1982), Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987, p. 12.
51. This massacre is reported in almost all newspapers. FBIS, China has an extensive
collection of media reports on this subject in its June 5, 1989 issue. See also, "Beijing
Bloodbath," Newsweek, June 12, 1989, pp. 24-29; "Despair and Death in a Beijing Square,"
Time, June 12, 1989, pp. 24-27; "Reign of Terror," Newsweek, June 19, 1989, pp. 14-22.
52. E.g., see, "Dealing Death With a Big Lie, China's leaders deny that the massacre
occurred- and condemned some of the survivors to execution," Newsweek, June 26, 1989,
pp. 26-28; Jill Smolowe, "China, Deng's Big Lie, The Hard-liners Rewrite history to justify
arrests and bury democracy," Time, June 26, 1989, pp. 32-34; "Expert tells how Chinese
are turning lies into truth," The Sun, Baltimore, August 15, 1989, p. 2A.
53. John Suhidlovsky, "China raises students' death toll," The Sun, Baltimore, July 1,
1989, pp. lA, 2A.
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Soon after the massacre, Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General
Zhao Ziyang was removed from power54 and the Chinese mainland
entered a period of political and economic instability. 5 5
On June 27, 1989, Tang Shubei, Deputy Director of the Taiwan
Affairs Office of the State Council stated that the Chinese Communist
Party and government will not change the basic national policy for the
solution of the Taiwan question, i.e., "peaceful reunification and one
country, two systems." But he blamed Taiwan for repeatedly expressing "support" to what he called "an extremely small number of people who created the counterrevolutionary riot in Beijing." 56 The
PRC's media also launched an attack on Taiwan for supporting the
students' democratic movement. 57 The PRC's security agencies also
arrested several so-called Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist
Party) agents on the mainland for alleged involvement in the recent
turmoil, i.e., the democratic movement on the mainland. 58
The ROC's response to the democratic movement on the Chinese
Mainland has been very cautious in order not to give the PRC an excuse to renew its military threat against Taiwan. While severely condemning the atrocity committed by the Chinese Communist military
forces in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent mass arrests and executions, 59 the ROC has made it clear that it does not consider the
54. Michael Weisskopf, "Chinese Communist Party Ousts Zhao as Chief in Wide
Shake-Up," Washington Post, June 25, 1989, pp. Al, A25.
55. E.g., see, Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Communist Party Calls for Purge," New
York Times, June 26, 1989, p. AS; Daniel Southerland, "China's Economy May Renew
Strife," Washington Post, June 28, 1989, pp. Al, Al8.
56. "PRC Official Says Taiwan Policy Unchanged," FBIS, China, June 28, 1989, p. 71.
57. E.g., see, "Taiwan Authorities Stir Up Anticommunist Wave," FB/S, China, June
26, 1989, p. 83.
58. E.g., see, "Mainland Detains KMT 'Agents'; Profile Given," FBIS, China, June 23,
1989, p. 42.
59. E.g., President Li Teng-hui issued a statement on June 4, 1989, stating:
With a deeply grieved and heavy heart, I wish, on behalf of the government
and people of the Republic of China, to summon all the peace-loving nations and
people of the world who share a concern for human rights to sternly condemn the
Chinese Communists; to demand they put an immediate stop to this bloody massacre; and to demand they offer their best care and relief to the wounded and
families of the dead.
I also summon all Chinese people at home and abroad to put their great love
for their countrymen into practice, to closely unite and act as a backup for our
mainland compatriots in their struggle for survival and freedom, to support and
assist them in every way possible, and to make a complete break with the Chinese
Communists.
The Free China Journal, Vol. VI, No. 42 (June 8, 1989), p. 1.

CHAPTER

II

25

mainland under Communist rule as a belligerent60 and it will not attempt to launch a military attack against the mainland. 61 On July 20,
1989, President Li Teng-hui severely condemned the Chinese Communists' bloody crackdown on the democratic movement on the mainland and called upon all countries to morally and materially support
the democracy movement on the Chinese mainland, 62 but he did not
mention any belligerent or subversive actions against the PRC. Earlier then ROC's Premier, Li Huan, also denied that his government
instigated the recent turmoil on the mainland. 63 These responses appear to suggest that the ROC on Taiwan does not want to increase
tension in its relations with the PRC, but after the Tiananmen Square
Massacre it does want to slow down its recent policy to increase contacts with the mainland. 64 For instance, it indefinitely postponed considerations to allow mainland reporters to visit Taiwan. 65 Both sides,
however, have decided to maintain their present mutually beneficial
trade relations. 66
VII. THE DECEMBER 2,1989 ELECTION IN TAIWAN AND
THE RISE OF THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT
In the 1983 election for the Legislative Yuan, the candidates who
later formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) jointly espoused
a platform that advocated, among other points, "self-determination
for Taiwan." After the formation of the DPP, the new party platform
said that "the future of Taiwan should be decided jointly by all the
inhabitants there." Many believe both platforms are just a euphemism
for "Taiwan independence." However, before the December 2, 1989
Legislative Yuan, Provincial Assembly, Taipei and Kaohsiung City
Councils, and City Magistrates election, a faction of the DPP called
New Tide formed a "New Country Front" and publicly advocated
60. "Cabinet Says Mainland Not Considered Belligerent," FB/S, China, June 16, 1989,
p. 68.

61. "Taiwan Not to Consider 'Military Counterattack,'" FBIS, China, June 19, 1989,
p. 63; "Premier Stresses No Military Attack on Mainland," FB/S, China, June 21, 1989, p.
79.
62. "President Li Supports Mainland Democracy Movement,'' FB/S, China, July 21,
1989, p. 49.
63. "PRC Charges of Taiwan Instigation Refuted,'' FB/S, China, June 15, 1989, p. 69.
64. "'Relaxation' of Mainland Policy Still Slow," FB/S, China, July 17, 1989, p. 69.
65. "No Entry for Mainland Journalists," FB/S, China, July 17, 1989, p. 69.
66. See, "Mainland Trade Policy with Taiwan Unchanged," FBIS, China, June 29,
1989, p. 59; "Commentary Reaffirms Commitment to Trade," FB/S, China, July 24, 1989,
p. 83; "Trade Official Interviewed on Mainland Trade," FB/S, China, June 30, 1989, p. 57.
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"Taiwan Independence." The PRC, through its controlled media, severely criticized this view. 67 Finally, an article published in the
Liaowang (The Outlook) Weekly of November 27, 1989, implied the
use of force could be used to eliminate the Taiwan independence
movement by stating:
The flood of thought of "Taiwan independence" on the island will cause some very bad influences to the development
of relations across the strait and for the Taiwan authorities.
1. To some extent, it will disrupt the stable development of Taiwan. At present, Taiwan is at the stage of political change, transforming itself from the despotic and
totalitarian "anticommunist martial law system" to an "incomplete" form of "democratic politics." Owing to the escalation of speeches and activities for "Taiwan independence,"
the ruling authority in Taiwan has been "shaken." This will
necessarily intensify the "struggle between reunification and
independence" and cause a tense relation between the Kuomintang and the opposition forces. Under external and internal pressure, the Kuomintang will find that it cannot
tolerate the open activities for "Taiwan independence,"
which will weaken and shake the foundation of its rule. Recently, the Kuomintang authorities have announced that
"any words or activities advocating 'Taiwan independence'
must shoulder legal responsibility," and that the persons involved will be investigated and prosecuted. This will cause
opposition or even conflict between both sides, and bring
about "chaotic" clashes in the election for government posts
in the end of this year, making Taiwan's already confused
67. E.g., see following table:
News Media
Date
New China
October 27,
New Agency
1989
New China
November 7,
News Agency
1989

Title of Article
There is Only One China is Our Unshaken
Stand
View
on
"Taiwan"
Unbridled
Independence" within Island of Taiwan
Causing Attention
Wen Hui Po,
November 8,
Behind the Unbridled Activities of Taiwan
1989
Independence [Movement]
Hong Kong
==~==~------~~-----China News
November 17,
Watching "Election Campaign" Across the
Agency
1989
Sea
China News
November 23,
Opposing "Taiwan Independence" is the
Agency
1989
Joint Responsibility of Both Sides of the
Strait

Source: World Journal, November 26, 1989, p. 7
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situation at the stage of political change even more confused
and jeopardizing the stable development of Taiwan in every
aspect.
2. It will . . . jeopardize . . . the development of relations across the strait. In the past few years, relations across
the strait have become less tense, and various exchanges, including visits by relatives across the strait, have developed;
this is beneficial to China's reunification and is in conformity
with the interests of the Chinese people. "Taiwan independence" or the "Republic of Taiwan" will not be permitted by
the PRC authorities and will not be accepted by the absolute
majority of compatriots in the mainland. If it really happens, the PRC authorities must respect the will of the people
in the whole country and react forcefully; this, I am afraid,
would not be for the well-being of the people in Taiwan. At
present, some people in Taiwan think that by relying on the
factors such as support from the United States, even if Taiwan announces independence, the PRC will not "dare to use
force." This is a very dangerous thought. To conclude,
"Taiwan independence" can only bring disaster to Taiwan
people, not welfare.
3. It will increase difficulties for the opposition forces.
The radical advocators of "Taiwan independence" can only
create a "bad image" for themselves and their allies, scare
away some people, and lose some votes in the election to be
held at the end of this year. At the same time, they can only
cause disputes and internal strife within the opposition forces
or even within the Democratic Progressive Party to the extent that their normal growth is affected. . . .68
Despite the PRC warning, candidates of the "New Country
Front" did surprisingly well in the election as indicated in the following table:
68. Yao Yiping, "Guarding Against the Ideological Trends of 'Taiwan Independence'
on the Island," Liaowang (The Outlook), overseas edition, No. 48 (November 27, 1989), p.
22; translated in "Liaowang Speculates on Use of Force," FBIS, China, November 29,
1989, p. 54.

28

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

Le~slators

Ma~strates

Taiwan
Provincial
Assembly

Total
Number
of Seats

101

21

77

51

43

New

Number of
Candidates

15

2

8

6

5

County

Elected

8

3

6

4

Front

Percentage
of Popular
Votes

4.81%

9.96%

6.47%

City

7.79%

5.17%

Taipei
City
Council

Kaobsiung
City
Council

Source: Chung-kuo Shih-2.ao (China Times), December 4, 1989, E· 2.

If this trend for supporting Taiwan independence continues,
tension in the Taiwan Strait will increase. Ironically, it is the PRC's
policy to isolate Taiwan from the international community that helps
the advocates of Taiwan independence, because they can make a
seemingly convincing argument that only when Taiwan becomes
independent can it break its present international isolation. At
present, only a minority of people in Taiwan are convinced of this
view. However, if Taiwan's international isolation engineered by the
PRC continues, more people, out of frustration, may support the cause
of Taiwan independence.

VIII.

NEW INITIATIVE FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
TO BREAK THE MAINLAND-TAIWAN
STALEMATE AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S
RESPONSE

In order to break the stalemate in mainland-Taiwan relations,
President Li Teng-hui took a new initiative in his inaugural speech of
May 20, 1990. 69 After reaffirming the position that "Taiwan and the
mainland are indivisible parts of China's territory ... and all Chinese
should work together to seek peaceful and democratic means to
achieve our common goal of national reunification," 70 he stated:
I would like at this point to earnestly declare that, if the Chinese communist authorities can recognize the overall world
trend and the common hope of all Chinese, implement polit69. "Reportage on Li Teng-hui Inauguration Activities, Li Teng-hui Sworn in 20
May," FB/S, China, May 21, 1990, pp. 61-63.
70. Ibid., p. 62.
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ical democracy and a free economic system, renounce the use
of military force in the Taiwan Strait and not interfere with
our development of foreign relations on the basis of a oneChina policy, we would be willing, on a basis of equality, to
establish channels of communication, and completely open
up academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific, and technological exchange, to lay a foundation of mutual respect,
peace, and prosperity. We hope then, when objective conditions are ripe, we will be able to discuss our national reunification, based on the common will of the Chinese people on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 71
Two days later, at his press conference, President Li stated that
"it is not necessary that all the three conditions I put forward are met
before we can improve relations with the Mainland China," and "issues can be dealt with one by one.'m He gave two examples of how
the Chinese Communist authorities could show their sincerity toward
Taiwan: refrain from opposing Taiwan's membership73 in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and pull back their armed
forces along coastal areas by 300 kilometers (about 187 miles). 74
On June 11, 1990, Jiang Zemin, General Secretary ofthe Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee, responded to Lee's appeal at
his speech delivered at the opening ceremony of a national conference
on the work of the united front. Jiang repeated the earlier call for
"talks on a reciprocal basis between the Chinese Communist Party
and the Kuomintang [KMT, Nationalist Party]," but made a minor
concession on allowing other parties to participate in the talk. He said
that before the negotiation between the Communist Party and the
Kuomintang could get underway, all political parties and people's organizations must be consulted; during the negotiations, they would be
well-informed and their opinions would be solicited. Representatives
from these parties and people's organizations may also be invited to
attend the negotiations. Jiang rejected the "one China, two governments" concept, 75 which he apparently considered as implied in Presi71. Ibid., p. 63.
72. "President Li Teng-hui Holds News Conference," FBIS, China, May 24, 1990, p.
68.
73. In early 1990, the Republic of China applied to join the GATT under the name of
"Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Customs Territory." See, "ROC GATT Title A
Mouthful," Free China Journal, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January 8, 1990), p. 1.
74. See, supra, note 72.
75. "Party Chief Stands for One China and Two-Party Negotiation," Beijing Review,
Vol. 33, No. 25 (June 18-24, 1990), p. 7.
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dent Li's calling on establishing "channels of communication" on "a
basis of equality."
Jiang also said that the exchange of mail, trade, and air and shipping services should be realized prior to formal negotiations and that
specific problems that emerge in the exchanges may be dealt with
through consultations between appropriate authorities. He did not,
however, respond to President Li's call for not opposing Taiwan's
membership at the GATT76 and pulling out troops from the coast. He
also criticized President Li's call for the Chinese Communists to implement political democracy and a free economic system by pointing
out that "some of [Li's] remarks ... were quite improper and lacked
sincerity. " 77
While Jiang's response to Li's initiative was generally negative,
the tune of his speech was mild and moderate. Articles before and
subsequently appearing on PRC-controlled medias, however, severely
criticized President Li's position. 78
The ROC responded to Jiang's June 11, 1990 speech on the same
day. Commenting on Jiang's speech, Chiu Chin-i, spokesman of the
ROC Presidential Office, stated that President Li's speech made no
mention of "one country, two governments," and the Chinese Communists' strong criticism and their response, which indicate a lack of
good intentions, also bear out the fact that they have not changed their
attitude and nature. 79
76. On October 19, 1989, the spokesman of the PRC Foreign Ministry stated that after
the ''restoration" of Chinese membership at the GAIT, then there is a possibility for Taiwan, as a province of China, to join the GAIT. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), October
20, 1989, p. 1. In August 1990, a PRC responsible official in charge of economic and trade
affairs, reiterated the above position. "Official of Economic and Trade Ministry Talks on
the Question of Taiwan's Participation in the GAIT," Liaowang, No. 33 (August 13,
1990), p. 5.
77. See, supra, note 75.
78. E.g., see, "Xinhua on Li Teng-hui Inaugural Speech," FBIS. China, May 22, 1990,
p. 77; Commentary by Kan Cheng entitled "Li Teng-hui Proposes Three Conditions for
Communication Between the Two Sides of the Strait" released by the PRC's Zhongguo
Tongxun She, in "Commentary Views Conditions, FBIS. China, May 23, 1990, p. 74;
Huangfu Chi, "Li Teng-hui's Remarks; Plus Annotation Equals Empty Talk," Hong Kong
Ta Kung Pao, May 20, 1990, p. 4, translated in "Ta Kung Pao Views Remarks," FBIS,
China, May 23, 1990, pp. 74-76; Shih Chun-yu, "Political Talk: Beijing's Reaction to Li
Teng-hui's Inaugural Speech," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, May 22, 1990, p. 2, translated in
"Beijing Reaction Viewed," FBIS, China, May 23, 1990, pp. 76-77 and Wang Kuai, "Looking at the 'Policy Toward the Mainland' Through the 'Inaugural Speech,' " released by the
PRC's Zhongguo Xinwen She, translated in "Commentary Views Li Teng-hui Inaugural
Speech," FBIS. China, June 7, 1990, pp. 62-63.
79. "Spokesman on Jiang's Remarks on 'Taiwan Issue,'" FBIS, China, June 14, 1990,
p. 65.
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Despite the lack of positive response from the PRC on President
Li's initiative, the ROC has continued its effort to normalize its relations with the mainland. It is now working on lifting the ban on members of the Chinese Communist Party visiting Taiwan. 80 To resolve
legal issues involving the mainland, the ROC decided to adopt the
concept of "one country, two regions [areas]" so that some PRC laws
and regulations may be applied by Taiwan administrative agencies or
courts through conflict of law principles. 81
In early September 1990, representatives of the Red Cross Committees of the mainland and Taiwan conducted talks at Quemoy
(Kinmen) on the problem of repatriating mainlanders who illegally
went to Taiwan and reciprocal repatriation of criminals. 82 As this is
an unofficial contact, the ROC considers it did not violate the "three
nos" principles.

IX. THE ROC'S GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL
UNIFICATION AND THE PRC'S RESPONSE
President Li Ten-hui of the Republic of China (ROC) set up a
National Unification Council in October 1990. The Council is headed
by the President and has three vice-chairmen and 30 members representing a wide spectrum of Chinese interests at home and abroad.
President Li also appointed 12 research members of the Council to
study various aspects of mainland-Taiwan relations. 83
On February 23, 1991, the Council adopted Guidelines for National Unification which were approved by President Li on March 5,
1991. According to the Guidelines, the unification process of China
should go through three phases as stated below: 84
1. Short term A phase of exchanges and
reciprocity.
(1) To enhance understanding between two sides
of the Straits through exchange and eliminate hostility
80. "CPC Members to Be Permitted to Enter Taiwan," FBIS. China, September 18,
1990, p. 54.
81. See "(ROC Executive] Yuan Proposes 'One Country, Two Regions,'" FB/S,
China, September 6, 1990, p. 60 and "Editorial Lauds 'One Country, Two Areas' Concept," FB/S, China, September 10, 1990, pp. 57-58.
82. See, Shih-chiehjih-pao (World Journal), New York, September 20, 1990, p. 8 and
"Agreement on Repatriating Mainland Stowaways," FB/S, China, September 20, 1990, p.
68.

83. Huang Jen-yu, "New National Council Places ROC Squarely Behind Unification,"
The Free China Journal, Vol. VII, No. 78 (October 11, 1990), p. 4.
84. The Free China Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 18 (March 11, 1991), p. 1.
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through reciprocity; and to establish mutually benign relations by not endangering each other's safety and stability
while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the other's
existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting
reciprocity.
(2) To set up an order for exchanges across the
Straits, to draw up regulations for such exchanges, and to
establish intermediary organizations in order to protect people's rights and interests on both sides of the Straits; to gradually ease various restrictions and expand people-to-people
contacts in order to promote the social prosperity of both
sides.
(3) To improve the people's welfare on both sides
of the Straits with the ultimate objective of unifying the nation, economic reform should be actively carried out in the
mainland area, the expression of public opinion there should
gradually be allowed, and both democracy and the rule of
law should be implemented; while the Taiwan area should
accelerate constitutional reform and promote national construction to establish a society of equal prosperity.
(4) The two sides of the Straits should end the
state of hostility and, under the principle of one China, solve
all disputes by peaceful means, and furthermore respect not reject- each other in the international community, so
as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.
2. Medium term - A phase of mutual trust and
cooperation.
(1) Both sides of the Straits should establish official communication channels on equal footing.
(2) Direct postal, transport and commerce links
should be allowed, and both sides should jointly develop the
southeastern coastal area of the Chinese mainland and then
gradually expand this to other areas of the mainland in order
to narrow the gap in living standards between the two sides.
(3) Both sides of the Straits should work together
and assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities.
(4) Mutual visits by high-ranking officials on both
sides should be promoted to create favorable conditions for
consultation and unification.
3. Long term A phase of consultation and
unification.
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A consultative organization for unification should
be established through which both sides, in accordance with
the will of the people on both the mainland and Taiwan, and
while upholding the principles of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of armed forces,
jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a
constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China.
The Guidelines were adopted on March 14, 1991 by the Executive Yuan Council (Cabinet) as guiding principles for dealing with
mainland-Taiwan relations. Earlier, the Executive Yuan established a
Mainland Affairs Commission to take charge of mainland-Taiwan relations. A "private" Strait Exchange Foundation was also established
to make unofficial contacts and negotiations with the Chinese communist authorities on the mainland. The Foundation is funded twothirds by the Government .and one-third by private contribution. It is
specifically authorized to undertake the following tasks:
(1) Accepting, ratifying and forwarding on entry and
exit documents from the two sides of the Straits;
(2) Verifying and delivering documents issued on the
mainland;
(3) Deporting fugitives on the two sides of the Straits;
(4) Arbitrating trade disputes;
(5) Promoting cultural and academic exchanges;
(6) Providing consultation on general affairs;
(7) Helping protect the legal rights of ROC citizens
during their visits to the mainland; and
(8) Dealing with other affairs commissioned by the
ROC government. 85

X. THE PRC'S RESPONSE TO THE UNIFICATION
GUIDELINE AND THE ROC'S TERMINATION OF
THE STATE OF HOSTILITIES TOWARD
THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
The language and tone used in the Unification Guidelines are
quite conciliatory and mild. The Guidelines also avoid any offensive
language against the Chinese communists. It does not explicitly demand the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, nor does
85. "Coordinating Mainland Affairs," The Free China Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 14 (February 25, 1991), p..
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it require the PRC to give up the so-called four basic principles,
namely, the socialist road, the People's Democratic Dictatorship, the
leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thought. With respect to the PRC's "one country, two systems" model for unification, the Guidelines do not categorically reject
it, but imply that at the third phase (long term) of unification process,
every model for unification is negotiable as long as it is based on the
principle of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of armed forces.
The PRC has so far not yet officially responded to the Unification
Guidelines, though several commentators have taken a somewhat critical view of the Guidelines. 86 Among their major criticisms are:
( 1) "Three direct links," i.e., direct trade, direct investment and direct air and shipping services should be moved to
the short term phase, rather than remain in the medium term
phase.
(2) "Not denying [each other's] existence as a political
entity" means "two Chinas" which is not acceptable to the
PRC.
(3) Taiwan attempts to promote peaceful changes on
the mainland by bringing about China's unification on the
basis of democracy, freedom, and equal distribution of social
wealth, i.e., unifying China on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, which is rejected.
The PRC has not published the entire text of the Guidelines in its
official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily). 87 On the contrary, in recent
years, all major newspapers in Taiwan usually publish the full text of
the Chinese communists' documents on Taiwan or other important
subjects.
On May 1, 1991, the ROC terminated the "Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion," 88 which was
86. E.g., see "Taiwan's Reunification Program Challenged," [Bao Xin, "Letter from
Beijing," in Liaowang Overseas Edition, No. 10 (March 11, 1991), p. 2], FB/S, China,
March 20, 1991, pp. 81-82; Commentator, "On Taiwan's 'National Unification Guidelines'," Renmin Ribao (People's daily), March 18, 1991, reprinted in Shih-chieh jih-pao
(World journal), New York, March 18, 1991, p. 2; and" 'Random Talk' Studies Reunification Guidelines," FB/S, China, May 7, 1991, p. 69.
87. But it was published in Cankao Ziliao (Reference Materials), which is distributed
only to high officials.
88. "Li Addresses News Conference, Ends Mobilization," FBIS. China, May 3, 1991,
p. 51 and "ROC terminates hostilities toward Peking," The Free China Journal, Vol. VII,
No. 32 (May 2, 1991), p. 1.
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announced on July 4, 1947, thus formally ending the state of hostility
toward the Chinese Communists.
On June 7, 1991, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued a statement on
mainland-Taiwan relations. 89 After rejecting the "equal political entities" and "changing the mainland peacefully" concepts allegedly advocated by the "Taiwan authorities" (ROC), the statement again calls
for establishing three direct links and urges the Chinese Nationalist
Party to send representatives to contact the CCP "so that conditions
can be created for negotiations in connection with formally ending the
two sides' hostility and achieving peaceful reunification step by step."
It further states that "under the premise of upholding the principle
that there is but one China, we can also discuss other issues which the
Taiwan authorities are concerned about." It also offers to send a Chinese Communist Party delegation to Taiwan to discuss the unification
issue or welcomes the Chinese Nationalist Party to send a delegation
to the mainland to establish contacts.
The next day, ROC Government Spokesman Dr. Yu-ming Shaw
rejected the Chinese Communist Party's offer for party-to-party contacts and considered that the Chinese Communist Party's statement
"lacks new meaning [and] does not contain any good intention."
"Before the Chinese Communists renounce the use of military force to
invade Taiwan and refrain from exerting diplomatic isolation against
us, their offer to send a delegation to Taipei for a party-to-party talk
would be absolutely unacceptable," he said. 90
With respect to the question of establishing "three direct links"
(trade, investment, and air and shipping services), Shaw said that
"they are listed as the second stage [phase] of cross-strait development
under our National Unification Guidelines," and would only be made
possible when the communists commit to stop threatening to use force
against us and isolating us from international community."91
On July 2, 1991, the National Unification Council decided not to
make further comments on the Chinese communist statement of June
7, 1991.

XI.

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the above study, it seems clear that there is almost no
89. "CPC Office Issues Statement on Ties," FB/S, China, May 7, 11991, pp. 70-71.
90. "Mainland Delegation's Proposed Visit Rejected," FB/S, China, June 12, 1991, p.
58.

91. Ibid.
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possibility for the PRC and the ROC to reach an agreement on unification in the foreseeable future - though cultural, commercial and
other contacts between them will continue. However, the rise of the
Taiwan independence movement as indicated in the December 2, 1989
Taiwan election has introduced an unstable element in mainland-Taiwan relations. If this movement continues, even the present cultural,
commercial and other contacts between the mainland and Taiwan will
be in jeopardy. The PRC may renew its military threat against Taiwan to deter the expansion of the independence movement. Since the
Taiwan independence movement is primarily a response to the PRC's
policy to isolate Taiwan in the international community, unless the
PRC modifies this policy, it seems likely that this movement will continue to spread in Taiwan. Moreover, as long as the PRC maintains
its present policy of anti-democratic reform on the mainland, thus
widening the political, economic and social gaps between Taiwan and
the mainland, the PRC's call for unification will have little appeal to
the Chinese people on Taiwan.
The PRC has been demanding complete and direct exchange of
mail, trade, and air and shipping services before formal negotiation.
In view of the PRC's lack of positive response to President Li's initiative, as expressed in his inaugural speech and the Guidelines for National Unification, it is unlikely that the ROC will respond positively
to such a demand. Moreover, even if direct exchange of mail, trade,
and air and shipping services were established between the mainland
and Taiwan, it will not necessarily follow that the ROC and its people
will be willing to enter unification negotiations with the PRC on the
latter's proposal of "one country, two systems." Hong Kong has direct exchange of mail, trade, and air and shipping services with the
mainland for many years. The people of Hong Kong have, however,
responded negatively to the PRC's decision to unify on the basis of
"one country, two systems" as embodied in the Basic Law of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region adopted by the PRC National
People's Congress in 199 U 2 Since the adoption of the Basic Law, the
people of Hong Kong have accelerated their immigration to other
countries to avoid living under "one country, two systems" after the
Chinese Communist takeover on July 1, 1997. 93
As the PRC has insisted on "party-to-party" negotiations with
Taiwan and refused to consider President Li's call for establishing
92. See, supra, note 18.
93. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Increases Emigration Estimates," New York Times,
September 9, 1990, p. 5.
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"channels of communication" on "a basis of equality"; high level contacts between Taiwan and the mainland do not appear to be possible in
the foreseeable future. However, "unofficial" contacts, such as
through Red Cross Committees of Taiwan and the Mainland, toresolve non-political issues will continue.

CHAPTER III
FEDERATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND
CHINA'S UNIFICATION 1
Quansheng Zhao

The issue of Taiwan's unification with China is closely linked to
China's political development. There has been an increasing consensus that unificiation will have a significant impact on the process of
political pluralization on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
The Mainland-Taiwan separation, a direct outcome of the late
1940's civil war, has now existed for more than forty years. The civil
war and the long separation inevitably have had a great impact on the
political development of both sides. The issue of unification, although
with different interpretations, has been equally important to people on
both sides, and especially to the two ruling parties, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the Mainland and the Nationalist Party
(KMT) in Taiwan.
This chapter will elaborate a theme I raised in 1983 that, "Unification can promote smooth development of democratic processes on
both sides," 2 and will analyze how unification may promote China's
democratization. A related subject is what kind of nation system will
be most suitable for the PRC-Taiwan unification. I will first discuss
the concept of federation and the ideas of federalism, and then will
examine the relationship between unification and democratization.
UNIFICATION AND FEDERATION
In addition to political considerations, one of the major obstacles
to China's unification is the traditional idea of authoritarian central
government, which seems to have significant influence over China's
political leaders. But one has to consider the current political reality.
The division between the Mainland and Taiwan has lasted for more
than four decades. Neither side is willing to give up its own political
1. A part of this chapter was published as an article entitled "One Country Two
Systems and One Country Two Parties: PRC-Taiwan Unification and Its Political
Implications," Pacific Review, Vol. 2, No.4, 1989, pp. 312-319.
2. Quansheng Zhao, "An Analysis of Unification: The PRC Perspective," Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 10, October 1983, pp. 1081-1114.
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and economic system. Furthermore, unification brought about
through the use of military force is unacceptable to either side. 3
Therefore, the notion of a united China under an authoritarian central
government is neither achievable nor desirable. Other possibilities for
peaceful unification must be examined.
The federal system is one of several major proposals for China's
unification. "Federation" is a concept rooted in Western political systems, and in a general sense can be defined as: "a group of states
united with one government which decides foreign and defense affairs;
but in which each state can have its own government to decide its
internal affairs. " 4 Hence, the federal system has two distinct characteristics: First, there is a clear division of labor between the central
and local governments in terms of administrative power; second, local
governments have a high degree of autonomy with regard to internal
affairs.
In the contemporary world, there are many countries that have
adopted the federal system, and it appears that the system is particularly suitable to large countries, such as the United States, the Soviet
Union, India, Canada, Australia, Germany, Pakistan, and Brazil
(there are also smaller federalist countries such as Malaysia, Yugoslavia, Argentina, and Switzerland). Countries choose the federal system
primarily as a result of historical background, social structure, and
political culture. Furthermore, there are different types of federal systems, for example, the federal system in the Soviet Union is different
from that of the United States in terms of basic political and economic
structures.
There are several advantages to the federal system, the most obvious being the creation of an environment that will simultaneously enable a country to be a united political entity, while allowing for
pluralistic development in the fields of politics, economy, and culture.
This arrangement can best serve different political, ethnic, and cultural
groups and areas, and promote evolutionary rather than radical
changes in a society.
A weakness of the federal system is that the power of the central
authorities can be diminished by localism and separatist tendencies, as
in the case of Canada, where Quebec has long struggled to achieve
more autonomy (and sometimes even independence) from the federa3. Beijing has promised that it will not use force against Taiwan unless Taiwan moves
towards independence. See further discussion later on this issue.
4. See, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. Essex, England: Longman
Group, 1978, p. 401.
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tion. Overall, however, the post-World War II development of most
federalist countries (such as the United States) has demonstrated that
the authority of the central (federal) government has not been weakened, but strengthened. With proper handling, such as the accordance
of adequate recognition to a local government's special interests, localism and separatism can gradually be overcome.
The suitability of a federal system for China depends on China's
political and social reality. China's division into three parts - the
Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macao5 - was primarily due
to foreign imperialism and the internal civil war of the 1940s between
the CCP and the KMT. Future relations between the Mainland and
Hong Kong and Macao are relatively clear, although many concrete
issues remain unresolved. The future status of Hong Kong, for example, has been set by the Sino-British Agreement of 1984. This agreement covers the future of Hong Kong from 1997 until well into the
next century. Portugal and China have also reached an agreement on
Macao. By comparison, the status of Taiwan and Mainland-Taiwan
relations are still very much uncertain. Where is China heading Will the division continue to exist well into the future, or is unification
possible under certain arrangements, such as the federal system?
These questions deserve special attention.
Although the tradition of a single authoritarian central government will be a major obstacle to the creation of a federal system, the
idea of federalism is not new to China's political and intellectual leaders. As early as 1894, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China, advocated the establishment of a "united government" in
the new China. Sun's idea was influenced by his understanding of the
federal system adopted by the United States. After the 1911 Revolution, Sun began to emphasize the idea of "local self-government,"
which was similar to federalism.
Liang Qichao, a leading Chinese thinker in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, also looked at the federal systems of other countries as
a reference for China's political reform movement. In an article published in 1901 Liang examined the experience of Switzerland saying,
"if there is a big country that could follow the example of Switzerland
to adopt the federal system and to be democratic, then this country's
strength and freedom will strike the whole world. This big country
5. Although there is close linkage between the issue of Taiwan and the issue of Hong
Kong and Macao, the two are different in nature. I will try not refer to the latter in great
detail here.
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will become an example for all the countries in the world. " 6 This "big
country" in Liang's mind was China.
During this period, many scholars and politicians in China participated in discussions on the idea of federalism. Zhang Shizhao, for
example, in his article published in 1915 discussed three points:
"First, local state government can be organized after the establishment
of the central federal government. Second, local state government is
not an independent state. Third, to carry out a federal system, there is
no need to conduct a revolution; what is needed is the influence of
public opinion. " 7 Other scholars who advocated federalism or "local
self-government" include Zhang Taiyan, Hu Shi, Li Zhaonong, Xiong
Xiling, and Zou Rong. 8
Chinese communist leaders during the 1919 May Fourth Movement also expressed support for federalist ideas. For example, Mao
Zedong advocated self-government for Hunan Province. Chen Duxiu,
the first CCP Secretary General, argued that, "We communists do not
oppose federalist ideas, and support provincial self-government. What
we are against is the division of the country." 9 In 1922, the CCP made
a clear statement in the communique of the second National Congress,
that one of the goals of the CCP is to unify China through a free federalist system, and to establish the Federal Republic of China.
Obviously, all these discussions took place at different times and
under different circumstances, and may not be suitable for the current
situation. At present, leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait do not
show any support for federalist ideas for China's unification. But this
does not mean federalism should not be discussed. In order to clarify
ideas and achieve a consensus on issues, it is necessary to discuss federalist ideas and their implications for China's political development
fully. In fact, beginning in the 1980s, a number of scholars proposed
that the federal system may be an ideal way for China to achieve its
goal of peaceful unification. 10
6. Liang Qichao, "Rousseau xuean [The case of Rousseau studies]," Yinbinshi Quanji,
Vol. 3, 1901, p. 110.
7. Zhang Shizhao, "Xueli shang zhi lianbang lun [The theories of federalism]," Jiayin,
Vol. 1, No. 5, 1915.
8. For detailed accounts, see Qian Zhenming and Zhou Zidong, "Jindai zhongguo
lianbangzhi sixiang de lishi kaocha [A historical examination on federalist ideas in modern
China]," Zhengzhixue Yanjiu, Vol. 5, 1988.
9. Chen Duxiu, "Liansheng zizhi yu zhongguo zhengxiang [United provincial selfgovernment and China's political development]," Xiangdao, Vol. 1, 1920.
10. See, for example, Zhang Xin, "Lianbangzhi: zhongguo hepingtongyi zhi tu? [Is
federal system suitable for China's peaceful unification?], Minbao Yuekan, July 1983; and
Jiang Jingkuan, "Zhongguo tongyi zuilixiang de tujing - shixing lianbang gonghezhi [The
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A new development in Beijing is worthy of attention. In 1991
Beijing made it clear that it would support Kim 11 Sung's "federal
system" idea for Korean unification, that is "one nation, one country,
two systems and two governments." 11 In addition, it is believed that
Beijing played a key role in Pyongyang's dramatic reversal of its policy
on the issue of United Nations membership by seeking separate memberships together with Seoul in May 1991Y Immediately after North
Korea's announcement seeking separate U. N. membership, Chinese
Premier Li Peng commented positively that this move was "an interim
measure before the unification," and would be "welcomed by international community, including China." 13 This fact has signaled Beijing's
positive attitude toward the federal system idea and its possible application to the course of national unification, at least in the case of
Korea.
UNIFICATION AND POLITICAL PLURALIZATION
The second concern of this chapter is the impact that future
peaceful unification will have on China's political development. My
principal argument is that the unification policy of "one country, two
systems" 14 proposed by Beijing, may well lead to the creation of "one
country, two (or more) parties." 15 That is, the realization of unification may become the starting point for a real multi-party system in
China. There will be two major parties, the CCP and the KMT, and a
few minor parties in China's political scene. This incremental development will be, perhaps, an unintended consequence of unification.
According to this model, unification will not be the simple process of
combining two into one, but rather a process of social integration and
interdependency of various political forces.
In using the term "pluralism" I mean (1) there is no single source
most ideal way for China's unification - the system of federal republic]," Zhongbao,
March 12-13, 1984, p. 2.
11. "China Backs DPRK Reunification Efforts," Beijing Review, Vol. 34, No. 20, May
20-26, 1991, pp. 8-9.
12. Damon Darlin, "North Korea Reverses Position on U.N., Seeks Admission Separately From South," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 3, 1991, pp. 18 & 23.
13. "Li Peng on Domestic and World Issues," Beijing Review, Vol. 34, No. 26, July 17, 1991, pp. 24-29.
14. See, Deng Xiaoping, "One Country, Two Systems," in Deng Xiaoping: Speeches
and Writings (second edition), Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987, pp. 91-94.
15. Political pluralization means a multi-party system, not necessarily only two parties.
Later discussions concentrate mainly on the two big parties - the CCP and the KMT - in
part this reflects the reality of the two major parties, but it also is used for the sake of
convenience.
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of authority; therefore there is no concentration of power in the sense
of the absolutist state; (2) political and non-political groups have a
legitimate right to exist and to influence the state; these groups may
include, for example, "business organizations, trade unions, political
parties, ethnic groups, students, prison officers, women's institutes and
religious groups;" 16 and (3) these groups must be "organized into an
unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined categories.'m
Prior to the 1989 turmoil on the Mainland, there were far-reaching political and economic changes under the banner of "openness and
reforms," which began at the end of 1978. Market economy, as emphasized in 1987 by now-purged Party Secretary General Zhao
Ziyang, became a "new economic mechanism." 18 Economic reforms
covered a wide area and included the dissolution of the commune system in rural areas and the establishment of the responsibility system;
the opening up of free markets for agricultural goods; the development
of private enterprise; the enlargement of the entrepreneurial base and
the granting of additional power to managers; the revival of material
incentive systems; the reduction of ideological intervention in the
economy; the undertaking of price reforms and housing system reforms; the initiation of open-labor markets; and the dismantling the
"iron rice bowl" system. Changes in the area of "openness" to the
outside were also impressive: China joined the world (especially western) economic system; established special economic zones and opened
coastal cities; encouraged foreign investment and joint ventures; exported labor abroad; developed tourist industries; and reformed its
foreign trade system.
In contrast to China's achievements in the area of economic reform, political reform on the Mainland has remained sensitive and tortuous. The party elders who have controlled the decision-making
power of the party and the government for the last four decades are
still tremendously resistant to political changes. The government's
military suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989
shows that the conservatives are willing to pay any price to preserve
16. David Held, Models of Democracy, Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1987, p. 189.
17. Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," in Philippe Schmitter, ed.,
Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications,
1979, p. 15.
18. Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,'' in Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987, pp. 10-11.
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their own power and interests. The crackdown on the pro-democracy
movement has delayed or even reversed the political reform of the
Mainland, inevitably jeopardizing the process of unification with
Taiwan.
Internal changes in Taiwan are also notable. Taiwan's economic
and political development has drawn world-wide attention. Ever since
high-speed economic growth began in the late 1960s, Taiwan has been
labeled one of the "four little tigers," or East Asian NIEs (newly industrialized economies), together with South Korea, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. As economic growth accelerated, the democratic movement in Taiwan has progressed remarkably. The most well-known opposition groups were called Dangwai- the non-KMT forces- which
challenged the KMT's ruling position vigorously. The KMT's top
leaders carried out a series of political reforms under intense pressure
from both within and outside the island. 19 These reforms included
repealing the thirty-eight-year old martial law in 1987, legalizing opposition parties, allowing the news media greater freedom, and recruiting native Taiwanese into the highest levels of the ruling circle, which
reduced tensions between "the Taiwanese" and "the Mainlanders" on
the Island. 20 The most striking sign of progress, as I will discuss later,
is the change in policy toward the Mainland.
In sum, economic modernization and political democratization
- the two major goals for future development - will gradually be
accepted by the majority on each side of the Strait. They will lay the
foundations for future unification. The slow progress of internal political development on the Mainland, however, means that unification
will be a prolonged and incremental process.
CHANGING MAINLAND-TAIWAN RELATIONS
There have been significant changes in Mainland-Taiwan relations since 1979, when Beijing changed its Taiwan policy from "liberation" to "peaceful unification," advocating "three links" (trade,
transportation, and postal services) and "four exchanges" (exchanges
between relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and
19. See, Robert Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century. Lanham and New York:
University Press of America, 1988, pp. 45-60.
20. "Mainlander" refers to those who moved to Taiwan from the Mainland after 1945,
when Taiwan was returned to China from the Japanese colonial rule; and "Taiwanese"
refers to those who were originally from the Chinese mainland, mostly from Fujian Province, but have lived in Taiwan for many generations. In fact, this distinction comes from
the people in Taiwan. The people on the Mainland do not really distinguish the "Mainlander" from the "Taiwanese," but consider both fellow countrymen.
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sports representatives). Development ofbilateral relations gained further momentum in October 1987, when Taiwanese authorities made a
dramatic move - allowing their citizens to visit Mainland relatives reversing the stubborn, long-standing "three nos" policy (no contact,
no negotiations, and no compromise), A year later, in a much more
limited manner, specific groups from the Mainland were allowed to
visit the island. Bilateral contacts have since increased tremendously.
At the beginning stage, the following groups of people from the
Mainland were allowed to visit Taiwan: those whose relatives in Taiwan just died or have been seriously sick; those left on the Mainland
in 1949 as soldiers of the KMT troops who were originally from Taiwan; and those who are invited (or selected) as "distinguished intellectuals," such as scholars (including overseas students and scholars)
and sports representatives. The policy on Mainland visitors is expected to be further relaxed. In August 1991, two news reporters from
the Mainland visited Taiwan with formal arrangements by the Taiwan
authorities. 21
In 1988, right after the removal of the ban, more than 380,000
people from Taiwan visited the Mainland, among those more than 40
percent were not "Mainlanders" but "Taiwanese" who did not necessarily have Mainland relatives. In 1989, the number of Taiwanese visitors reached 500,000; exchange of mail exceeded ten million letters,
encouraged by Taipei's decision to open direct telephone and mail
links to the Mainland. Some 3,100 people from the Mainland visited
Taiwan in 1989. In a highly publicized manner, a 12-member official
delegation headed by Taiwan's Finance Minister Shirley Kuo visited
Beijing in early May 1989, to attend the Asian Development Bank
meeting. And in mid-1989 for the first time, the Taiwan authorities
allowed their newspaper and television reporters to be based on the
Mainland. 22 Students from Taiwan have begun to enter graduate programs for advanced studies on the Mainland. In 1991, thirty-nine (increased from 1990's twenty-three) Taiwanese students applied to
Mainland universities - twenty six for master programs and sixteen
for doctoral programs. 23
The total value of indirect trade, mostly through Hong Kong, increased more than ten times within one decade from US $300 million
in 1980 to US $4 billion in 1990. Direct and indirect Taiwanese investment on the Mainland has also increased rapidly, despite the polit21. Renmin Ribao, August 13, 1991, p. 1.
22. Carl Goldstein, "One, But Also Two," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 4, 1989,
pp. 27-28.
23. Renmin Ribao, February 25, 1991, p. 5.
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ical turmoil of summer 1989. At the Guangzhou Trade Fair of spring
1990, for example, more than 4,600 businessmen from Taiwan conducted trade and investment negotiations with their Mainland partners. By the end of 1990, the investment from Taiwan reached US
$1.2 billion in Fujian Province alone, about one third of the province's
total foreign investment. 24
Since the late 1980s, Taipei has moved from its passive, defensive
position to an active, pragmatic, and flexible policy, creating new challenges for Beijing. Since the end of the 1970s, when Beijing first raised
proposals for peaceful unification, 25 the PRC has always actively campaigned for unification, while the Taiwanese have long insisted on a
"three-no" policy - no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise
- a policy that appeared to be passive, rigid, and defensive. Starting
in the late 1980s, however, Taipei launched a series of initiatives in its
Mainland policy. In addition to legitimizing bilateral economic and
cultural exchanges, Taiwan has also set up a top advisory group
chaired by President Li Teng-hui - a thirty-member National Unification Council - to bring about a consensus and to clarify long-term
objectives in its Mainland policy. 26 Under the Council, there is a policy-coordination working organ, the Mainland Affairs Commission
(MAC). In November 1990, the Foundation for Exchanges Across
the Taiwan Strait was established. At least half of the Foundation's
funding comes from government sources, and the group is accountable
to the Premier and the Legislative Yuan through the MAC. The
Foundation hopes eventually to be allowed to open offices in Hong
Kong and major cities on the Mainland. 27 In April 1991, a delegation
of the Foundation visited Beijing and held talks with Mainland officials, including Vice Premier Wu Xueqian.
The Taiwanese authorities have also actively worked on their own
formulas for unification. To counter Beijing's "one country, two systems" proposal, for example, Taipei raised its own proposal for unification. In May 1990, Li Teng-hui, President of Taiwan, declared that,
if Beijing can "implement political democracy and a free economic
system, renounce the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait and not
24. Julian Baum, "Strait Expectations, Taiwan Businessmen Prepare for Direct Trade
with China;· Far Eastern Economic Review, June 6, 1991, pp. 40-41.
25. "A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" issued by the Standing Committee of
China's National People's Congress, see Renmin Ribao, January 2, 1979, p. l.
26. Julian Baum, "The Mainland Dilemma;· Far Eastern Economic Review, October
18, 1990, pp. 29-32.
27. Julian Baum, "Hands Across the Sea", Far Eastern Economic Review, December 6,
1990, pp. 16-18.

48

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

interfere with our development of foreign relations on the basis of a
one-China policy," then Taipei will be willing "to establish channels of
communication, and completely open up academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific, and technological exchanges," and will discuss
"national reunification [with Beijing] based on the common will of the
Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." In June 1990, Shi
Qiyang, Deputy Head of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, proposed the idea
of "one China, two areas," advocating a "peaceful coexistence of two
separate-but-equal regimes." Some Taiwanese officials further proposed that Taipei should regard Beijing as a "politically competitive
regime," preparing for the legalization of the status of the communist
party. 28 In return, Yang Shangkun, President of the PRC, suggested
that once negotiations start, there is no need to clarify the issue of
"central-local" (who is the central government and who is the local
government). 29 It is not beyond imagination that the time for holding
official negotiations or even a summit on bilateral relations and the
unification issue may eventually become mature in the foreseeable
future.
Other than unification with the Mainland, one possible path of
development for Taiwan, according to some external and internal observers, is to become a legally independent state (or taidu in Chinese).
Taidu is unlikely at the present time for the following reasons. First,
the sense of Chinese nationalism and Chinese culture is deeply rooted
on the island as well as on the Mainland. With the exception of opposition groups, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) who
openly demand "Taiwan's self-determination," there are few mainstream politicians who can afford to become a /ishi zuiren (a person
condemned by history) for splitting the nation. Second, the Mainland
has persistently refused to give up using force against Taiwan if Taipei
moves toward independence. Beijing has consistently opposed taidu
and any other similar idea such as "one China, one Taiwan," or "dual
recognition." A major criticism, for example, of Taiwan's "programme for state reunification" are the concepts of Taiwan's "political
entity" in the international community and diplomatic "dual recognition. " 30 The risk of war makes taidu an undesirable choice for
Taiwan.
28. Yang Liyu, "Cong yiguo liangzhi dao yiguo liang qi [From 'one country two systems' to 'one country two areas']," Zheng Ming, August 1990, pp. 76-78.
29. See, Renmin Ribao, November 10, 1990, p. 1; for English version of Yang's talk,
see, Beijing Review, Vol. 30, No. 48, November 26-December 2, 1990, pp. 11-17.
30. See, Wu Daying, "On Taiwan Authorities' Programme," Beijing Review, Vol. 34,
No. 27, July 8-14, 1991, pp. 33-35.
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Third, the international community has looked on taidu with disfavor, ever since the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered the
United Nations in 1971. No major power in today's world would
openly support a declaration of Taiwan's independence at the expense
of breaking relations with the PRC and triggering a new crisis in the
international community. In addition, the legal status of Taiwan as
part of China has been accepted in a number of important international documents, such as the Cairo Declaration of 1943 (signed by
China, the United States, and Great Britain), the Sino-U.S. Shanghai
Communique of 1972, and the statement establishing formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States in 1979. All
these internal and external conditions have made it extremely difficult
for Taiwan to declare independence.
On the other hand, as long as Taiwan maintains de facto separation from the Mainland, there will always be political forces from
within and outside the island demanding taidu. It is not difficult to
imagine that the longer the separation continues, the stronger Taiwan's tendency towards independence will become. This tendency
will be further enhanced if there are major political setbacks on the
Mainland, such as the Tiananmen incident. Under these circumstances, public opinion in the international community may become
more sympathetic toward Taiwan. Therefore, while emphasizing the
unlikeliness of taidu, one should not entirely rule out the possible
evolution of Taipei toward independence.
HOW UNIFICATION CAN PROMOTE CHINA'S
DEMOCRATIZATION
The unification process poses a series of questions regarding
China's political development: How should the current political and
economic systems on both sides be dealt with? What kind of relationship should exist between the political forces of each side, in particular, between the two ruling parties? Can the CCP and the KMT
tolerate each other's activities under a federal system? Some of these
questions have already been answered. Others remain unclear.
The KMT's authority on Taiwan has been increasingly challenged by the DPP and other opposition parties. The CCP on the
Mainland has also faced severe criticism from the pro-democracy
movement and intellectual dissidents such as Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan,
and Wang Ruoshui, who were openly expelled from the Party in early
1987. Nevertheless, the present positions of the ruling KMT and CCP
are the result of internal and external struggles that can be traced back
to the 1911 Revolution or the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Based
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on this historical background and on current conditions, the most
probable development in the foreseeable future would be that the two
parties will continue to play leading roles on each side. This assumption only reflects the current situation and has nothing to do with the
issue oflegitimate rule (that is broad-based popular support). One has
to remember this when considering China's future choices.
The influence of feudal monarchical rule that lasted over two
thousand years in Chinese history still remains. The Soviet Stalinist
political system has also had an influence, in varying degrees, on the
two ruling parties. Neither side has yet reached a truly political institutionalization, a fact that is reflected in the uncertainty and abruptness of transfers of power at the highest levels - such as Hu
Yaobang's sudden departure from his top position as General Secretary of the CCP in January 1987, and the downfall of Hu's successor,
Zhao Ziyang, in the wake of the 1989 crackdown on the Mainland.
One key question has been around for several years and is still debated
by scholars and politicians all over the world: Who will Deng Xiaoping's real successor be and what will happen to China after Deng
passes away (despite the propaganda campaigns that the new Party
General Secretary Jiang Zemin has become the core for the "third
generation leadership")? In Taiwan, the internal struggles for political
leadership surrounding the issue of succession before and after the
death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988 also show an instability in
power transfers. 31 Both examples demonstrate that the pattern of
"strong man politics" is still influential on both sides. Taiwan's political development during the past several years, however, has made
greater progress than that of its Mainland counterpart. In fact, one
may even argue that political pluralism may come to Taiwan well
before unification. In tum, Taiwan's democratization will have a tremendous impact on the Mainland, similar to the influence on East
Germany exerted by the west prior to the Germany unification in
1990.
From the PRC perspective, the proposal of "one country, two
systems" will only solve the external issue of "one China," not the
internal issue of different social systems. Under the Mainland proposal, for a long period (fifty years or more) after unification, the political
31. Although the power transition in Taiwan after Chiang Ching-kuo's death was constitutional in nature, and was consummated fairly swiftly, there were, however, serious
internal power struggles with regard to KMT's chairmanship, involving such important
political figures as Madam Chiang (widow of Chiang Kai-shek), Yu Guohua (Prime Minister), Li Huang (General Secretary of the KMT), Song Chuyu (Deputy Secretary of the
KMT), and others.

CHAPTER

Ill

51

and economic systems of each side will develop in their own directions. One can further argue that the political forces of each side will
not be controlled by the other. The leading positions of the CCP and
the KMT on the Mainland and Taiwan respectively will not be
changed by unification. Therefore, unification will create a unique environment for China to start its own type of federal system. Externally, there will be a federal government that represents "one China."
Internally, there will be two major political forces leading two areas
(Beijing and Taipei), in roughly equal positions in the sense of political
legitimacy, yet autonomous from each other. This reality will become
the foundation for the model of "unification-led political
pluralization."
This model will be divided into two stages. The first stage can be
called "cross-checking and mutual influence." During this period, important issues such as foreign and defense policies will be decided by
the federal government led by Beijing in consultation with Taipei and
other political forces. (Since the PRC has promised that Taiwan will
be allowed to maintain its own armed forces after unification, Taiwan
will reserve certain defense policy authority with regard to regional
affairs, which in tum would involve some foreign policy considerations. Beijing will not send its military forces, the People's Liberation
Army, to Taiwan.) After consultation, new policies will be sent to the
legislative and executive branches for approval and implementation.
In this sense, the CCP will continue to be the ruling party; the KMT
will switch to the position of non-ruling or opposition party. As a
former high-ranking KMT official privately told me, "the KMT would
not mind becoming an opposition party after unification, because the
KMT's future is not on Taiwan, but on the Mainland."
On the other hand, however, the internal affairs and external economic relations of each side will be handled by their respective authorities, and will not intertwine. At this early stage, the two ruling parties
and other forces will not deal with one another directly. Instead, they
will send representatives to carry out various political functions, i.e.,
the KMT and opposition parties will participate in the leading bodies
of the federal government in Beijing, whereas the CCP and the federal
government will send representatives or liaison officials to Taiwan. In
this sense, the KMT will continue to enjoy its ruling party position on
the island, while the CCP will play the role of "opposition party" in
terms of Taiwan's local politics, creating a seemingly symbolic yet
very significant political structure.
Non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean that mutual
influence will not exist. Mutual political influence can be exercised
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through the following four ways. First, representatives stationed on
each side are entitled to raise suggestions and to criticize directly. Second, since the news media will be, as now, controlled largely by the
ruling party of its own side, the media coverage, style, and viewpoint
of each side will still differ substantially (with control of news media,
there is an asymmetry between the two sides. The Taiwanese news
media has recently moved toward pluralism much faster and more extensively than its Mainland counterpart). After unification, it would
be difficult to prohibit people from reading and watching the other
side's news media (newspapers, periodicals, and TV programs). This
will increase information sources in each society, and will effectively
break the monopoly over the news media on the Mainland. Third,
increasing exchange visits across the Taiwan Strait will open opportunities for non-ruling party forces to exchange experiences and information. These trends will bring further development to social and
political groups in both societies. Finally, political reforms on both
sides, growing in similar contexts and directions, will provide a challenge to each party, producing an environment of peaceful political
competition. Any setback to the reforms will not only draw domestic
and international criticism, but will slow, even stop, the unification
process, damaging the interests of China as a whole. Conservatives of
both sides will face tremendous difficulties "moving the clock back."
The unique pattern of "cross-checking" has several implications.
First of all, since the mutual influence is legal and independent, it will
be difficult to stop even if the ruling parties attempt to do so. At the
same time, however, this political checking will be rather limited. The
checking itself is not a significant threat to the ruling parties' leading
positions, thereby making it easier for the CCP and the KMT to tolerate each other. Furthermore, this limitation will slow the pluralization process, thus avoiding political chaos and maintaining the stable
social environment that is needed for continued economic growth and
modernization. Cross-checking may also be welcomed by opposition
parties and social groups because it will promote political pluralization
and democratization.
We have discussed the importance of mutual influence across the
Taiwan Strait at this stage, but it would be wrong to assume that the
CCP or the KMT could replace indigenous opposition forces on either
Taiwan or the Mainland. Because the two have been separated for so
many years, they have largely lost their roots on the other side.
Hence, it will be easier for both sides to move toward pluralism if the
new political forces are independent and indigenous organizations.
In Taiwan, the opposition forces have obtained the right to form
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political parties, and have begun to flourish in the past several. years.
One may anticipate that as the current leadership on the mamland,
which is composed of members of the older generation, passes away,
new leaders from the younger generation may have to respond to the
popular demand for more democracy. This has already been demonstrated by the Lee Teng-hui administration in Taiwan. Under a federal system, both the ruling parties and citizens will likely become
familiar with political competition, which will enhance conditions for
both societies to progress towards a more plural and democratic stage.
The experience of "cross-checking and mutual influence" will also
greatly reduce or even eliminate hostile feelings and estrangement on
each side and increase mutual understanding. Therefore, what I emphasize at the first stage is the limited "checking function" and "mutual influence," which are different from "mutual penetration," or
"real participation." After a long period (and it would be difficult to
predict how long) of "cross-checking and mutual influence," the process will move to the second stage.
During the second stage, which I call "fair competition and pluralistic politics," political forces of each side, including the two ruling
parties, will be allowed to conduct political campaigns on the other's
territory. These campaigns will be held under the principles of equality, democracy, and fair competition. This hypothetical development
could only take place in the fairly remote future. No one can apply
this idea to the current situation since the mutual suspicion between
the two sides remains deep, and the internal conditions are not yet
mature enough. By the time of the second stage, there will be a real
co-existence of two major political parties and several small parties in
Chinese political life. As various political forces continue to develop,
it is not impossible that a third major party outside of the CCP and the
KMT may emerge. Regardless of what kind of political situation exists during the second stage, the general trend towards political pluralization will continue.
NECESSARY CONDITIONS
Political change in general depends on various factors, including
internal efforts, political and economic structures and their development, historical and cultural background, and the international environment. The political transformation of a society requires a period of
preparation of the necessary conditions for such a transition. For a
process as complex as "from an authoritarian government to a federal
system," or "unification-led political pluralization," the following six
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conditions will be necessary. Each of these conditions, if not met in
the future, can give rise to obstacles in the unification process.
First, the foundation of unification, or the federal system, is the
formation of "one China" to include both the Mainland and Taiwan.
The announcement of taidu (Taiwan's legal independence) would
mean not only the cessation of the unification process, but could also
mean the start of another civil war. As we discussed earlier, the Mainland will not use force against Taiwan unless Taiwan asserts itself as
an independent state. Since this is an important development in terms
of the PRC's Taiwan policy, one would expect a full, high-level authoritative confirmation from Beijing. As a first step, a formal bilateral agreement containing phrases such as "no-taidu" and "no-use-offorce" might be appropriate. This would help prevent taidu and create a more relaxed atmosphere between the two. On the other hand,
unification in which "the big one swallows the small one" would probably also lead to a civil war. This point must be remembered by the
"big one." It is obvious that another civil war would seriously injure
both the Mainland and Taiwan, and could constitute a major setback
for political and economic development.
Second, both sides will continue to develop their own political
and economic strengths, which are the foundations for the principle of
"one country, two systems." For quite a long time, each side will continue relatively independent operation of its internal affairs. This is
what I call the stage of "cross-checking and mutual influence." This
arrangement will give the CCP and the KMT, as well as the people on
each side, enough room to prepare for the second stage - "fair competition and pluralistic politics." Further reform and democratization
within the ruling parties seems to be a key element for the future directions of political development. It is rational and logical to begin negotiations when each side is healthy and strong both politically and
economically.
Third, there must be precise and feasible legal arrangements.
This will become an important consideration once the negotiations
open. The legal aspect is closely connected with the continued political reforms on both sides. After the passing of Chiang Ching-kuo
[who died in 1988] and Deng Xiaoping [who is still alive], "strongman
politics" in both camps may gradually be phased out. It appears that
in the future there will be a more institutionalized structure of political
leadership. Under the influence of political and economic reform,
"rule of man" will be replaced by "rule of law." In this regard, the
future development of Hong Kong and Macao will serve as a touchstone for the reliability of the framework of "one country, two sys-
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terns.'' In fact, prior to the Beijing crackdown, the main trends
already underway in Hong Kong were conducive to the realization of
the model discussed in this article. With the military crackdown on
the student demonstration, Hong Kong's confidence in Beijing was seriously damaged. Because Hong Kong and Taiwan serve as political
insurance for each other, this loss of confidence in Hong Kong will
inevitably have a significant impact on the people on Taiwan. It seems
clear that the confidence of the Hong Kong population will not be
restored until the eventual emergence of a new, more moderate leadership after Deng Xiaoping.
Fourth, economic and political reforms must be continuously
pursued. The high-speed economic development and the rise in the
standard of living on the Mainland may narrow the economic gap with
Taiwan, facilitating unification. But, if development on the Mainland
slows, the gap will widen and the unification process will likely be
delayed. The current economic reforms on the Mainland, especially
the establishment of "special economic zones" and open cities along
the coast, have moved the Mainland markets from "potentiality" to
reality. Meanwhile, Taiwan's enormous capital, advanced administrative personnel, and its technologies in certain fields are increasingly
needed by the Mainland. It is not difficult to predict that mutual economic benefits, together with the close cultural and geographic connection, will push bilateral private economic exchanges to a new level,
well ahead of the official unification. More importantly, economic development will increase each society's demand for political development. This pressure is one of the basic foundations for political
pluralization.
Fifth, ideological considerations should be further cast off. On
the issue of unification, national interests should precede all other considerations. Other ideologies, such as "socialism," or "three principles
of the people,'m are secondary. Therefore, under the principle of
"one unified China" all issues should be negotiable, including a new
name for the country and a new national flag and anthem. A simple
name "China" (Zhongguo in Chinese), or "The Federal Republic of
China,'' might be choices to replace both "The People's Republic of
China" and "The Republic of China" that are currently used by the
two sides respectively. Furthermore, one of the basic criteria for a
32. It refers to Sun Yat-sen's three principles: nationalism, democracy, and "people's
livelihood," used for the 1911 Revolution and the new republic. "Unifying China through
the three principles of the people" is the official slogan of the KMT authorities in Taiwan.
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democratic society is toleration of different ideologies. Freedom of
thought and freedom of expression will be a basic law.
Sixth, it is necessary for the cause of unification to have a peaceful
and favorable international environment, especially in the Asia-Pacific
area. That is to say, all major powers in this area- the United States,
the Soviet Union, and Japan- should support, or at least not hinder,
the process of China's unification. The current international environment is a favorable one. Since the beginning of the 1970s, Northeast
Asia has remained relatively peaceful and stable. Both Mainland-Taiwan relations and relations between the major powers have improved.
The international environment has also witnessed progress in
other divided nations such as Germany and Korea, which will put
additional pressure on the PRC's unification policy. The German
model now has a new significance for other divided nations. It demonstrates that national unification may be achieved through a long process of peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition. The German
experience shows that a temporary peaceful coexistence in the international community may work better than open confrontation between
two different regimes. This model is likely to facilitate national unification, rather than lead to national division. South Korea's recent
diplomatic breakthrough in its relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe has further isolated North Korea. In turn, the two
Koreas have held several high-level (prime ministers) dialogues with a
possible presidential summit in the future. Progress in Korea may
place more pressure on Beijing.
CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this chapter is on the issues of China's unification
and its prospects for the establishment of a federation system and
political pluralization. It is a long transformation process from monist
politics into pluralistic politics, yet there are growing demands for democracy throughout the entire East Asian area including the Mainland and Taiwan. These demands are directly correlated with the
high-speed economic growth of the area. The primary push for transformation is from inside of each society. Influences from outside, for
example from the West, are usually secondary. Patterns for the transformation vary depending on historical background and economic and
political conditions. Each individual state or area has its own pattern
of development. In this sense, pluralistic politics is only a direction for
political development. It does not, and cannot, provide concrete models for each society.
In research on East Asian political development, I argued that
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Japan developed into a democratic stage by adopting a model of "informal pluralism." The model demonstrates that while Japan is similar to other democracies in terms of basic democratic structure, it has
been able to maintain its own characteristics in political as well as
economic development. 33 Therefore, "informal pluralism" has met Japan's strategic goals for development and met its own internal conditions as well.
It is not appropriate for a country to adopt another nation's political development model without regard to domestic conditions. Obviously, the Chinese model will be similar to those of other countries in
many ways, yet will keep its own distinguishing characteristics. The
models of a federalist China and "unification-led political pluralization" may be quite different from the patterns of other countries. One
has to recognize China's political reality: Since 1949 there have been
two opposing regimes under the leadership of two major parties, living
in different political and economic systems across the Taiwan Strait.
Separation has had a great impact on the political development of each
side. In other words, the current political situation is not only the
result of the internal development of each society, but is also heavily
influenced by the lack of bilateral relations. As time has passed, tension across the Taiwan Strait has been sharply reduced.
Progress in pluralistic development and the strong popular demands for democracy and political freedom within both societies is
even more significant. The pluralistic development in non-political
(economic and cultural) fields will foster future political pluralization.
Meanwhile, the development and consolidation of various political
forces will provide favorable conditions for future political development, which will lead to a gradual accommodation across the Taiwan
Strait. This process makes the above models possible.
I would like to emphasize that without the issue of unification,
Chinese politics would still move towards democratization on both
sides of the Strait. It is important to note that unification, although
critical in nature, is only one of many important issues that the two
sides have faced. Issues like internal politics, economic reform programs, and foreign policy are no less important than the issue of unification. Political liberalization and reform in both Taiwan and the
Mainland most likely will continue separately and autonomously in
both societies for a long time to come. The push toward political de33. For the detailed elaboration of the model of Japan's "informal pluralism," see
Quansheng Zhao, " 'Informal Pluralism' and Japanese Politics: Sino-Japanese Rapprochement Revisited," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, summer 1989, pp. 6583.
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velopment of each society is being led by indigenous forces. This has
been demonstrated by the Tiananmen demonstrations on the Mainland and the development of opposition forces in Taiwan.
Nevertheless, the process of unification does have its unique function. It is true that neither the CCP nor the KMT could or should try
to replace indigenous opposition forces on the other side. But, they
may play largely symbolic roles at the beginning, such as the checking
function. They will gradually move from the first stage of "crosschecking and mutual influence" into the second stage of "fair competition and pluralistic politics." In this sense, unification will serve as a
catalyst for China's political pluralization. "One country, two systems" may well develop into "one country, two (or more) parties"
under a federal system - an unintended consequence of unification.
Hence, it will become a peaceful and evolutionary process breaking the
political monopoly of the ruling parties and integrating various social
groups. In China's future political life, the CCP and the KMT, together with a few minor parties, will coexist peacefully for the first
time since the outbreak of the civil war in the mid-1940s.
This is not to say, however, that unification will only have a positive impact on China's political development. There is a negative side
of the possible development: After unification the new "federalist
state" will pose a great challenge to leaders on both sides. As demonstrated by the experiences of Germany and Vietnam, the stresses
caused by the clash of different political and economic systems may
grow. These stresses, if not handled properly, will produce new tensions between the two sides, which may lead to another political crisis.
Therefore, the feasibility of the model will depend largely on the realization of the six conditions that I have discussed. The whole idea is
based on two assumptions - a deep-rooted sense of identity as "one
China," and irreversible trends on both sides toward a more democratic society. The unification process will be in great danger if either
of these conditions fails to be met.
If Beijing really wants to prevent Taiwan from asserting independence and wishes to achieve the goal of peaceful unification, it will
have to learn to tolerate non-communist political forces including opposition parties. It has to accept not only the concept of "one country,
two systems," but also the notion of "one country, two (or more) parties" leading two different areas under, possibly, a federalist system.
On the other hand, if Taipei really hopes to unify with the Mainland,
or at least, to maintain a friendly relationship with Beijing (thus a
peaceful environment for the island), it will have to recognize the ne-
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cessity of finding a common ground (such as a federal system) with the
Mainland.

CHAPTER IV
SOUTH KOREA AND THE POLITICS OF KOREAN
REUNIFICATION

George 0. Totten and Yung-Hwan Jo
The fever for reunification, following the arbitrary division of the
peninsula by the occupying powers of the United States and the Soviet
Union in 1945, has risen and fallen with the tides of internal and external events. It reached a new historical level when the Prime Minister
of South Korea, Kang Young Hoon, met and shook hands with the
Prime Minister of North Korea, Yon Hyong Muk, on Wednesday,
September 5, 1990. Although no immediate "breakthrough" resulted,
a new plateau had been reached in that both sides were implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the other and they were calling each other
by their official names, the South being the Republic of Korea (ROK
or Taehan Minguk) and the North, the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (DPRK or Choson Minjujuui Inmin Konghwaguk).
SOUTH KOREA'S POLICIES TO 1980
It was in the 1970s, almost twenty years after the tragic Korean

War, that the North and South Korean governments began to take
some concrete steps toward peaceful reunification (which means showing some willingness to compromise) without the intervention of the
superpowers. In 1945 the Koreans had been unable to get their spontaneous attempt at creating a single government recognized by the
American occupation forces in the South. In the next three years the
Soviet and American occupying powers failed to get a coalition government formed, and they withdrew after their proteges had each established their own separate regime, the South being the first to
establish a government claiming to represent the whole country.
With both sides calumniating the other as illegitimate and both
justifying the use of force to realize their claims, the North's military
move south on June 25, 1950, no matter how it may have been induced, brought forth a United Nations condemnation and the intervention of the United States, using the UN's authority to legitimize its
military actions in concert with other supporting nations. This forced
the North back to its former borders. However, instead of stopping
(61)

62

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

there, the United Nations forces in hot pursuit crossed that border
themselves and advanced north almost to the Chinese border at the
Yalu River before triggering the intervention of Chinese "volunteers,"
who in turn forced the UN troops back to approximately the original
border between North and South Korea. This line was later recognized in a cease-fire agreement in 1953 which remains in force today,
signed by the North Koreans, the Chinese, and the United States (as
the representative of the United Nations). South Korea, however,
under its President Syngman Rhee, refused to sign the accord.
During the rest of the 1950s and the 1960s both the North and
the South were licking their wounds. Their borders were tightly
closed against each other. It was the high tide of the Cold War. The
United States opposed "appeasement" of communism anywhere. But
with the turn of the decade, President Richard M. Nixon did an unbelievable thing. Through his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, he
made secret, and then open, contact with the People's Republic of
China, culminating in the February 27, 1971 communique with the
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in which the United States said in effect
that there was just one China and that it was up to the Chinese to
work out how a peaceful reunification could occur. By this time, the
United Nations had recognized Beijing (rather than Taipei) as the government that represented China in the United Nations.
Also by 1972 Park Chung Hee had been in power for a decade,
had become President of South Korea in 1963, and was nearing the
end of his constitutionally limited second term. A former military
man, he had first come to power by a coup d'etat on May 16, 1961
against the short-lived government that followed in the wake of the
fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960. Now with over ten years' experience as
leader of South Korea in which remarkable strides in an export-oriented economy had been made, Park shocked the world almost as
much as Nixon had, by imitating him. Park secretly dispatched his
own "Kissinger," Lee Hu Rak, to North Korea to meet its Prime Minister, Kim 11 Sung. The result was made public by both sides on July
4, 1972, in a joint communique declaring that the reunification of Korea should be done through (1) independent Korean efforts "without
being subject to external imposition or interference," (2) peaceful
means, and (3) a greater national unity, "transcending differences in
ideas, ideologies, and systems." When this communique was issued,
hopes in Korea were raised that progress would be made. 1
1. United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), Report 1972, p. 39; for the North Korean version, see Foreign Broadcast Informa-
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President Park was able to use these hopes to argue that, if he
were given greater powers and a secure tenure, he would be in a
stronger position vis-a-vis Kim 11 Sung and thus be able to set in motion a process that would lead to peaceful reunification. He thus drew
up what he called the Yushin (Revitalizing) Constitution and got it
ratified in a referendum on November 24, 1972 by an overwhelming
91.5 percent. 2 But he never succeeded in getting very far with reunification, even though the constitution gave him dictatorial powers and
ensured his tenure for life. 3
Park justified his slow pace on reunification by promoting "incrementalism" as an approach in his 197_~ New Year's press conference.
According to him, the North-South dialogue would have to develop
steadily with mutual patience and sincerity, searching for the settlement of the easier questions first. This could start out with removal of
long-standing distrust and misunderstanding - what we can call
"confidence-building measures" (CBMs). He argued that, although
on the surface they looked as though they would take a long time, they
were really short-cuts to the achievement of peaceful reunification. 4 In
other words, this was "reunification preceded by peace. " 5 President
tion Service (FBIS), Daily Report, 5 July 1972, IV, p. D2. For an analysis of the
communique, see Young Whan K.ihl, "Korean Response to Major Power Rapprochement," in Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea, Silver Spring, MD: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973, pp. 139-164.
2. This was called his way of legitimizing his premeditated "coup in office" which did
away with the Third Republic and replaced it by the Fourth Republic. Young Whan Kihl,
Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest, Westview Press: Boulder, CO,
and London, 1984, p. 61.
3. Since Park was elected on December 23, 1972 by a handpicked constituency that
virtually assured him the presidency permanently, Kim 11 Sung, the leader of North Korea,
possibly believing he may have to deal with President Park very soon, drew up a new
constitution himself with a strong presidency on December 27 and got himself elected President the next day, attaining the same official status, as head of state, as Park. Up until that
time, since the founding of the DPRK in 1945, he had served as Prime Minister (and more
importantly as Secretary General of the Workers [Communist] Party). For the significance
of this change, see Dae-Sook Suh, Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 269-276.
4. The press conference is quoted and cited in K.ihl, Politics and Policies, supra, note 2,
p. 208.
5. The Korean term "tong'if' is often translated as "unification," but in English
"reunification" is more appropriate, since Korea was unified, except intermittently since
668 A.D. Also in this connection "nampook" is translated as "north-south" rather than as
"south-north" which is more literal but not good English. It is as bad as "'pooknam" would
be in Korean. In English "north-south" is neutral; it does not mean that the speaker prefers "north" to "south." In this book, "North Korea," the "North,'" and "South Korea"
and the "South" are capitalized, but it is equally permissible to use lower case, since they
are not proper names and the Koreans consider Korea as a single state temporarily divided
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Park sought to institutionalize a relaxation of tensions, while keeping
up a military guard, including the American forces.
The American military forces played a dual role. They served as
a safety shield in the eyes of the South Korean people, because they
would deter an attack from the North. The North knew that any attack on the Americans would bring the tremendous power of the
United States into play on the peninsula again. 6 Secondly the presence
of American forces gave the South Korean people the feeling that the
United States approved of the South Korean government. This perceived approval by the United States, which had the reputation of being the champion of democracy, rather than the stationing of troops
per se, gave the government a certain amount of legitimacy.
Finally, since the issue of peaceful reunification, or at least more
friendly relations with the North, was very popular, it provided the
leaders with political capital. Thus, Park, as well as his successors,
have found it extremely important to appear to be sincerely pursuing
the goal of national reunification.
To sum up, the reunification policy of the South during Park's
last years was (1) utilized for political purposes, (2) consisted of a stepby-step approach, and (3) should start with tension relaxation vis-a-vis
the North. This policy was already set when Park clarified it further
at his press conference for the New Year held on January 18, 1974, by
calling for a non-aggression pact between North and South Korea
wherein (a) both sides would promise publicly that they would never
wage armed aggression against each other, (b) both sides would refrain
from mutual interference in the internal affairs of the other side, and
(c) in all events, the existing armistice agreement would remain in
effect. 7

NORm KOREA'S POLICIES TO 1980
In North Korea, the DPRK. continued to champion the three basic principles of the joint communique of July 4, 1972, mentioned
above. The first principle being that reunification is an internal probby ideological differences and the remnants of superpower rivalry. Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society, Boulder, CO and London: Westview
Press, 1988, p. xi.
6. This prospect, it can be argued, was confirmed by the Iraq War of 1990-91. Of
course, North Korea takes the position that South Korea is not really a free and sovereign
state, because the U.S. with its troops there calls the tune.
7. These three policy principles subsequently became the "three basic principles for
peaceful reunification," as enumerated by President Park in his National Day Address on
August 15, 1974.
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lem for Koreans to solve without outside interference. Therefore, it
has since happened that the first demand the North Koreans have almost invariably made was for the withdrawal of American troops.
The second principle of peaceful reunijjcation became compromised
by the North Korean government's reluctance to deal with the "illegitimate" government of the South, especially in the early years of the
Chun Doo Hwan regime, which had come to power through a coup
d'etat in 1980. This means that instead of proposing "negotiations and
dialogue" with the authorities in the South as the peaceful alternative
to violence, the North simply left it as reunification by nonviolent
means. And finally the third principle_ of greater national unity was
interpreted by the North to mean that reunification talks should involve representatives from all parties and social organizations, not just
the "responsible authorities" in the South.
The Northern leadership is well aware that the Southern leadership - and this is truer today than ever before - has to deal with a
vocal domestic opposition that wants to share power itself in the
South. The North attempts to appeal to such political opposition and
the radical student groups in order to put pressure on the leadership of
the South. The government of South Korea takes this as "proor• that
the North is trying to destabilize the government of the South, overthrow it, and set up a "communist" regime that would submit to the
North on all its terms. Thus, if the North wants to pressure the South
into hurrying along with negotiations, this does not appear to be a
very fruitful tactic. But it is one way of trying to paint the South
Korean leadership as not being "democratic," because it keeps the
control of negotiations exclusively in the hands of the top leader of the
South and also because it uses the National Security Law against the
opposition. (That law is directed against subversion by the North but
it is so vaguely worded that it can be employed against a broad variety
of opposition to the government in the South.) 8
During the 1970s neither side made proposals sufficiently attractive that the other side could not refuse. Nevertheless, the overall
peace was maintained, despite a number of provocations, which are
not taken up in this chapter, but which served to keep tensions high.
One ray of hope flickered for six years and then went out. That was
the Red Cross talks that began in 1971 to address the problem of the
estimated ten million families that had been torn asunder by the Korean War. However, after 1973 these talks became stalemated for all
8. For a discussion of this law and its early uses, see Chi-Young Pak, Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1985, pp. 125-129.
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practical purposes, although working-level meetings were held from
time to time until December 19, 1977. Such an issue, of course, could
not go away, and has reappeared.
At the very end of the decade, renewed attempts were made to get
negotiations on track again. President Park in January 1979 made a
proposal to the North to resume discussions on all issues pending between the two sides "without any preconditions." The [North] Korean
Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland responded
by proposing a meeting in Panmunjom, which was held. Nevertheless,
the talks soon became deadlocked.
The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26,
1979, changed the situation completely. North Korea quickly made a
proposal for holding a meeting between the prime ministers of the two
sides. Before this could get underway, the Chun Doo Hwan coup
d'etat in May 1980, followed by the Kwangju uprising and its bloody
suppression, occurred, all of which threw cold water on any rapprochement between the two sides. The North took the position that
the government of the South was "illegitimate," and condemned the
K wangju Incident as a massacre. 9
After a great deal of preparation and fanfare the [North] Korean
Workers Party held its Sixth Party Congress starting on October 10,
1980. At that time it unveiled its proposal for the establishment of a
Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK). 10
The use of the name "Koryo" was put forward to solve the problem of the two names then and still in use, as mentioned above,
"Choson" for North Korea and "Hanguk" for South Korea. Koryo
was the name of the dynasty in Korea (936-1392) when its borders
approximated more closely the present borders of the country than
those of the preceding Silla Dynasty. The Silla Kingdom had incorporated Paekche and Koguryo and in that sense was united in 668, but
then the Parhae Kingdom came into existence in the North, taking
over part of what was Koguryo, so, in that sense, Korea was not as
united as during the later Koryo dynasty. Incidentally Koryo is the
source from which the West gets the name which in English we write
9. For a succinct description of this incident, see Koon Woo Nam, South Korean
Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability, Lanham, MD; New York;
London: University Press of America, 1989, pp. 221-224, 280-281.
10. This proposal is quoted and analyzed in detail in Kihl, Politics and Policies, supra,
note 2, pp. 214-230. For the official translation of the original text see, Kim II Sung, Report
to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee,
October 10, 1980, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980, especially "Let
Us Reunify the Country Independently and Peacefully," pp. 59-81.
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as "Korea." At the beginning of the dynasty, the capital was moved
to what is the present-day Kaesong, which is more or less in the middle of the peninsula. The 38th parallel which divided Korea between
1945 to 1948 ran north of Kaesong. Since the Cease-fire of 1952, the
Demarcation Zone (DMZ) runs south of it. Because it is so centrally
located, it could conceivably be made the new capital of the Confederation, as the North proposes a "reunited" Korea be called, or the
Commonwealth, as proposed by the South. 11
The DPRK proposal envisioned the establishment of a supreme
national confederal assembly composed of an equal number of representatives from the North and from the South plus some overseas Korean representatives (along the lines presumably of China). This
assembly would create a standing committee to act as its executive and
guide the existing governments of the North and the South. Each side
would have its own government, presumably continuing the governments (and economic systems) that already exist. The reunited nation
would be neutral or independent in foreign policy without foreign alliances. The two states of the republic would presumably have the task
of reducing and combining their military forces.
As summarized by Young Whan Kihl, the confederal republic's
national government would have the following functions:
(1) adhere to independence in all state activities and
follow an independent policy;
(2) effect democracy throughout the country and in all
spheres of society and promote great national unity;
(3) bring about economic cooperation and exchange
between the North and the South by ensuring the development of an independent national economy;
(4) realize North-South exchange and cooperation in
the spheres of science, culture, and education by insuring
uniform progress in the country's science and technology,
national culture and arts, and national education;
(5) reopen the suspended transport and communications between North and South, by ensuring free utilization
of the means of transport and communications in all parts of
the country;
(6) ensure a stable livelihood for the entire people in11. For the history of these dynasties mentioned earlier in this paragraph, see, for example, Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, translated by Edward W. Wagner with Edward J. Shultz, Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1984, Chapters 4-8.
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eluding the workers, peasants, and other working masses by
promoting their welfare systematically;
(7) remove military confrontation between the North
and the South by forming a combined national army to defend the nation against invasion from outside;
(8) defend and protect the national rights and interests
of all Koreans overseas;
(9) handle properly the foreign relations established
by the North and the South prior to reunification, by coordinating the foreign activities of the two regional governments
in a unified way; and
(10) as a unified state representing the whole nation,
develop friendly relations with all countries of the world by
pursuing a peaceful foreign policy. 12
From this summary, it is apparent that the North was proposing
a policy of "one nation and two autonomous regions." Moreover, this
arrangement was to be considered "permanent" for the foreseeable
future.
Looking back at this plan from 1991, over ten years later, it seems
a shame that so little has been accomplished by the two sides. The
borders are still as tightly guarded as before. The suspension of transport and communications as well as the bar on exchange and cooperation in the spheres of science, culture, and education continue
unabated. No direct trade took place until 1991. Still have been no
reductions of the military on either side. The mere thought of combining the reduced military on both sides into one force for defense of the
reunified country seems like a pipe dream.
In contrast to the North's policy of all or nothing, that is,
"reunification" in terms of a confederal system first- after the withdrawal of American forces - and then the working out of the various
problems, the South has called for a step-by-step approach. Its pre1980 position was basically incrementalist, calling for readjusting psychological attitudes prior to gradually working out the easier and then
the more difficult problems, culminating in reunification. The South's
position, then, can be characterized as having as its goal "one nation,
one government."
12. Kih1, Politics and Policies, supra, note 2, p. 215. This quotation has only been al·
tered by capitalizing "North" and "South."
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CHUN DOO HWAN'S POLICIES
With the advent of former General Chun Doo Hwan as President
of South Korea on March 3, 1981, greater emphasis was laid on a
possible meeting between the presidents of North and South Korea,
which he averred could create an atmosphere in which smaller
problems could be worked out over time. On January 12, 1981, President Chun invited President Kim II Sung to visit Seoul without any
preconditions and offered to visit North Korea himself, if invited. He
followed this up by a proposal in January of 1982, calling for the two
sides to jointly draw up a draft constitution. This would be done, he
proposed, by a Consultative Conference for National Reunification
(CCNR).
Granting that this would be a giant step, Chun proposed that the
two sides should first "normalize relations" by concluding a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between North and South Korea
containing seven provisions, conveniently summarized by Kihl, as
follows:
First, relations between South and North Korea shall be
based on the principle of equality and reciprocity pending
unification.
Second, the South and the North shall abandon all
forms of military force and violence, as well as the threat
thereof, as a means of settling issues between them and seek
peaceful solutions to all problems through dialogue and
negotiation.
Third, South and North Korea shall recognize each
other's existing political order and social institutions and
shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs in any way.
Fourth, the South and the North shall maintain the existing regime of armistice in force while working out measures to end the arms race and military confrontation in order
to ease tensions and prevent war on the Korean peninsula.
Fifth, the South and the North shall facilitate free travel
between the two halves of the peninsula, including the reunion of separated families, and shall promote exchanges and
cooperation in the fields of trade, transportation, postal service, communications, sports, academic pursuits, education,
culture, news gathering and reporting, health, technology,
environmental protection, and so forth.
Sixth, until unification is achieved, both parties shall respect each other's bilateral and multilateral treaties and
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agreements concluded with third countries, irrespective of
differences in ideologies, ideals and institutions, and consult
with each other on issues affecting the interests of the Korean people as a whole.
Seventh, the South and the North shall each appoint a
plenipotentiary envoy with the rank of cabinet minister to
head a resident liaison mission to be established in Seoul and
Pyongyang. The specific functions of the liaison missions
shall be determined by mutual consultation and agreement,
with each party providing the liaison mission from the other
party with all necessary facilities and cooperation to insure
its smooth functioning. 13
This proposal was followed up by many smaller concrete proposals that would bring Koreans from the North and the South together,
including at the 1986 Asian Games and at the 1988 Summer Olympics
later held in Seoul. However, the North found objections to all the
proposals and the result was their non-participation in the Olympics.
One offer by the North, however, was accepted by the South. It
was the offer by the Red Cross of North Korea of September 8, 1984
to provide relief goods for the victims of a flood in South Korea.
Without asking how much was needed the North announced that it
was willing to send 225,950 bushels of rice, 500,000 meters of fabric,
100,000 tons of cement and various medicines. 14 It is no secret that
one reason this was accepted was that the South thought that the
North believed that South would not accept aid from the North and
the South doubted whether the North could really deliver what was
promised. Nevertheless, despite the South's saying this was not really
needed and disputes about how the goods would be shipped, it turned
out that the goods were duly delivered to South Korea's Red Cross.
To upstage the North, the South took the occasion to send back as
presents to the North packages of consumer goods including TV sets
(that could receive South Korean broadcasts) altogether worth as
much as, or more than, the aid that had been sent by the North. Despite the snide remarks made by both sides, this gesture did seem to
improve the atmosphere in both the North and the South.
North Korean attitudes, however, were extremely self-righteous
and contemptuous of the South's leadership. In the North, the idea of
13. As summarized by Kihl, Politics and Policies, supra, note 2, pp. 219-20 on the basis
of the account in the Korea Herald, February 2, 1982.
14. These figures are from A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, published
by the National Unification Board, Republic of Korea, December 31, 1988, p. 202.
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the "Great Leader" Kim 11 Sung meeting with Chun Doo Hwan was
ridiculed, on the basis that the former enjoyed great legitimacy,
whereas the latter did not. All the South's rejections of North Korean
reunification proposals were summarily denounced as measures to
make de jure the North-South de facto division of the peninsula, inevitably perpetuating "two Koreas." Also the North insisted that the
rhetoric about respecting treaties with "third parties" was designed to
keep American troops in the South. The North argued that the
South's talk of humanitarian concern for the reuniting of families was
contradicted by the South's pressuring overseas Koreans not to go to
the North to visit relatives.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES
The big issue that thereafter dominated the 1980s and became
intertwined in the reunification issue was none other than the Olympic
games. Ever since the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in
September 1981, sitting in Baden-Baden, West Germany, chose Seoul
as the venue for the 24th Olympic Games, North Korea was highly
concerned. It first attempted to abort that decision. When it found
that was impossible, it proposed co-sponsoring. This led to long and
difficult negotiations in which the IOC attempted to get the two sides
to work out some agreement. But the North in the end did not accept
the concessions that the South was willing to make, and consequently
boycotted the Games. The North promised not to disrupt the Olympics in any way. The South nevertheless took tremendous precautions.
But the North evidently kept their word and caused no trouble.
The two sides did meet earlier, in 1984, to discuss the formation
of a single team to send to the 23rd Olympics in Los Angeles in July of
that year but North Korea joined the Soviets and others in boycotting
the Games, although the People's Republic of China participated
fully.
The Seoul Olympics were relevant to the reunification process in
several ways. Obviously any joint sports participation held the
probability of confidence building on both sides. The "ping-pong diplomacy" ofthe Chinese and Americans that started in Japan in 1971
and eventually led to normalization· of relations was on people's
minds. While the Olympics did not open up North Korea, they did
bring the Soviets and the Chinese as well as teams of Eastern Europe
to Seoul, where great goodwill was demonstrated toward them. This
led to the Soviets establishing an economic liaison office in Seoul and
the Chinese setting up special economic arrangements between the
Shandong region and Seoul.
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The goodwill demonstrated by the Koreans toward the Russians
at the Olympics led, two years later, to the surprise meeting between
President Mikhail Gorbachev and President Roh Tae Woo in San
Francisco on June 5, 1990. That meeting in turn made it just a matter
of time before diplomatic relations would be established between the
Soviet Union and the ROK. All this aided the South's strategy of
"cross-recognition," whereby the Republic of Korea would be officially recognized by the Soviet Union and China and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea would be recognized by the United States
and Japan. 15 At least South Korea was making contact with the Soviet Union and China, North Korea's allies, but Pyongyang was making little headway with Washington or even (until later) with Tokyo.
It looked as though everything was going South Korea's way. The
East European socialist states, starting with Hungary, established formal diplomatic ties with South Korea, in the face of protests from
North Korea. Only China was hesitant about more formal ties in consideration for North Korea's feelings.
The Seoul Olympics were significant in another respect. They
served as a further incentive to the democratization of South Korea.
Preparing the country for the games, both the government and the
people wanted to project a good image when the eyes of the world
would be on Seoul. They wanted South Korea to be seen as peaceful
and democratic. One of the main causes for violence and dictatorship
in South Korea had been the desire of Presidents Rhee and Park to
hold onto power indefinitely. Just one year before the Olympics, politics in South Korea had reached crisis proportions with masses of people joining with students in street protests. The issue was whether
Chun Doo Hwan would actually carry out his pledge to step down
after his seven-year term as President ended, in 1987, as he was required to, according to the Constitution, and, if he did, whether he
would try to continue to rule from "behind the throne," by putting in
a successor who was a puppet indebted to him. When he announced
in May 1987 as his chosen successor another former general, Roh Tae
Woo, who allegedly supported Chun in his decision to send troops to
put down the uprising in Kwangju in 1980, the reaction against this
was unexpectedly great and took the form of still wilder protests. 16
15. "Cross-recognition" had originated with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in
1975 and at the same time he suggested that the South propose that both North and South
be admitted to the United Nations simultaneously. See Byong-youn Choy, A History of the
Korean Reunification Movement: Its Issues and Prospects, Peoria, IL: Research Committee
on Korean Unification, Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, 1984, p. 141.
16. For a fuller exposition of the significance of the Olympics as well as the argument
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ROH'S DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOUTH KOREA
However, what was even more unexpected by far was Rob's reaction to the reaction. On June 29 he announced he was willing to accept all the demands of the opposition, including a presidential system
with direct popular vote and the release of the many political prisoners
as well as the restoration of full political rights to the chief opposition
figure, Kim Dae Jung, who had gained great support for putting his
life on the line in championing democracy and challenging both Park
and Chun. While Rob's move toward democracy was unexpected, he
probably had no other alternative. Only the military could put down
the degree of opposition that had arisen, but the military had become
neutralized by the rising tide of anti-Americanism that had its inception in the aftermath of the K wangju Incident of 1980 when troops
were moved down from the DMZ to Kwangju in the very south of the
country, because local troops could not be counted on to not sympathize with the local people and the protesters were calling for Chun
Doo Hwan to step down. People began to criticize the Americans for
supporting Chun by allowing troops, all of whom were technically
under U.N. (i.e., U.S.) command, to be used for political purposes. In
order to counter this, the United States was watching to see that the
military would not be used to suppress protestors calling for democracy. In such circumstances, Rob's move was most logical and, as it
turned out, successful.
Thereafter, in collaboration with the opposition leaders, presidential candidate Roh drew up a new constitution, got it ratified by the
people, ran under it and won. His victory, however, was only possible
because Kim Dae Jung and the erstwhile co-leader of the democratic
movement, Kim Yong Sam, fell out with each other and could not find
a formula for collaboration. In the voting for president, Roh Tae Woo
won only by a plurality. His two liberal opponents stacked up more
votes together than he got. His own vote was also eroded by another
conservative, Kim Jong Pil, who had once been a right-hand man of
the assassinated former President Park Chung Hee. Roh proclaimed a
new Republic in South Korea, the Sixth. Because of its popular support and its creation in collaboration with the opposition, it gained
greater legitimacy than any preceding regime. The image created
helped make the Olympics perhaps the most successful ever held.
Many were disappointed that the North Koreans did not particion democratization that comes in the next section below, see George Totten, The Democratization of South Korea and the Role of the Olympics in the Process, Occasional Paper 3,
August 1988, Center for Pacific Asia Studies, University of Stockholm, pp. 14-16.
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pate in the Games, but even under Chun a number of initiatives toward the North had been taken. An important one of these resulted in
renewed Red Cross talks for reuniting families. This occurred during
the fall of 1984. On September 20-24 for the first time officially sponsored private-level exchange took place. Visiting groups of 151 members reached Seoul from the North and the same number reached
Pyongyang from the South. They included art troupes that presented
performances in the host capitals. This was a moment of great joy for
both sides of the divided peninsula. 17
Economic talks also began and broke off during this period. Five
meetings were held between November 5, 1984 and November 22,
1985. The sixth was to be held on January 22, 1986 but was suspended two days earlier by the North in protest against the joint exercises of American and South Korean troops called "Team Spirit,"
which had been, and thereafter has continued to be, held almost
annually. 18
Even discussion about three-way talks on military issues among
the North, the South, and the United States forces were taken up on
North Korean initiative starting June 9, 1986. In the course of this,
North Korea on July 23, 1987 proposed "multi-national arms reduction talks" to discuss phased arms reduction on the Korean peninsula.
They called for reducing both the North and the South Korean forces
to 100,000 each by which time the United States would withdraw its
entire forces "including nuclear weapons." But the South proposed
that the North should start first, since it has so many more arms than
the South. Also the South insinuated that the North was making this
proposal to divide public opinion in the South and was therefore not
sincere. 19
When former General Roh Tae Woo took over as President in
January 1988, he gradually began to take a more positive position with
regard to reunification. Most significantly on July 7, 1988 he made a
"Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity." 20 In this he called for promotion of exchanges
between the people of North and South Korea and for opening the
door to overseas Koreans to visit both the North and the South.
It has since become clear that there is a contradiction between
North-South exchange and the Anti-Communist and National Secur17. For the negotiations leading up to this and its realization, see A White Paper on
South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra, note 14, pp. 201-263.
18. See ibid., pp. 263-296.
19. Ibid., pp. 359-362.
20. The statement may be found in ibid., pp. 461-465 and discussed on pp. 381-90.
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ity Laws, which have so far not been abolished. 21 To overcome th~s,
the South Korean government selectively gives permission to certam
people to contact North Koreans, thus waiving the law in their cases.
In this way President Roh and the South Korean government try to
retain control on all contact, using the police and the legal system to
arrest and sentence persons who make contact without prior government approval. As for the overseas Koreans, however, they are no
longer harassed by the South for visits to North Korea.
In his July 7, 1988 declaration "For National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity," President Roh brought up six other items.
The second was for arrangements to aid dispersed families to reestablish communication with each other. The third was to begin NorthSouth trade. The fourth was for ending the South's objections over
South Korea's allies having trade relations with North Korea for
everything except military goods. The fifth item was the expression of
hope for free inter-Korean contacts and cooperation in the world community. And finally the sixth was an expression of an intention to
help improve North Korea's relations with South Korea's allies. 22
This last item was part of a new policy on the part of the South,
namely, of ending North Korea's relative international isolation. This
was a real turnabout. It also provided further justification for South
Korea's attempts at rapprochement with Eastern Europe, the Soviet
Union, and China. North Korea continued its policy of opposing
"cross-recognition." Nevertheless, it was clear that North Korea was
very interested in "contact" with the United States and Japan.
In a step that allows for greater participation by the people of
South Korea in the "policy making" of reunification, the South Korean government on September 3, 1988 made public its intention to
roll back censorship of "communist" materials on a selective basis for
selected people. For instance: The Rodong Shinmun (the main north
21. This National Security (Gong'an Chongchi) law has been slightly amended from
time to time, the latest as far as this chapter is concerned was on May 10, 1991. In order to
try to lessen the pressure on Kim Dae Jung, in hopes he would not support the radical
students, the law was revised so as to make it not a crime not to report someone going to
the North. Kim Dae Jung had been accused of knowing about one of his party people
making a trip to North Korea. By the change in the law, Kim would be let otf the hook.
The government felt this would be a concession worth making to reduce somewhat the
opposition in the streets, since Kim had joined demonstrations and even suffered from the
tear gas used by the police to quell them. Korea Herald, May 11, 1991, pp. 12-14.
22. Chong Sik Lee, "Coexistence, Revolution, and the Dialogue for Unification," paper
presented at the Fourth Korea-US Conference on North Korea sponsored by the Korea
Association for Communist Studies and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, August 8-10, 1989, p. 2.
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Korean newspaper) and visual materials, it was said, "shall be open to
the public on a selective basis. " 23 Also broadcasts which slander
North Korea or its leader would be unilaterally suspended. Contacts
with North Korea were initiated in August 1988 with a view to arranging meetings between North and South Korean parliamentarians
to discuss relevant issues, an item that made a step in the direction of
the wider contacts that had been called for by the North.
President Roh's most dramatic appearance was his speech at the
United Nations on October 18, 1988. Some people wonder why President Kim 11 Sung did not also accept an invitation to appear at the
same time at the same forum in front of the nations of the world. It
would be pointless to speculate other than to note that Kim 11 Sung
may have felt it would be awkward to appear before the United Nations while the U.S. "cover" was still being used by American troops
poised against Kim's alleged threat to invade South Korea. As for
Roh, this was a wonderful opportunity for him, while he was still
basking in the afterglow of the Seoul Olympics (held September 17 to
October 2), and he made the most of it. 24
In his speech President Roh proposed to President Kim 11 Sung
that Kim and he hold direct talks with each other at a summit meeting
that could be held in Pyongyang or elsewhere and discuss issues such
as the following: ( 1) a non-aggression pact, (2) problems of disarmament, arms control, and other military matters, such as transforming
the existing Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace arrangement, (3) institutional structures for bringing about reunification, and
(4) other types of exchange and cooperation. He also called for a "city
of peace" to be built in the Demilitarized Zone. And he proposed
setting up a consultative conference for peace composed of the United
States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan, as
well as North and South Korea.
Inside South Korea this U.N. speech and the earlier July 7 declaration were aimed at assuring the people that the new Sixth Republic
was more sincerely committed to reunification. These speeches were
even designed in part to appeal to the increasingly radical and antiAmerican students who were demanding direct contact with the
North to hurry the process of reunification and the withdrawal of the
American military forces.
In the fall of 1988 following the Olympic Games the prospects for
improving relations with the North appeared favorable. For instance,
23. A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra, note 14, p. 399.
24. For a copy of the talk, see ibid., pp. 478-90 and for a discussion of it see pp. 429-39.
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the millionaire businessman (who had been born in North Korea bu~
since the war lived in the South), Chung Chu-Young of the Hyundat
Group visited the North with the apparent permission of the South
Korean government to talk about joint ventures, including tourism
from the South in the Kumgang Mountains which are located in the
North.
NON-OFFICIAL REUNIFICATION ACTIVITIES
In the spring, however, the atmosphere suddenly deteriorated
again, with the unofficial visit of the Reverend Moon (Mun) Ik-hwan
at the end of March 1989 to North Korea. Moon was a well-known
critic of the government who had denounced Roh for suppressing democracy and going too slow on reunification. He was apparently invited by President Kim 11 Sung along with Cardinal Kim Su-hwan,
Paek Ki-wan (a former presidential candidate), and the heads of the
four political parties in the South (which included Roh Tae Woo as
head of the Democratic Justice Party at the time). This was in line
with Kim's call for a Joint Conference of political parties, social organizations, and leading personalities of North and South Korea in 1988
and the North-South Consultative Conference in 1989. And this in
turn was part of Kim's alleged concern to carry on a dialogue with
more than just the incumbent South Korean leadership. However, in
the South this strategy was considered to be "united front" tactics,
aimed at seeking allies in South Korea and mobilizing radical elements
there. The South Korean government perceived this as attempts by
the North to "communize" the South.
The Reverend Moon vehemently and frequently denounced President Chun on the questions of civil liberties and reunification. He
took part in demonstrations. Now he made his way to North Korea
allegedly without the knowledge of the South Korean authorities, including the Agency for Security Planning (the organization that had
replaced the former Korean Central Intelligence Agency [KCIA]).
Moon was welcomed by President Kim 11 Sung who met with him for
some time. The Reverend issued a statement in which he praised Kim
and criticized South Korean reunification policy, although he was not
in complete agreement with Kim on a number of issues.
As soon as his presence in North Korea was known through an
announcement by the North, the South Korean media reported it in a
sensational way. It was immediately claimed that he had breached the
National Security Law in not getting permission from the South Korean government. And when he did return to the South, he was ar~
rested and later tried and sentenced for that transgression.
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This incident was taken up by the Northern delegates at various
meetings with South Korean delegations. For instance, the North unilaterally postponed the third preliminary meeting for arranging highlevel official talks, slated for Apri112, to April 26 and again to July 12
and so on, while the South objected to the intrusion of political issues
into what they called an "administrative matter. " 25
Then during the summer of 1989 North Korea held the 13th
World Festival for Youth and Students in Pyongyang starting July 1.
Young people came from many countries, both developing and industrially developed, with views ranging from left to center, most representing youth organizations to which they would report their
experiences. The South Korean radical Chondaehyop (Association of
National Student Representatives), a federation of student groups
from various universities in South Korea, secretly sent a female student from Hankook (Hanguk) University of Foreign Studies in Seoul
to the Festival as a representative claiming to represent the youth of
South Korea. Her name was Lim Soo-kyong (lm Su-kyong). She had
been able to get there, since she was staying in East Berlin. It turned
out that she was a Catholic student, who had been very much involved
in student protest. She was a type not much seen in North Korea,
where girls are more bashful and where there is no vocal opposition.
As such, she was said to be very impressive to North Korean youth.
She was an experienced speaker, self-confident, capable, and beautiful.
Being the only student from South Korea, she was the center of attention not only for the authorities in the North but also the students
from all the other countries. She denounced the South Korean authorities for not allowing South Korean students to attend the
Festival.
The South Korean government was furious, especially when a
Catholic priest, Father Moon (Mun) Kyu-hyon, a Korean resident in
the U.S., went to Pyongyang to escort her home, saying they would
arrive at Panmunjom, as a gesture to break down barriers, and enter
South Korea that way. This they did, and they were arrested, tried for
violating the National Security Law, and sentenced. 26 This prompted
protests from the North Koreans' Committee for Peaceful Reunifica25. South-North Dialogue in Korea, No. 048, Seoul: International Cultural Society of
Korea, December, 1989, p. 73.
26. The South Korean government did originally look into the situation and considered
allowing or even promoting South Korean student participation in the North Korean affair.
A year before the Festival on July 15, 1988, the South Korean North-South Student Exchange Promotion Committee proposed a meeting with the North to discuss South Korean
student participation. The North, however, rejected the overall exchanges and approached
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tion of the Fatherland, to which in tum the South Korean National
Reunification Minister, Lee Hong Koo, retorted that the North should
not be interfering in South Korean political affairs and especially not
condoning unlawful acts.
In recounting these events it might appear that North Korea was
eager to open up wide contacts with the South, while the South feared
contacts with the North. The irony of the situation was that the
North was probably more fearful of the exposure of its people to the
affluent South, being well aware of the way the East Germans came to
envy the West Germans. The South Korean government was cognizant of this, but they evidently feared losing internal control more
than what they might gain from subverting the North.

PRESSURES PUSHING THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER
The fact that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were becoming more friendly with South Korea and were eager to do business
with it was putting pressure on North Korea to carry out some "glasnost" and "perestroika" of its own.
In the eyes of its own people, the North Korean government, especially Kim 11 Sung, must continue to be seen as leading the movement towards reunification of the fatherland. It should not be
perceived as afraid to lose some of its power for the higher purpose of
reuniting the country, but that is logically and understandably the
prospect of what opening the country would entail. This probably
goes a long way to explain the stop-and-go tactics by the North. 27
The picture one gets of 1988 and 1990 is that both the North and
the South are being pushed toward each other by the trend of world
events, even while trying to outwit each other. They each want to
appear to be the one more eager for reunification, while the other side
is the one being unreasonable and sabotaging the effort. Despite all
this, to an outsider it does appear that they are inching towards a
reunification in which both sides continue to exist and maintain their
own positions and but find the mere presence of the other unsettling
and the prospect of having to share decision-making alarming.
During these last two years contacts have continued to increase in
number in several areas. While talks go on to prepare for some summit conference in the future, intergovernmental contact becomes more
the Chondaehyop student group directly to represent all South Korean students. For a
fuller explanation, see ibid., pp. 120-123.
27. Kong Dan Katy Oh, "South Korea: The View From the North,'' paper presented
at the Fourth Korean-US Conference on North Korea, August 8-10, 1989, pp. 5-29.
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frequent. There are discussions on the parliamentary level. More in
the limelight are endless contacts and meetings on sports. For example, the first successful joint North-South Teams were those for the
41st World Table Tennis Championships held in Japan in April 1991
and the planned 6th World Youth Soccer Championships. 28 But more
significant by far is the fact that South Korea imported US $162,000
worth of items between October 1988 when indirect trade was first
approved by both sides and January 199U9
Closer to the hearts of still grieving families are the Red Cross
working-level delegates contacts, holding out the glimmer of hope that
some may yet live to see long-missed loved ones and relatives. While
war appears more remote than ever, the glint of the steel of military
weapons reminds people that the terrors of war are close at hand ready
at the push of a button in anger, or fear, or by mistake.
The inter-Korean parliamentary talks have borne some fruit.
Before the beginning of 1990 some nine such meetings had taken place
since their initiation in August 1988. The two sides mutually agreed
to include a declaration of mutual non-aggression and pledges of increased exchange and cooperation in the agenda of future meetings,
but the North reserved the right to suspend them, unless the Team
Spirit military exercises were suspended. The lOth preparatory contact for the proposed North-South parliamentary talks took place in
the newly constructed Peace House in the Southern sector of
Panmunjom on January 24, 1990. This was built by the Seoul government in a little more than a year, as a symbol of its dedication to the
cause of reunification. 30
The 6th preliminary meeting to prepare for the proposed NorthSouth High-Level Officials Talks, i.e., prime ministers' talks was held
in the Unification House in the Northern sector of Panmunjom. This
led to the historic first meeting of the prime ministers of both sides
that took place on September 5, 1990 in Seoul when the South's Prime
Minister Kang Young Hoon introduced the North's Prime Minister to
President Rob Tae Woo. A month later on October 18, Kang shook
hands with President Kim 11 Sung in Pyongyang. The eventual goal of
28. The agreement on these events was first mentioned in The Pyongyang Times,
March 9, 1991, p.l.
29. FordS. Worthy, "Can the Koreas Get Together?", Fortune Magazine, Vol. 123,
No.3 (February 11, 1991), pp. 126-132; seep. 131. During the same period South Korean
chaebul (such as Samsung, Saangyong and Daewoo) spent about US $ 35 million on imports such as zinc, iron ore, fish and cement, which should whet the appetite of the North.
30. South-North Dialogue in Korea, No. 049, Seoul: International Cultural Society of
Korea, 1990, pp. 31-38.
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these meetings was to organize a summit meeting when President Roh
would meet with President Sung. During the last year or so there
have been rumors that Kim II Sung would step aside as President and
hand over that office to his son, Kim Jong II. Since that did not happen, there was speculation that Kim II Sung himself may "condescend" to meet with Roh, if that would either "bless" or consummate
the founding of a "confederal" republic.
President Roh's proposal made on September 11, 1989 for a
"commonwealth" is surprisingly close to Kim 11 Sung's "confederation." Actually, the Korean word "yonbang" is used to translate both
of these words. In that speech Roh used the word "gongdongche,"
which literally means "common entity," but it was translated as "commonwealth" in English. With this idea, Rob associated the three longstanding basic principles for reunification, namely, "independence,
peace, and democracy."
This formula suggests that, while expanding openness, exchanges,
and cooperation, and building mutual trust through North-South dialogue, a Korean National Charter should be adopted (through a summit meeting between the two Koreas). This charter would contain a
comprehensive package of agreements covering a basic scheme for attaining peace and reunification, mutual non-aggression arrangements,
and the founding of a Korean commonwealth, as an interim stage towards reunification.
In characterizing this as an "interim stage," Rob was actually
going back to a position Kim 11 Sung had abandoned. Kim had
changed this in 1980 to say that he considered the "confederal" republic to be a permanent arrangement and thus "reunification" itself.
Now Roh has said that this "commonwealth" could be a transitional arrangement. The commonwealth, he suggested, should have a
Council of Presidents as its highest decision-making organ, a Council
of Ministers as the executive organ, a Council of Representatives as
the legislative body, and a joint Secretariat.
This Council of Representatives, he further proposed, should
draft a constitution for a reunified Korea. This would provide for a
new unified legislature and a single central government for a democratic republic. 31
31. South-North Dialogue in Korea, No. 048, supra, note 25, pp. 32-35; and Kwang Soo
Choi, "Korean Reunification: Its Problems and Future Prospects," in Hyung K. Jin (ed.),
Korea in the 1990's: Prospects for Reunification, Pomona, CA: Industrial Research Institute
for Pacific Nations, College of Business Administration, California State Polytechnic University, April 1990, p. 34.
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Another front on which North Korea is inching forward is in
contact with the United States. Consular level contacts between
Americans and North Koreans began taking place in Beijing.
America nevertheless still carried on its economic embargo and policy
of diplomatic non-recognition, vis-a-vis North Korea. Also the North
Koreans considered that the U.S. was letting too few North Koreans
into the U.S. So they decided to cut down on visits to North Korea of
South Koreans living in the U.S. The U.S. bad made an earlier concession to North Korea in 1988 by slightly amending the Trading with
the Enemy Act to allow American exports of much needed humanitarian items, such as foodstuffs and medicines.
It is in the academic field where perhaps the most hopeful signs
for improvement have appeared. 32 A symposium took place on July 57, 1990 in San Francisco. It was jointly sponsored by Stanford's
Center for International Security and Arms Control, together with the
Center for International Studies of Seoul National University and the
Peace and Disarmament Institute of North Korea. Delegates included
Professor Chung Chong-uk, Director of the Center for International
Studies, and Professor Han Sung-Joo of Korea University from the
South. The main organizer on the American side was Dr. John W.
Lewis of the Department of Political Science at Stanford. Delegates
from the North included Song Yo-gyong, Director of the Peace and
Disarmament Institute.
At that symposium scholars from the North appeared to be taking the talk of confidence-building measures (CBMs) seriously, for example, cuts in the military forces on both sides of the border.
Representatives from both the North and the South seemed to have
reached a consensus on trimming down and eventually stopping the
arms race, which is still going on between North and South Korea. In
fact, the North Korean scholars were even willing to accept the concept of joint inspection in a process of arms reduction.
NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS
The first North Korean scholars to come to the Los Angeles area
were Kim Byong Hong, Vice Director, Institute for Disarmament and
Peace, DPRK, and Chong Yon Gap, Researcher, from the same Institute. This meeting took place on January 22, 1991 and was arranged
by Tony Namkung for the Asia Society in connection with the University of California at Los Angeles where the meeting took place. At
that talk Mr. Kim interrupted Mr. Chong, when the latter translated
32. See George Totten, "Developing Contact with North Korea," in ibid., pp. 58-67.
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incorrectly what Mr. Kim said. Mr. Kim did not call for the "immediate" withdrawal of American troops but a "phased" withdrawal, according to three-way agreements. Mr. Chong was so used to saying
"immediate" that he had forgotten the policy had changed. 33 At that
meeting the scholar from the South was Kim Hakjoon, who was serving as Chief Assistant to President Roh for Policy Research.
The South Korean view has been that the military and political
confidence-building measures should proceed gradually and incrementally. The North's position has been that the presence of the enormous amounts of military hardware on the peninsula causes tensions
and saddled both sides with enormous economic burdens; large-scale
reductions of armaments would alleviate this. This means that the
North holds arms reduction as the first measure. Namely, confidencebuilding would be ineffective until some concrete evidence of arms reductions takes place.
The South from the beginning has called for nation-wide elections. The North has been skeptical of this, because the population of
the South is twice as large as that of the North and the North feared
they would be outvoted. In view of this perspective, the North's demand for a confederal system of two equal states is easily understandable. The South has accepted the concept of equality, for without that
nothing could be accomplished.
In the words of a North Korean, "[The Democratic Confederal
Republic of Koryo] is not for a certain specific class or section but for
the entire Korean people; it is a form of a unified state in the interest of
both, without causing damage to either side. The regional autonomy
of the DCRK is designed to provide independence of each part within
the framework of effecting national unity and reunification." 34 Therefore, the DCRK concept seeks "an equal number of governmental representatives from the north and the south." True to this concept, the
North insists on equal representation in all its negotiations with the
South.
In 1990 the North Korean approach towards reunification has
33. This was noted by Totten who was present at the seminar which was titled somewhat misleadingly "China in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy." Significantly there was
also a scholar from Vietnam, Dao Huy Ngoc, Deputy Director, Institute of International
Relations, Hanoi. There was some discussion as to whether Hanoi or Pyongyang would be
first in gaining American recognition. The impression was that it would be Hanoi.
34. Appendix H (Text of the Opening Address by Kim Jong Su, Deputy Director,
Institute of International Affairs, DPRK), Dialogue With North Korea: Report of a Seminar
on "Tension Reduction in Korea", New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1989, p. 72.
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become somewhat more defensive, probably brought on in part by the
increasingly aggressive stance of the South, demanding national integration, and in part by the perception in the South that the North was
becoming increasingly isolated in the context of what might be called
the emerging "new international order." 35 This scaling down of
Pyongyang's demands into accepting the DCRK framework as the
end product of reunification and the coexistence of the two "equal"
parts is consistent with the DPRK's Ninth Supreme People's Assembly held in late April 1990.
Some of the other policies that the Assembly adopted also revealed a growing change in perspective, notably the following:
(1) Tension reductions and the creation of a peaceful
international environment.
(2) Removal of all obstacles separating the North and
the South- such as the "concrete wall," that runs along the
southern side of the Demilitarized Zone, and the National
Security Law, which forbids unauthorized contact with
North Korea- which hinder free human interaction and
movement.
(3) Adopting policies by both sides, particularly foreign policies, that will not hinder the independent and peaceful reunification of the motherland. Here one can see the
underlying assumption that historically Korea has been
overly influenced by outside powers to its detriment, the
present division of the country being only the latest tragedy.
In line with this way of thinking, separate membership in the
United Nations would only play into the hands of those who
wish to see the continued condition of division. Therefore,
there should be just one foreign policy.
North Korea does not want any of its neighbors, including the
Soviet Union and China, to be able in any way to pursue a "two
Koreas" policy. That is why North Korea continued to oppose "cross
recognition."
Despite the North's wishes, however, Eastern Europe has now
recognized South Korea, China has established semi-formal trade ties,
and the Soviet Union has, in addition to an economic liaison mission
in Seoul, established formal diplomatic ties.
While unable to stop the Soviet Union, especially after the sur35. This was the impression Yung-hwan Jo received when he attended a pro-North
Korean symposium held in Osaka, Japan, in July 1990.
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prise meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and President
Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco on June 4, 1990 and again on Chejudo
on Gorbachev's return home from Japan on April 23, 1991, North
Korea has continued to be successful in temporarily halting China's
move toward full diplomatic recognition of South Korea.
Nevertheless, when Japan made clear its intention to begin rapprochement, after a year and a half of feelers, North Korea could no
longer refuse. It welcomed Japan's "king maker" Shin Kanemaru,
when he arrived with a bipartisan delegation in Pyongyang on September 24, 1990. Kim II Sung listened to an apology for the "agony and
damage" that Japan inflicted during its occupation of Korea. That
was expressed by Kanemaru on behalf of the head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Toshiki Kaifu, which means it was not exactly
an official Japanese government act, but after all Kaifu was the Prime
Minister. This was accompanied by Kaifu's recognition of North Korea's right to demand war reparations. Kanemaru met with President
Kim three times. Kim raised the question of diplomatic recognition in
a positive fashion but also demanded compensation for the 45 years of
division since Japan's withdrawal in 1945. 36
The question of American contact and even recognition of the
DPRK is also being discussed in Washington. In the Spring 1991 issue of Foreign Affairs, Admiral William J. Crowe, until recently
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for the elevation of
talks in Beijing to higher levels in order to prepare for the normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. Specifically, he
suggested linking the U.S. call for an international inspection of the
North Korea nuclear facilities with the North's demand for removal of
U.S. nuclear deployments in South Korea and a U.S. pledge not to
use nuclear weapons against North Korea. He also advocated that the
North should pledge not to attack the South and not to develop nuclear weapons. 37 In order to prepare the atmosphere for such talks,
Washington could unilaterally end the annual "Team Spirit" military
exercises in South Korea. In any case, it appears that cross recognition is proceeding inexorably.
Whether this will impede or facilitate the "reunification" of the
two Koreas is still not clear. But in view of the German case, even
having two separate seats in the United Nations as separate states did
36. See, Sam Jameson, "N. Korea Gets Apology From Japan Delegation," Los Angeles
Times, September 25, 1990, p. A4 and also "Japanese Back N. Korea Bid for Compensation," Los Angeles Times, September 29, 1990, p. A4. The South Korean reaction was that,
if North Korea gets any compensation for the years after 1945, the South should get it, too.
37. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 133-134.
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not prove to be an obstacle to the country's reunification. The fact
that West Germany "swallowed" East Germany and is staggering
under the tremendous economic burden of East Germany with its
comparatively backward economy provides a sobering warning concerning Korean reunification.
"REUNIFICATION" SCENARIOS
In the light of this example, one can imagine at least three possible scenarios in North Korea concerning Korean "reunification."
(1) North Korea could collapse like East Germany, or Rumania for
that matter, following a popular revolution against the government.
This would place South Korea in the position of paying huge amounts
of money to integrate the North Korean economy into that of South
Korea. Not being as comparatively strong as West Germany, this
might well bring South Korea to the point of collapse or beyond it.
(2) The North Korean government could carry out a controlled opening of its doors to the outside world in a selective manner, while at the
same time engaging in its own version of "perestroika," if not "glasnost." The attempt would be to avoid the "spiritual pollution of Western bourgeois liberalism," of the kind that led to the Tiananmen
Square Incident in China. This would maintain the North as a viable
institution, able to take care of itself in collaboration with the South
(3) The North Korean government
during a period of transition.
might be overthrown by a coup d'etat of progressive minded military
and party people, who would carry out changes learned from the experiences of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and then negotiate
and collaborate with the South. This would mean that the South
would have to pay more for the realignment of the economy of the
North than under condition (2) above but a lot less than under condition (1).
Variations of the above scenarios can easily be imagined. But
clearly a collapse of the kind that happened in East Germany - and
that may have weighed on the minds of perceptive thinkers in South
Korea and even in the North in recent years - would not be in the
interests of South Korea.
Despite all the talk of the "economic miracle" of South Korea
and statistics that purport to show that it has a Gross National Product (GNP) four, five, or even ten times larger than that of the North,
South Korea does not have the economic strength in comparison to
North Korea that West Germany had to East Germany. Even in
terms of population, East Germany with less than 20 million was only
one-third the size of West Germany with its almost 60 million,
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whereas North Korea with about 20 million is about one-half the size
of South Korea. In land mass North Korea is approximately the equal
of South Korea and in terms of the potential of mineral wealth it is
superior.
Finally the political legitimacy of East Germany was highly compromised by the stationing of Russian troops there for so many years.
East Germany did not champion the reunification of the motherland,
as has North Korea. In addition North Korean independence vis-avis the Soviet Union, thanks to the proximity of the People's Republic
of China, is much greater than East Germany's. And finally no matter
how exaggerated are the tales of Kim II Sung's participation in the
Korean resistance to Japan, that gives him a legitimacy never enjoyed
by the East German leadership.
One can also imagine various scenarios taking place in South Korea that could affect reunification.
(1) Increasing anti-government riots in South Korea demanding
the resignation of President Rob Tae Woo, which might result in some
faction of the army taking over again as has happened in the past. If
that happened, it would slow down the process of reunification, because it would probably use the anti-Communist National Security
Laws to crack down on the students and others. But this scenario
seems unlikely, given the present world situation and the widespread
attitudes against military intrusion in politics both internally and
abroad.
(2) The South Korean government may make concessions to the
anti-government protestors by abrogation or significant revision of the
National Security Laws. After all, the government on Taiwan in May
1991 abrogated the Law on Suppression of the Communist Rebellion.
If Taiwan that is so small compared to mainland China can do this,
how about South Korea? This could lead to a more democratic approach to reunification in that the government would not be able to
monopolize the process of reunification, as it has so far.
One cannot predict what will happen, but it is ironic in the light
of the past that the South and the North may gradually start to collaborate for extending the life of the North Korean regime for the sake
of a more peaceful and orderly transition than that which occurred in
Germany.
East and West Germany had years of closer contact than North
and South Korea have today. That included communication, travel
and trade. In the case of the Koreas, the first direct trade between the
two parts was initiated when a South Korean freighter left Mokpo on
July 27, 1991 for Nanjin in North Korea loaded with 5,000 tons of
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South Korean Tongil (Reunification) variety rice, grown in the South
in 1988. It had been arranged that payment would be made in coal
and cement. 38 This was the first trickle in what bids fair to become
torrent in both directions in time.
On the international political level contact was growing fast also.
Seeing that its two staunchest allies would no longer keep South Korea
out of the United Nations, North Korea reversed itself on full U.N.
membership and then on July 8, 1991, handed in its own application
for membership in the U.N. Assembly. A month later when South
Korea had submitted its application, the U.N. Security Council
adopted a resolution recommending both North and South Korea be
granted entry simultaneously. 39
Thus, the challenge to both North and South Korea is the same
-find a way (or many ways) to work together for the mutual benefit
of both the North and the South, for the future generations of Korea
as a whole, and for regional and world peace and prosperity.

38. Korean Newsreview, Vol. 20, No. 31 (August 3, 1991), pp. 12-13.
39. Ibid., Vol. 20, No. 32 (August 10, 1991), pp. 4-5.

CHAPTER V
PEACE, COOPERATION, AND REUNIFICATION IN KOREA
Byung-Joon Ahn

PEACE AND COOPERATION BEFORE REUNIFICATION
Despite movement toward reunification by China, and the unification of the two Germanies - Korea remains a divided nation. The
cold war continues on the Korean peninsula, both politically and
militarily.
North-South Korean relations are moving from confrontation to
negotiation. Dialogues on political and military issues have begun, but
no substantive progress will be seen in the immediate future. North
Korea continues to guard its political system under Kim 11-Sung, despite strong external pressure for change. When the North Koreans
deliberately transform the political structure, then the North and
South will achieve peace, cooperation, reconciliation, and eventually
reunification.
Five conclusions may be drawn from the status of North-South
Korean relations:
First, the international trend toward detente and interdependence
is forcing the two Koreas to move toward peace and cooperation. The
impact of international changes will encourage direct dialogues between the two sides, which in tum will "Koreanize" their relationship
and normalize diplomatic relations, ultimately resulting in
crossrecognition.
Second, the South has achieved democratization at home and
greater international acclaim for having successfully hosted the 1988
Olympics. As a result, the South is in a position to normalize relations
with socialist countries through its Nordpolitik initiative. In conjunction with its diplomatic initiative, the South has begun to pursue a
policy of building a Korean commonwealth with the North.
Third, although North Korea's economy is stagnant and the
Northern government has made efforts to improve relations with the
South, the U.S., and Japan- the present Northern leadership is committed to preserving the current political system.
Fourth, North-South relations are shifting into an era of recognition. Militarily and politically, the South is in a more favorable posi(89)
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tion than the North, which has been reluctant to negotiate for
domestic reasons. The main issues of negotiation will, therefore, be
arms control and economic cooperation.
Fifth, though little will be achieved from North-South dialogues
in the next few years, both sides anticipate that negotiation will bring
peace, cooperation, and reunification. To achieve these goals, the two
Koreas will need the support of the U.S., Japan, China, and the Soviet
Union.
The following elements affect the current status of North-South
Korean relations: 1) the international situation, 2) the situation in
South Korea, and 3) the situation in North Korea. The South Koreans and the international politics favor negotiation, while the North
Koreans remain ambivalent.
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL
DETENTE AND DE JURE CROSSRECOGNITION
The changing international environment reveals a clear trend toward global detente, which in tum is transforming the relationship
between the two Koreas from de facto to de jure crossrecognition.
Among the changes that have a substantial impact on the Korean peninsula are the end of the cold war, the thrust toward German unification, political shifts in Eastern Europe, normalization of Soviet-South
Korean relations, the U.S. strategic view toward Asia, and the rise of
Japan as a global economic power.
1.

The End of the Cold War and the Advent of German
Unification

The multitude of changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe
signal the end of the cold war, as the NATO leaders at the London
summit declared in July 1990. German unification also changed with
its currency reunification on July 1, 1990. More than anything else,
the (so far) successful merging of two economies in Germany acts as
persuasive pressure on North Korea to modify its rigid stand on unification. The resurrection of civil societies - along with the resurgence
of pluralism and market forces- in Eastern European countries is
making North Korea an international outcast, even among the socialist states.
After Gorbachev changed the Brezhnev Doctrine into the Sinatra
Doctrine, the Soviet Union decided to pull troops out of Eastern Europe, virtually ending the cold war. After its ideology is challenged
and war is no longer a viable state plan, communism will inevitably
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collapse, as demonstrated so graphically by the Romanian incident.
The assertion of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union is threatening
to break apart this communist empire. The Warsaw Pact seems to
have become defunct, and a unified Germany is a foregone conclusion.
At the sixth U.S.-USSR summit in June 1990, Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev renewed their commitment to the new detente with their
agreements on START nuclear weapon reductions and new trade
relations.
2. Normalization of Soviet-South Korean Relations
The Soviet Union is gradually normalizing its diplomatic relations with South Korea in the midst of these changes. It is remarkable
that Moscow has began to separate the Korean question from its
global rivalry with the U.S.- and even from its alliance with Pyongyang. Gorbachev signaled this to Kim Young Sam when they met in
the Kremlin on March 22, 1990. 1
North Korea is interested in securing as much economic cooperation as possible from South Korea; it is also engaged in a diplomatic
game - playing South Korea against Japan in an attempt to prod
Japan into changing its policy. At the same time South Korea hopes
to use its leverage over North Korea, so that the latter can emulate the
examples of Eastern European countries by initiating reforms and
greater opening to the world community.
Moscow is applying its New Thinking and Glasnost to Asia in
general and Korea in particular. Thus, Moscow has begun to take up
the issue of divided Korea in its bilateral talks with Washington. On
record, it is urging both Seoul and Pyongyang to resume dialogues and
reduce tensions. The Soviet press accurately reported and openly
characterized North Korea as Kim 11 Sung's personal museum. 2 For
this reason Alexander Shebin, a veteran correspondent based in
Pyongyang for seven years, was expelled from North Korea in May
1990. 3 Nevertheless, since establishing a consular department in Seoul
in January 1990, Moscow has been seeking a "two-Koreas" policy by
diplomatically recognizing the Republic of Korea. The summit meeting of Presidents Rob and Gorbachev in San Francisco on June 5,
1990 marked the culmination of this process, which will have farreaching impact on North-South Korean relations.
With its relations with Washington steadily improving, Moscow
I. Korean Herald, March 31, 1990.
2. Yomiuri Shimbun, April I, 1990.
3. International Herald Tribune, May 25, 1990.
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is interested in applying pressure on Pyongyang to sign the safeguard
agreement regarding the nuclear reprocessing facilities in Youngbyun.
Moreover, Moscow has made it clear that establishing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula takes precedence over accomplishing
unification. Thus, its view on security and economic matters have
been edging toward Seoul's.
3. The U.S. Strategic Review: Troop Reduction and Arms Control
Mter conducting a strategic review of the presence of American
forces in Asia and Korea, the U.S. plans to reduce troops in its forward deployment. As the U.S. plans to reduce troops stationed in
South Korea (in pace with North Korea's willingness to take measures
to build confidence), this review should encourage arms control negotiations between the North and the South.
Under the Nunn-Wamer Amendment, the Bush administration
has submitted a report concerning this review to Congress, which envisages a future transition where South Korea assumes "a leading
role" and the U.S. "a supporting role" in South Korea's defense. According to Paul Wolfowitz, who explained the report, the U.S. would
play the role of "a region balancer, honest broker and an ultimate security guarantor" in Asia. 4 As for Korea, the report provide a flexible
timetable outlining three stages for both the reduction of American
troops and the sharing of the financial burden. During the first phase
in 1991-93, the U.S. will reduce American forces by 7,000 persons,
including 2,000 Air Force personnel and 5,000 noncombatants.
Washington has asked Seoul to appoint the chief delegate to the Military Armistice Commission and to increase South Korea's burden of
maintaining American troops to $ 1.3 billion.
During the second stage in 1994-95, the U.S. will reexamine the
North Korean threat, the state of North-South relations, and improvements in South Korea's military capabilities - and then consider further U.S. military restructuring. At this stage, the U.S. can transfer
operational control over land forces to a Korean general. Finally, during the third stage in 1996-2000, the U.S. expects South Korea to take
the lead role in defense. 5
It is evident that this report is prompting Seoul to increasingly
4. The text of Paul Wolfowitz's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee
on April 19, 1990.
5. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century,
the Report of the Defense Department to the Congress on the military presence on the
United States in Korea, April 1990, p. 17.
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assume responsibility for Korea's own defense. Equally clear is the
assumed linkage between American troop reduction and North-South
arms control possibilities, because all U.S. forces will be withdrawn
from Korea only when the North and the South agree on a confidence
building measure that can assure peace and stability.
4. Japan as a Global Actor: A Regional Political Role
The relative decline of the U.S., and the Chinese and the Soviet
preoccupation with their own domestic problems have helped to
change the status of Japan from a "free rider" to a global actor. With
growing economic and technological power, Japan has begun to reassert a regional political role in Asia.
While the U.S. continues to play a balancing security role, Japan
is being asked to play more important roles in economic matters.
Since Japan does not have many friends in Asia, it has eschewed from
assuming security roles. But Tokyo is currently aiming at asserting its
political role commensurate with its economic clout by increasing its
international activities. Evidence of this trend is indicated by Japan's
resumption of credit to China, for which Prime Minister Kaifu sought
President Bush's approval at the Houston Summit in July 1990. By
inviting President Roh in May 1990, Tokyo provided Emperor Akihito with a chance to apologize to South Korea by saying that he felt
the deepest regret for the suffering of Koreans caused by his country
during the colonial period. 6 Besides these gestures, Tokyo is planning
to use the Emperor's visit to South Korea and other Asian countries as
a means to enhance Japan's image abroad. In this symbolic manner,
Japan is attempting to play a stabilizing role in Korea and throughout
Asia.
It should be clear from the analysis below that South Korea has
become an active global participant. In contrast, North Korea has
alienated itself by rejecting the global trends toward political pluralism
and economic interdependence.
THE SOUTH KOREAN SITUATION: STABILITY AND
SELF-CONFIDENCE
The propitious development in the international system coupled
with the democratization and economic development at home has enabled South Korea to project a measure of stability and self-confidence
in its foreign policies and unification efforts. This can be discerned
from Seoul's Nordpolitik diplomacy and the idea of a Korean Com6. Korea Herald, May 25, 1990.
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monwealth. The merger of three parties into one large ruling party
does hold some political uncertainty, but it is being regarded as a preparation for the coming era of negotiations with the North.

1. Economic and Political Development
Although the South Korean economy is facing a sluggish phase
now with the rising prices of land, goods, services, and labor, South
Korea has demonstrated its potential by hosting the 1988 Olympics.
If it achieves a successful structural adjustment to overcome current
difficulties, South Korea could become one of ten leading trading
countries by the end of this century.
In addition, South Korean politics have experienced democratization since June 1987 when Rob Tae Woo agreed to accept demands for
the popular election of the president. Elections and party politics have
been restored; human rights and an independent judiciary have also
been reactivated. As a result, the old pattern of authoritarianism is
being transformed into a new pattern of pluralism. Although politicians have failed to elicit public support, the overall trend of democratization seems to be irreversible. As institutions of democracy set their
roots in the State and society, there will emerge an optimal balance
between economic development and political stability in South Korea.

2.

Nordpolitik: Crossrecognition

Seoul's diplomatic success in Nordpolitik, i.e., its policy toward
China, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, has been quite
spectacular. Since South Korea established diplomatic relations with
Hungary in February 1989, South Korea has similarly done so with
Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Mongolia. On
October 20, 1990, South Korea and China signed a treaty establishing
trade offices on each side's capital and promoting normalization of foreign relations. 7 It is also on the verge of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It is currently engaged in negotiations for
this diplomatic purpose with Vietnam and the other remaining socialist countries.
South Korea's economic relations with these countries have rapidly expanded. In 1989, trade with these countries exceeded $ 4 billion, making South Korea their fourth largest trade partner: about $ 3
billion with China, $ 600 million with the Soviet Union, and $ 400
7. Shih-chiehjih-pao (World Journal), October 20, 1990.
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million with Eastern European countries. Its investment and cultural
relations are also likely to expand in the years to come.
3. A Korean Commonwealth
Against the backdrop of these developments, President Rob announced a plan in September 1989 for building a Korean Commonwealth. The key to this new proposal is to institutionalize ministerial
meetings, summits of the highest authorities, and consultations of representatives from the two legislatures as an interim forum before accomplishing reunification.
It is important to note that the South pledged itself to treating the
North as a partner in the process of building a national community.
In so doing, the South accommodated much of the North's contentions for equal representation and addressing military and political issues first. By embarking on programs to build confidence and
facilitate economic cooperation, this proposal seeks to lay the groundwork for reunification which will be achieved by peaceful agreement.
4. Party Realignment for a Grand Ruling Party
On January 22, 1990, Rob Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim
Jong Pil reached a dramatic agreement to merge their parties into the
new Democratic-Liberal Party, which enabled them to enjoy an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. One motivation for this
move was to restore unity and stability in preparation for negotiations
with the North.
This merger served to end the political stalemate that had
plagued Korean politics since Roh was elected as president with only
37 percent of the popular vote. The outbreak of infighting between
Kim Young Sam and Roh, however, has disappointed the public.
Faced with economic and social malaise, the leaders are trying hard to
preserve a united front.
Whatever happens to their struggle for political succession, it is
inescapable that this new party will be primarily responsible for governance and for devising policies toward the North.
From a comparative perspective, the South Korean situation has
improved a great deal. Hence, the South is in a position to accommodate most of the North's demands with a sense of self-confidence, except for those attempts at military or revolutionary provocation.
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THE NORTH KOREAN SITUATION: ISOLATION AND
DEFENSIVENESS
North Korea is isolated, because it is defensive against the democratic revolution rising in its erstwhile allies. North Korea is bent on
keeping socialism by consolidating the existing system under Kim 11
Sung. New ideas in the North are not so much in the substance of
politics and policy as in the style. An example of such a change is
found in Pyongyang's deliberate efforts to improve relations with
Washington and Tokyo.
1.

Diplomatic Isolation

It is evident that North Korea is isolated, even from the socialist
countries. Pyongyang has recalled most of its students from the Soviet
Union and Eastern European countries. After its ambassadors to
these countries had an emergency meeting in January 1990, Pyongyang halted verbal attacks on those countries which established diplomatic relations with the South.
China is one of the few countries still friendly with North Korea.
In March 1990, Jiang Zemin paid a formal visit to Pyongyang and
promised to defend socialism with North Korea. But China's reforms
and open-door policy are at odds with North Korea's rigid central
planning and self-reliance policy. Most devastating of all is
Gorbachev's summit with Rob which hit at the heart of Kim 11 Sung's
political legitimacy. He has lost support from those on which he could
rely as a source of strength.
2.

Economic Stagnation

All indicators show that the North Korean economy is stagnating. The lack of infrastructure, incentives, and proper policy accounts
for this. The bulk of the North's industrial production depends on
plants and technologies from the Soviet Union. Over one half of its
trade has been with the Soviet Union. Apparently, both China and the
Soviet Union have decreased supplies of energy and goods to the
North in recent years.
Since Pyongyang has defaulted on its payments for foreign debt,
it cannot successfully invite trade and investment from the West. The
rule of diminishing returns seems to be further limiting its productivity. Most serious of all is the shortage of food and necessities. This
picture is really far from the North's official depiction of itself as a
paradise on earth.
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3.

Internal Consolidation
Faced with external isolation and economic difficulties, North
Korea has chosen to consolidate the political system in the mold of
Kim 11 Sung's cult of personality and long-held philosophy. The
Ninth Supreme People's Assembly was formed in April 1990, six
months ahead of schedule to consolidate "the people's regime." Contrary to expectations, Kim 11 Sung was reelected as president to a fifth
term at the first session in May; he further pledged to uphold his brand
of socialism. He put some of the old military guards in positions of
power and appointed his son Jong-il as the second ranking Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. One third of the new 687member parliament are newcomers who are allegedly followers of
Jong-il. Interestingly enough, about six percent of them are non-communist party members. Also noteworthy is the fact that most provincial governors are members of the Central People's Committee, while
premier Yong Hyong-muk of the State Council is not a member. 8
4.

A Softer Stance Toward the South, the U.S., and Japan

In his speech to the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim 11 Sung
revealed a somewhat softer stance toward the South, the U.S. and Japan. In a five-point statement on unification, he reaffirmed the familiar calls for a peace agreement with U.S., for free movement of people
by removing "concrete walls" between the North and the South along
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), for abrogating anti-communist laws,
for building an international environment conducive to unification, for
resuming dialogues not only between authorities but also between social groups and political parties, and, finally, for forming a national
united front involving all Koreans at home and abroad.
The only new aspect in this speech was revealed when he said: "If
the North and the South are to join the U.N. before Korea's reunification is achieved, they must not hold two separate seats but enter it
jointly as one member." 9 This is designed to forestall the South's unilateral entry into the U.N.
The way in which Kim 11 Sung departed from his previous
speeches is that he avoided attacks on the U.S. and Japan. Moreover,
North Korea returned the remains of five American soldiers killed in
the Korean War to the United States at Panmunjom on May 28, 1990
as a humanitarian gesture. This is only a tiny fraction of the 8, 172
8. Nodong Shinmun, May 24, 1990.
9. The Text of Kim II Sung's Speech to the First Session of the 9th People's Supreme
Congress, May 24, 1990.
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military personnel listed as missing in action [MIA] that are still unaccounted for since the Korean War ended in 1953. By offering further
returns, Pyongyang is calling upon the U.S. to upgrade the level of
negotiations that have been held at the consulate level in Beijing to an
ambassadorial talk at some other place.
Clearly, Pyongyang is signalling a willingness to improve its relations with Washington. Yet Washington has insisted that Pyongyang
stop supporting state terrorism, resume dialogues with Seoul, stop diatribes on the U.S., sign the safeguard agreement on nuclear facilities,
and expand confidence building measures in addition to further accounting for U.S. MIA's. Unless there is real progress in these areas,
Pyongyang's approaches to Washington are likely to remain fruitless.
What concerns the North Korean leaders most is how to keep
their system intact in the face of serious challenges from abroad.
Their priority lies in justifying their continued rule to their domestic
audience. By tightly controlling channels of communication, they are
trying to minimize the impact of foreign inputs and find their own way
to survive politically. Should they allow reform as did many Eastern
European countries or as did the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, their
own power will be in jeopardy. They have little choice but to opt for
the Chinese model of defending their political stakes while allowing
some economic reforms. This is why they refuse to change. Hence,
they have become defensive by displaying a soft flexible stance at least
in style, if not in substance, toward the outside world.
NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS AT A CROSSROAD
North-South Korean relations are at a crossroad between confrontation and negotiation. The diplomatic and economic race has
been won by the South, and even the military and political race seems
to be shifting that way. But the North relies primarily on the so-called
"Juch'e" ideology of unification which refuses to recognize the South
Korean system, whereas the South is diversifying the sources of its
political legitimacy by achieving democratization, economic development, social welfare, and internationalization.
Confrontation seems inevitable as long as the two different systems struggle for legitimacy and security. Negotiation is also necessary for survival and coexistence. Settlement of pending issues, such
as economic cooperation and arms control can be achieved only
through dialogue. Substantial differences in the way that the two sides
approach these issues still exist.
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1. The Struggle for Political Legitimacy: Peace before or after
Unification
The North and the South have been struggling for political legitimacy. The North has attempted to legitimize itself via the Juch'e ideology and by applying it to the South through advocating unification
before peace. The South, however, has been trying to engage the
North in dialogues so that peace can be assured before unification,
which should be reached through mutual agreement. The very nature
of the North Korean political system compels Pyongyang to seek a
united front strategy against the South to justify its own political legitimacy to its domestic audience and to some sympathizers in the
South. 10
This struggle is a distinctive aspect of North-South Korean relations. Unlike the two Germanies, both sides are technically at war,
with hostilities abated by an armistice, creating a zero-sum game with
a high quotient of distrust and hostility. 11 In this sense, political and
military conflicts are combined. The North still refuses to recognize
the South as a legitimate entity while the South is ready to accept the
North as a partner for a North-South Commonwealth. 12
2. Military Balance: Quantity v. Quality
The military balance along the DMZ favors the North at least in
quantity because it has about one million troops, whereas the South
has only 600,000. Given the size of South Korea's GNP, which is
almost eight times that of North Korea's, and the level of the South's
technology, the balance should soon shift in the South's favor in terms
of quality.
Because the North has deployed 60 percent of its forces along the
DMZ and because Seoul is only 35 miles away from the DMZ, the
North has reduced the warning time for attacks to only 24 hours. The
American troops between Panmunjom and Seoul serve as the most
effective deterrent to a possible North Korean invasion. For political
reasons, Pyongyang has consistently demanded the South's withdrawal and replacement of the armistice with a peace agreement with
10. Byung-joon Ahn, "North-South Korean Relations and the U.S.," in Robert
Scalapino and Hong-koo Lee, eds., U.S.-Korea Relations, Berkeley, California: Institute of
East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986, p. 159.
11. Byung-joon Ahn, "North-South Korean Relations and the Major Powers," in Robert A. Scalapino, Seijaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-joo Han, eds., Asian Security
Issues, Regional and Global, Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1988. p. 198.
12. Ibid., p. 199.
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Washington agreement.
3.

which could be accomplished through a tripartite

Dialogue: Between Social Groups or Governmental Authorities

Thus far, there have been three rounds of dialogue since 1971_13
From January 1988 through July 1990, there were thirty-five contacts
at Panmunjom: nine preliminary sessions preparing for a senior level
political and military talk, eleven preliminary sessions preparing for a
parliamentary talk, fifteen sessions of sport talks preparing for a single
team for the Asian Games in Beijing, and seven sessions of working
level Red Cross talks preparing for resumption of family visits and
exchanges of art troupes. Just before "Team Spirit 1990" got under
way, the North unilaterally suspended all of these dialogues. Even
after the South called for their resumption after the exercise was over,
the North showed a negative reaction, complaining that the South had
refused to accept revolutionary plays. Suddenly in June 1990, however, the North called for resumption of high level parliamentary
talks, and the South welcomed this.
In principle, Pyongyang wants to have a dialogue, but insists on
having political consultative meetings of leaders from various social
groups and political parties, in addition to the talks between the two
authorities. For example, Pyongyang has extended an invitation to
President Roh not as the president of the Republic of Korea, but as
the ruling party - along with others, including dissident leaders.
Seoul also wants to have talks with Pyongyang. Preferring governmental talks, the South is committed to blunting any attempt by
Pyongyang to capitalize on the divisiveness within the South Korean
society. Since August 1989, Seoul has added democracy to peace and
self-determination as principles for unification, while calling upon
Pyongyang to improve its human rights record.
4. Military Settlement v. Economic Cooperation
Another difference in the approach is the degree to which each
authority places emphasis on military settlement as its first priority
and calls for the withdrawal of American troops. Seoul favors having
economic, social, and cultural cooperation first - and moving onto
the more difficult military and political settlement later in order to
relax tension and to restore trust. Since October 1988, when President
Roh said at the U.N. that he would go to Pyongyang to discuss any
13. Ibid., pp. 200-205.
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issues raised by Kim 11 Sung including those on the non-aggression
declaration and arms control, Seoul has been trying to accommodate
Pyongyang's calls for military talks as well.
Since Seoul set out to accommodate Pyongyang's preference for
political and military issues at high level talks in July 1990, both sides
agreed to convene prime minister level talks in September and October
1990. Hence, this round of dialogue has raised hopes for opening a
new era in North-South relations.
Indeed, there are emerging some areas of convergence as Seoul is
ready to take up military issues and Pyongyang is interested in economic cooperation. For example, the North invited Chung Ju Young,
honorary chairman of the Hyundai Group, in January 1989, and persuaded him to sign an agreement for the development of a tourist attraction around Mount Kumgang. But when Mr. Chung wanted to
deliver some vehicles and equipment before his second visit, Pyongyang rejected the offers in May 1990.
It should be noted here that Seoul can make concessions on economic cooperation and Pyongyang on military settlement. If the two
sides are seriously interested in probing each other's interests, they can
find some common ground. It is significant that Pyongyang made a
proposal for arms control right after the plan for the Roh-Gorbachev
summit was announced. The proposal called for a direct meeting between the North and the South for the first time, even though it revealed almost no new substance. 14
PROSPECTS: PEACE, COOPERATION AND
REUNIFICATION
Considering the changing international environment and the
North-South Korea situation, a long term and gradual development
should involve first peace, then cooperation, and finally reunification.
International political changes and the South Korean situation augur
well for making such a shift from military confrontation to political
negotiation. North Korea seems to be hesitating mainly for domestic
reasons. But even the North cannot go against the mainstream of history forever; it has little choice but to accept dialogue, crossrecognition, confidence-building measures, cooperation, and reunification by
mutual agreement.
14. Korea Herald, June 2, 1990.
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Dialogue

Resuming dialogues between the two governments is the surest
way to build trust and peace. Once Seoul and Pyongyang resolve to
settle their differences through negotiation, it will be easy for them to
reach agreement on issues such as crossrecognition, arms control, economic cooperation, and reunification on the basis of common interests.
Logically speaking, there is no reason why Presidents Rob and
Kim could not have a summit for this purpose, given that the RohGorbacbev summit was realized. Even without such a summit, the
responsible authorities should negotiate pending issues. It is unrealistic that they can be resolved through meetings of social groups, as the
North is demanding. The first priority in the North-South relationship, therefore, should be to resume a series of dialogues between the
two governments for the purpose of probing each other's real interests
on the basis of self-determination for all of Korea, instead of rehashing
the propaganda of the past. This is the essence of what is meant by the
"Koreanization of the Korean question."
2.

Crossrecognition

The surrounding powers should render assistance and urge both
sides to have dialogues. To do so requires that they normalize relations with the North and the South. China and the Soviet Union
should normalize their relations with South Korea, and the United
States and Japan should normalize their relations with North Korea.
It must be emphasized that this should only be a provisional state of
diplomatic relations until the Korean peninsula is completely reunified
(provided, of course, that North Korea and South Korea remain
peaceful in the meantime).
The North's contention that such crossrecognition is a device to
perpetuate the Korean division bas been discredited by the German
reunification. By no means is crossrecognition an end in itself; it is
only a means to reduce tension and encourage cooperation. Also, the
North seems to change its position on crossrecognition, demonstrated
by the fact that the North is cooperative in applying for one-vote U.N.
membership with the South - although it is unrealistic to imagine
how these two states can function together with only one vote if both
are admitted to the U.N.
3. Confidence-Building Measures and Arms Control
Now that the North bas indicated a willingness to have direct
military talks with the South, there is a possibility that the two sides
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can have constructive negotiations concerning anns control and confidence-building. In fact, many points in Pyongyang's recent proposal
coincide with what Seoul has consistently advocated. Among these
are operational measures like informing each other of military exercises and making the DMZ a truly demilitarized zone.
It is significant that Pyongyang proposed placing confidencebuilding measures and the need for the reduction of forces on both
sides before the withdrawal of American troops and other items. In
addition, it did not specify a timetable for such withdrawal in this new
proposal. This comprehensive proposal contains important measures
to build political confidence and improve Korea's image, which should
precede other operational and structural anns control steps, as was
similarly done in European negotiations. No less important is that
Pyongyang has indicated its serious willingness to negotiate confidence-building and anns control with Seoul bilaterally.
To realize a structural anns control measure like the reduction of
anned forces and disengagement of forward deployment from the
frontline necessarily requires long and hard bargaining. This is why a
political talk should precede a military talk in Korea. It can contribute to restoring some measure of trust, economic cooperation, and
other exchanges which might be considered confidence-building measures. Most important of all, given the tense military situation along
the DMZ, negotiating a disengagement of troops and offensive equipment by both sides to a rear area is essential to assure deterrence, as a
one Soviet anns control expert has proposed. 15
After the North and the South reach some agreement on these
matters, other concerned parties can be involved in guaranteeing their
implementation. From this perspective, linking progress in anns control to the reduction of American forces is necessary, not only to facilitate political dialogue, but also to encourage military talks between
North and South Korea. After the two sides conclude a peace agreement, the U.S., China and other concerned powers can discuss the
issue of ending the armistice and endorsing the peace agreement.
4.

Peace, Cooperation and Reunification

In conclusion, a realistic prospect for North-South Korean relations is a scenario of peace, cooperation, and reunification. If the
15. Alexei Arbatov, "Pacific Vortex: Arms Control and Related Security Problems for
the Far East," a paper for the conference, "In Search of a New World Order in East Asia"
sponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley ~d
Dong-a Ilbo, Seoul, South Korea, February 3, 1990, Santa Barbara, California.
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North decides to accommodate such a process or experience some
structural transformation as have other socialist countries, the potential time span of this prospect of unity will be shortened. Translating
such a scenario into action accords with the goal of diffusing the Korean cold war and of sustaining the global detente that is becoming
universal. Seen in this light, there seems to be no more important task
than keeping peace and stability on the Korean peninsula which has
become an island of the cold war in contemporary international
relations.

CHAPTER VI
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECfS FOR PEACE AND
UNIFICATION IN KOREA
Sung-Joo Han

INTRODUCfiON
Since the three-year Korean Confiict ended 37 years ago, there
has not been a war on the Korean Peninsula. But the peace has been
an uneasy one, often punctuated by incidents and clashes that could
have escalated into a major conflict. Both North and South Korea
have lived with the fear that the other side might be inclined to provoke a war. The arms buildup on both sides and the alliance relationships that have evolved to date can be traced directly back to the war
and the resultant anxiety and sense of insecurity. Thus, it has been a
precarious peace, maintained by a balance of defense and deterrence
capabilities.
Today, in 1990, the Korean people on both sides of the demarcation line, have an historic opportunity to make that peace more durable and to make the unification of their divided country a reality. The
objective circumstances, both domestic and international, allow the
two sides to begin to build bridges of exchange, open channels of communication, and devise means of cooperation that will make the relationship less dangerous and more productive, as well as more
conducive to peaceful unification. However, this can only happen if
the two sides transform their old ways of confrontation and rivalry
into new approaches of accommodation and cooperation. They must
learn to refrain from mutual recrimination and accusation, from attempts to take advantage of each other's internal political dynamics
and from the creation of artificial obstacles and preconditions to constructive talks and exchanges which could otherwise lead to cooperation and peace, and ultimately to unification.
The international situation today is ripe for a breakthrough in the
North-South Korean situation. Increasingly, members of the international community are placing greater importance on economic advancement rather than on political or military goals. All this is
evidenced not only by improvement of the major power relations, but
also by the actual and prospective improvement of relations between
(105)
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traditional rivals in the area. This means that as the North and the
South are undergoing a major change from confrontation to accommodation, both in form and in substance, other countries are not likely
to object to, or obstruct, the development of constructive and productive relationships between them.
Furthermore, during the past several years, South Korea has
gone through rapid political change and economic development that
would make it necessary and ready to start to expand exchanges and
cooperation with North Korea. Indeed, South Korea has undergone a
political transformation that makes it receptive to any reasonable proposals about improving North-South Korean relations that North Korea can offer. Economically, South Korea, which has had double-digit
growth during the past years, is becoming a major power. This
presents both North and South Korea with an extraordinary opportunity to cooperate for the common prosperity of all the Korean people.
As they cooperate, work together, freely travel in each other's territory, and conduct economic, cultural, sports and other exchanges, the
chances of peace and of unification will ultimately be enhanced.
In order to achieve permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula,
unification of the country would be the best way. Even as Koreans
strive for peaceful unification, however, they have to recognize that it
is not going to be an easy and quick task, considering the mutual distrust that pervades the relationship between the two sides, as well as
differences in ideological orientations, socio-economic structures and
political systems. However, there is no reason to leave all forms of
exchange and cooperation until the day when unification is achieved.
Thus, in order to promote peace and the unification of Korea, the
two Koreas should adopt a gradual and simultaneous approach. As
they work on the grand design of unification, they can also work for
the gradual reduction of tension, through arms talks and confidencebuilding measures. At the same time, they can and should try to build
a structure of peace based on an agreement between North and South
Korea - which one might call a peace agreement - which will replace the present armistice structure.
In short, what is most urgently needed is the building of confidence, which has been lacking between the North and South ever since
the outbreak of the Korean Conflict in 1950. Rather than simply talking about the results of tension, such as the weapons systems and deterrence capability, they have to go to the causes thereof, which are
intentions and anxieties. As confidence and trust build up, it will be
possible to restructure the security arrangements that North and
South Korea have with their respective allies.
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THE STATE OF NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Twice since 1953, when the Korean War ended with the signing
of an armistice, both North and South Korea were engaged in serious
dialogues to improve their hostile relationship, with a third occasion
yet to come. The first dialogue took place during the 1972-73 period,
when the North-South Korean Red Cross met to discuss the possibility of reuniting family members separated between the two areas. Subsequently, the two sides agreed to establish a North-South
Coordinating Committee to discuss reconciliation and reunification.
The dialogue was discontinued in 1973 because of Pyongyang's refusal
to deal with the Seoul government. The second period of North-South
Korean dialogue was between 1984 and 1985. At that time, NorthSouth Korean talks were divided into four different subjects - Red
Cross/family reunion, economic cooperation, political discussion between the parliamentarians, and sports. By examining why the conciliation talks of the mid-1980s failed to produce any positive results, we
can diagnose the problems of today's North-South Korean relationship and prognosticate its future.
In 1984, hopes of North-South reconciliation arose when North
Korea made, and South Korea accepted, an offer of relief supplies to
aid victims of the flood in September of the same year. That gesture
opened the way for the economic talks- the first between high-ranking representatives of the Pyongyang and Seoul governments since the
division of the country, as well as meetings to discuss issues related to
family reunion and possible North Korean participation in the 1988
Olympics. The Red Cross talks in 1985 led to an exchange of meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang, and also to visits by 50 separated family
members from each side to the "other area" where many of them had
reunions with their kin and relatives.
Pyongyang apparently concluded that talks with Seoul would be
a necessary step in establishing ties with Western powers, particularly
with the United States and Japan. It also saw talks with Seoul as a
necessary means of realizing its proposal for "tripartite talks" among
the United States and North and South Korea, inasmuch as the
United States was insisting that direct inter-Korea talks should precede any possible multilateral negotiation on the Korean issue.
North Korea probably had an economic motivation as well for
opening the various channels of dialogue with South Korea. Recognizing that it was lagging behind the South economically, it wished to
move out of its political and diplomatic isolation and regain its ability
to borrow from abroad and trade with other countries - an ability
that had been seriously damaged by previous debt defaults. By start-
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ing dialogues with South Korea, Pyongyang hoped to open the possibility of starting or otherwise expanding economic exchanges with
noncommunist countries such as the United States, Japan and the
countries of Western Europe.
The South Korean government had its own political motives for
welcoming Pyongyang's willingness, although shortlived, to engage in
talks with the South. As the host country for various major international events, including the Olympic Games that were to come, it was
eager to secure North Korean acquiescence, if not cooperation. At the
same time, the improvement of North-South Korean relations was
seen by Seoul as a necessary step to open its own relations with the
Soviet Union and China. Seoul also hoped that the North-South Korean dialogues and exchanges and improving relations with the
"northern neighbors" would promote peace and the possibility of unification in Korea.
Renewed exchanges in the mid-1980s led nowhere, as several obstacles kept Pyongyang from seriously pursuing accommodation with
South Korea. Pyongyang was constrained by its own ideology and by
political requirements. For Pyongyang, dealing directly and officially
with South Korean "authorities" was tantamount to accepting the
"two Koreas" formula, which it had opposed all along. Furthermore,
it did not have any intention of making it easy for Seoul to stage the
1988 Olympic Games successfully, as it was understandably unhappy
that the potential participation of North Korea's allies in the games
would enhance South Korea's prestige.
Under these circumstances, when the South Korean domestic
political scene became increasingly volatile and unpredictable, Pyongyang decided at the end of 1985 to suspend all talks, ostensibly in protest of the U.S.-R.O.K. "Team Spirit" military exercise. Inasmuch as
the exercise had been a regular annual event, it was clear that North
Korea concluded that the dialogue had to be suspended until after the
political situation in South Korea, as well as in North Korea itself, was
sorted out. North Korea was undergoing a process of succession and,
hence, one could not rule out the possibility of a policy debate within
its leadership.
In the final analysis, the second period of North-South Korean
dialogue came to an end because neither side had a genuine interest in
a productive outcome from the exercise. Pyongyang was afraid of
"conferring legitimacy" on the South Korean government and also of
facilitating South Korean expansion of relationships with its own allies, particularly the Soviet Union and China. It saw the possibility of
the South Korean policy collapsing under the weight of its own inter-
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nal division, a lack of legitimacy and political instability. On the other
hand, the South Korean government was afraid of a false sense of security that might result from superficial reconciliation with the northem adversary, and which might, in tum, lead to the weakening of the
U.S. security commitment to Korea. Both protagonists recognized the
usefulness of the status quo and the absence of a major breakthrough
in inter-Korean relations, at least for the time being. In short, interKorea talks between both Pyongyang and Seoul were not likely to be
seen as a means to achieve a genuine improvement of relations between them. Thus, it came as no surprise that the talks produced no
positive results.
North Korea refrained from participation in the Seoul Olympics
altogether, and instead concentrated on staging a successful International Youth Festival, which was held in June 1989. South Korean
student activists were invited to the event. The South Korean government, for its part, insisted that the visits and exchanges should be undertaken within a framework agreed upon by Seoul and Pyongyang.
Pyongyang, however, intended to bypass the Seoul government and
take advantage of the pluralistic nature of the South Korean polity.
Unproductive as they were, talks nonetheless continued in a sporadic
fashion between both North and South Korea for a while in several
areas, holding out a slim hope that one day a breakthrough in NorthSouth Korean relations might take place. Even those talks have been
suspended completely since 1989.
Meanwhile, Seoul and Pyongyang continued to exchange unification proposals. In response to Pyongyang's call for a Washington-Seoul-Pyongyang tripartite meeting to discuss military matters and the
withdrawal of U.S. troops, Seoul proposed a North-South Korean discussion on a peace agreement, credibility-building measures, and arms
reduction. In addition, South Korea has shown much eagerness to
open economic and trade relations with the North. As a means to
encourage economic exchanges, the Seoul government removed restrictions on inter-Korean trade, making it possible for South Korean
companies to engage in direct transactions with North Korea and to
import North Korean goods ..
NEW ELEMENTS IN NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS
In the second half of the 1980s new domestic and international
developments have given the North and the South policy dilemmas as
well as options that could bring about a change in their relationship.
In the international arena, the most notable and important development was a new detente between the United States and the Soviet
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Union, which resulted from Gorbachev's new political thinking and
accommodation policy. It not only led to the signing of an new Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty between the two superpowers,
but also caused a reassessment of U.S. strategic requirements and
plans in both Europe and Asia. As the United States is gradually persuaded that both Soviet military might and the threat that it poses are
actually decreasing, there is a weakening of U.S. conviction that it
needs to counter the Soviet Union militarily throughout the globe and
on all levels. A change in the U.S. perception of the Soviet military
threat and challenge also affects the U.S. view concerning the strategic
value of the Korean Peninsula, as well as the presence of U.S. troops
in Korea.
The Soviet Union is extending its conciliatory hand, not only to
the United States, but also to its allies. For South Korea, which has
been seeking the establishment and expansion of relationships with the
socialist (or formerly socialist) countries, the Soviet initiative
presented a welcome opportunity to accomplish that goal. Improvement of the relationship between the Soviet Union and South Korea
can also serve as an incentive for the United States to seek an improvement of its relationship with North Korea.
Another element that would have an important bearing on U.S.
policy toward South Korea is the enormous double deficit - in budget
and trade- that the United States has been experiencing for several
years. Facing a critical need to cut (or at least slow down the increase
of) its defense budget, the United States has been emphasizing "burden-sharing" by its allies in Asia as well as Europe. The temptation to
resort to "burden-sharing" grows as the deficit continues to place serious political and financial burdens on the United States. Ironically,
the countries who oppose this policy are those with whom the United
States has the largest trade deficit- Japan, West Germany and South
Korea - where the United States maintains large overseas contingents. These facts combined may very well lead to a reduction of
U.S. military presence in those countries. Many Americans are beginning to wonder whether the United States should continue to assume
the main defense rol~ for countries which maintain a large trade surplus with the United States at a time when U.S. strategic interests,
particularly in relation to military rivalry with the Soviet Union, seem
to require reassessment.
While so many changes have taken place in and around the Korean Peninsula, North Korea manifests essentially the same rhetoric
and goals that it has maintained for over four decades. Although the
changed environment has not caused North Korea to initiate a major
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change in its domestic and external policies, it does present a seri~us
policy dilemma to Pyongyang, which has to choose between openmg
up the country and reconciling with South Korea, on the one hand,
and maintaining the existing stance at the cost of further lagging behind in its economy and international standing on the other. The lack
of progress in North-South Korean relations, at least until now,
presents Seoul with a dilemma of its own in that it has to maintain a
strong military posture while everything else points in the opposite
direction. At the same time, however, the fluidity of the situation
presents both the Seoul and Pyongyang governments with policy options that were not available before, offering the possibility of a significant change of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang.
POLICY DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS
The most critical policy question for Pyongyang is whether to
open up the country- even partially, to the outside world, at considerable political risk - and thus to forego its time-old goal of driving
the South Korean government out of existence. So far, it has shown
virtually no indication of doing so, although such a policy choice
could be made in the future. Pyongyang can still choose between several alternatives on other more concrete and specific issues concerning
its relations with South Korea and the United States.
Pyongyang's existing policy consists of three key elements: a proposal for a confederation between North and South Korea, namely the
Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo; a call for a tripartite conference of the two Koreas and the United States; and a demand for the
withdrawal of U.S. troops. [(On May 31, 1990, in the wake of a summit meeting between South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and Soviet President Gorbachev, Pyongyang proposed arms control talks
with South Korea.)] As preconditions for its implementation, the confederation proposal calls for the signing of a peace agreement between
North Korea and the United States and the withdrawal of foreign
(U.S.) troops from Korea. From Pyongyang's point of view, it is a
useful proposal, not only because it will be to the political advantage of
monolithic North Korea in the unlikely event that the confederation is
actually realized, but also, and perhaps more relevantly, because it
preserves the propaganda value of Pyongyang's desire for peaceful
reunification, as well as a means of putting pressure on the United
States to withdraw its military presence in Korea.
Pyongyang's proposal for a tripartite conference calls for discussion among the three parties- the United States, North Korea, and
South Korea- of the withdrawal of U.S. "military force," arms re-
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duction by North and South Korea, and the verification of U.S. withdrawal and Korean arms reduction. According to the proposal,
bilateral negotiations will be held concurrently between the United
States and North Korea for a peace agreement, and between North
and South Korea for a non-aggression declaration. When Pyongyang
first proposed the tripartite format in 1983, it probably did so, at least
in part, in response to Beijing's urging that Pyongyang moderate its
adamant stance on the exclusion of Seoul as a negotiating partner.
Pyongyang probably also expected discord between Washington and
Seoul. It could very well have expected that the United States would
favor such a format. Both South Korea and the United States, however, rejected the tripartite proposal, instead suggesting a four-party
format which would include Beijing.
The removal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons has been a longstanding demand of Pyongyang, ever since the end of the Korean War.
Until recently, their immediate and total withdrawal was presented as
the key pre-condition for any settlement of the Korean question.
However, in 1988, Pyongyang began to demonstrate some flexibility
on this issue as it indicated a willingness to accept the possibility of a
phased withdrawal of troops to follow other measures such as a peace
agreement with the United States, and a non-aggression declaration
between North and South Korea. It is understandable that the North
Korean leadership has been so insistent on the U.S. troop withdrawal.
It was the U.S. intervention that prevented the military conquest of
the Korean Peninsula in 1950, and it was the presence of U.S. troops
in the South that kept North Korea from launching another "war of
liberation" against South Korea. Pyongyang may be convinced that
the South Korean government is so dependent upon U.S. support that
a substantial reduction or withdrawal of its troops from Korea would
cause the collapse of the government and of the polity itself. Pyongyang may actually even feel threatened and insecure, given the U.S.
military presence in South Korea.
Regardless of whether or not North Korea actually wants U.S.
troops out of Korea, it will continue to demand their withdrawal, perhaps more for political than for military reasons. However, a unilateral reduction or withdrawal of U.S. troops is likely to be looked upon
by Pyongyang with mixed feelings. In any case, it will not be inclined
to make significant concessions in terms of a reciprocal arms cuts or
confidence-building measures in order to induce a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. For Pyongyang, establishing financial and economic ties with the United States should have higher
priority than the troop withdrawal issue.
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Even as Pyongyang may be hoping gradually to increase contacts
and exchanges with the non-socialist world, it may be reluctant to
come to terms with South Korea. The successful conclusion of the
Pyongyang International Youth Festival in 1989 must have given it
confidence that contacts with the outside world can be conducted
without serious political risks. On the other hand, events in China and
political upheavals in Eastern Europe must have served as a warning
that the political risk of opening up the country to the outside, particularly to South Korea, remains quite high. Apprehensions over such
risks, coupled with Pyongyang's perception (or misperception) of
South Korean political vulnerability, could serve as a disincentive on
the part of North Korea to change the present stance in any significant
way.
Seoul's main policy dilemma is how to keep its security posture
intact while actively pursuing its "northern policy" and seeking accommodation with North Korea, while attempting to implement the
July 7th (1988) declaration, aimed at promoting exchanges with North
Korea. Seoul's northern policy is aimed at improving relations with
the socialist and previously socialist countries, including the Soviet
Union and China. The Seoul Olympics in 1988 provided a timely
boost to northern diplomacy. Seoul's active approach toward the socialist countries, which did not recognize the South Korean government, has shown rather dramatic results. The Soviet Union and
Eastern European nations sent large contingents of athletes and officials to Seoul for the Olympics. Talks on trade and other economic
exchanges have flourished. Trade offices and new lines of communications have been opened up. Major trading companies have opened formal liaison offices in major cities in China, the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. All Eastern European countries, except Albania,
have established full diplomatic relations with South Korea. South
Korea has exchanged consular offices with the Soviet Union. In Asia,
Mongolia has normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. Together with the July 7th Declaration which called for active promotion
of exchanges between North and South and an end to competition and
confrontation between them internationally, successful implementation of South Korea's northern policy has produced unexpected and
perhaps unwarranted euphoria in the Korean public about NorthSouth Korean relations, thus fostering a false sense of complacency.
Change in the nature of Korean politics has been another source
of dilemma for South Korean policy makers. Democratization has not
only brought about an explosion of nationalistic sentiments among the
people, but has also made the government much more sensitive to pub-
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lie opinion and attitude. In matters ranging from trade to burdensharing, the government is under enormous pressure to be more assertive and unyielding. Both within and outside of the government, those
who emphasize national self-respect tend to prevail over the
pragmatists who try to place reason and interest before emotion and
pride.
All of this would be fine if the Korean security problem had vanished as a result of the East-West thaw and South Korea's successful
northern diplomacy. But, in view of the existing military situation on
the Korean Peninsula, Seoul feels that South Korea still needs U.S.
security support and its military presence. Herein lies the major policy dilemma for South Korea: How to maintain a security posture and
stable alliance while the circumstances under which that alliance was
formed have undergone significant changes.
SEOUL'S NEW UNIFICATION FORMULA AND INTERKOREAN RELATIONS
Ever since Korea was divided after World War II, Koreans in
both parts of the country, North and South, have been preoccupied
with developing a formula that would bring them together again as
one state and one nation. Pyongyang's proposal for a "Democratic
Confederal Republic of Koryo" calls for a dual structure of government with a unified governing body and two separate governments for
North and South. For its part, until recently Seoul advocated a "national unity, democratic government" formula which called for cooperation and exchanges between the two Koreas to facilitate ultimate
reunification.
Both proposals were incomplete and unrealistic. Pyongyang's
formula only provided for the end product of unified Korea without
elaborating how it would be achieved. By contrast, the South Korean
proposal focused primarily on the process by which the two sides
would re-establish contact and common identity without specifying
what kind of a unified state was being envisaged.
Pyongyang's proposal for a confederal republic is problematic because it is predicated upon a degree of trust and cooperation that do
not exist at present between the two sides. Pyongyang's refusal to recognize the governmental authority of the South contributes to mutual
distrust and lack of progress in mutual dialogues. Pyongyang's highly
publicized proposal also fails to provide ways and means of getting to
the confederation, except to argue that both sides should simply accept
the formula. It does not provide a process for the realization of the
confederal republic.
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The confederal proposal is also incomplete and unlikely because
Korea as a nation would still have two governments with their respective autonomous jurisdictions, and socio-economic systems. Since,
under this plan, the two separate governments would be joined by a
supra-government which is to handle over-arching matters such as external and military affairs, the confederation, if formed, will immediately face serious differences of interests and views with no
institutional mechanism to maintain harmony and unity.
Apart from the merits and demerits of the Pyongyang proposal, a
unification "formula," no matter which side offers it, has an intrinsic
difficulty of its own. In today's context of North-South Korean relations, when such a formula is proposed by one side, it is taken by the
other as a propaganda ploy at best or as a recipe for subjugation. The
past South Korean proposals more often than not were in fact defensive responses to North Korean initiatives, rather than the product of
a well-thought-out blueprint for unification.
Even a balanced, systematic and realistic formula would have
only limited usefulness, as peaceful unification, by definition, requires
the mutual willingness and cooperation of both sides. Indeed, it is not
the absence of such a formula that has prevented progress toward unification. One may even argue that, if one side is sincere about bringing
about unification, the most useful and effective steps and measures can
be taken unilaterally while awaiting a more positive and constructive
response - internal and external - from the other side.
A dramatic breakthrough in North-South Korean relations leading to mutual adoption and realization of a peaceful reunification plan
will be difficult to achieve, given the mutual antagonism and vested
interests of both sides. Even if an agreement is reached on reunification, there will be numerous difficulties and obstacles in implementing
it. Nonetheless, it is important that the two sides continue to have
dialogues and try to agree in principle on the process and direction
they would take for peace and unification of their country. The recent
proposal by South Korea offers a realistic alternative approach.
With democratization in South Korea, there has been a virtual
explosion of interest in the unification issue and of the expectation that
something can and should be done to improve relations with North
Korea that will ultimately lead to unification. The "unification fever"
has presented the South Korean government with both the opportunity to initiate and conduct public discussion on the issue and the need
to come up with a plan addressing itself to what many Koreans still
consider to be the most urgent national task. In particular, the government found it both possible and necessary to seek a semblance of
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consensus - that a comprehensive unification formula is necessary;
that it should address not only the question of where the Koreans
want to go, but how to get there; that it should be a realistic and balanced one; and that it should take account of the changing external
environment and internal development of both North and South
Korea.
The new unification formula can serve still another purpose.
Even though there is only a slim possibility that Pyongyang will actually accept any significant part of the South Korean proposal, it will
serve the important function of informing the South Koreans themselves - both the government and the people - of what they can and
should do alone and of what they can do and should do with the
North Koreans in order to improve North-South Korean relations and
to promote unification. Until some kind of agreement, formal or informal, is reached and some degree of confidence and trust is established between the two sides, the only practical approach for South
Korea is to prepare unilaterally for the eventuality that North Korea
will finally recognize the reality of South Korean existence and agree
to set aside ideological and political goals in favor of mutual acceptance and cooperation.
Finally, Seoul's new unification formula will inform the North
Koreans of what the South Koreans consider to be the realistic and
acceptable goals, ways, and processes of unification. It is possible that,
sometime in the future, the external and internal circumstances will be
such that Pyongyang will find it necessary to respond positively by
making substantive changes. Furthermore, the fact and the existence
of South Korean willingness and desire to initiate a process of accommodation, exchanges, and cooperation, coupled with the efforts at unification expressed by the new plan will help North Korea to move
from dead center toward both social and political changes.
The new South Korean proposal, known as "the Korean National
Community Unification Formula," is essentially a dual track plan. It
calls for the reuniting of the Korean people who have been divided
since 1945 on the one hand, and the ultimate restoration of a unified
state on the other. It is chronologically a two-step proposal in that the
reuniting of the people will precede the restoration of a unified state.
Thus, the "Korean Commonwealth," with all its related organizational paraphernalia, is intended to promote the reunification of the
people. On the other hand, the plan envisages the eventual establishment of a "unified democratic republic," preceded by the adoption and
promulgation of a constitution.
This is in fact a development that would most closely resemble
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the "German Formula," although the Germans themselves never had
an explicitly agreed-upon plan such as has been proposed by Seoul.
While this has been the scenario most preferred by Seoul, it is also the
one which has been rejected, indeed denounced, by North Korea. In
view of the German experience, in order for the scenario to become a
reality, certain preconditions must be met.
Pyongyang refuses to consider the "German Formula." However, developments in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Germany,
should put to rest the criticism that the German method would perpetuate national division. Koreans on both sides of the barbed-wire fence
should realize that what is known as the "functional approach" to the
unification question, by which the two Koreas recognize each other's
existence and start cooperating in non-political areas such as humanitarian, cultural and economic relations, is in fact the only and the
shortest way to bring the two Koreas together into one.
CONCLUSION
For the peace and reunification of Korea, it is the Korean people
and their governments that should play the leading role. But in this
effort, they will also need help from other countries, in particular, major powers such as China, the Soviet Union, the United States and
Japan. They can help, not only by serving as intermediaries, but
equally important, by responding positively and taking initiative to establish and expand multifaceted contacts and exchanges, especially in
the economic area. The major countries surrounding Korea have an
obligation to see to it that peace develops in Korea and that Koreans
achieve unification. Both the United States and the Soviet Union must
share blame for the 1945 division of Korea. Japan must bear theresponsibility of subjecting Korea to Soviet and American occupation
after the end of World War II, following its 35-year long colonial rule
of Korea. Now it seems that Korea's neighboring powers are prepared
to help the Koreans resolve their differences and problems. All the
Koreans of both North and South have to do is to take advantage of
the circumstances that seem favorable to establish peace and the basis
of unification.
In the Korean Peninsula, as perhaps everywhere else, peace must
be a matter of the highest priority. The Korean Conflict of the early
1950s was destructive and tragic. It caused several million casualties
and virtually reduced the country, both North and South, to ashes.
Today, there are more than twice as many people living on the Korean
Peninsula as were living then. There are more than 1.5 million men in
arms. Both sides have arms and firepower that are several times more
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destructive and awesome than before. The havoc and tragedy from a
renewed conflict in Korea would be enormous and unimaginable.
There will be no winners, only losers - the Koreans. A war on the
Korean Peninsula would also have devastating effects on its neighboring countries and seriously disturb regional and international peace
and order. This is why everybody, Koreans and their neighbors alike,
have to make absolutely certain that war does not break out in Korea
either by miscalculation, misunderstanding, accident or design. That
is why communication, exchanges, confidence-building measures and
cooperation are necessary not only between North and South Korea,
but also between them and all other countries. They must move away
from and out of this wasteful and dangerous rivalry and start building
a durable structure for peace.

CHAPTER VII
DIMENSIONS OF THE GERMAN QUESTION
Dirk Verheyen

INTRODUCI'ION*
Events in 1989 and 1990 put the German Question back near the
top of the international agenda, right where it was when the war ended
in 1945. After 40 years of division in a shifting context of East-West
Cold War and tentative detente, the astounding rapidity of change in
Central and Eastern Europe confronted the world once again with the
future of a united Germany in the heart of Europe.
Developments have been occurring so rapidly that any analyst
faces monumental difficulty in seeking to get a firm grasp on the ultimate direction of what is transpiring in this turbulent age. The implications of recent and current events in Europe are truly far-reaching.
A new European order is emerging more quickly than most would
have predicted even a few years ago.
Western Europe is fully embarked on its ambitious "1992" program. Communist rule has collapsed in one Eastern European country after another, while Soviet troops are beginning to leave the
erstwhile "satellites." And the Soviet Union, with Gorbachev still at
the helm, continues to struggle on the twin paths of glasnost and perestroika in a context of social unrest, economic stagnation, intra-party
upheaval, and nationalist ferment in several of its republics, raising
questions about its ability to affect or manage the sudden dissolution
of its former Warsaw Pact empire.
Taken together, these developments are clearly signalling the end
of the postwar order in Europe. The continent's division into Cold
War spheres of influence has lost its former rigidity and coherence.
The future of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, symbols of Europe's EastWest division, is becoming an unavoidable issue. And perhaps most
• The material used in this essay draws heavily upon my book, The German
Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration, Dirk Verheyen, 1991, by
permission of Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado. I wish to thank the University Research
Committee at Loyola Marymount University for generous research assistance provided
during the summer of 1990.
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importantly, the unification of the two German states (again) signals a
fundamental recasting of European and broader international patterns
of power and policy.
A proper understanding of the German Question requires that we
place it in its historical context and that we examine its constituent
dimensions. In the pages that follow, I will suggest that the German
Question consists of three interrelated dimensions: German identity,
German unity, and the management of German power (tied to Germany's role in international affairs). Too often the German Question
is simplified into a matter of German (re)unification, although that is
understandable in view of the spectacle currently unfolding in Central
Europe. Yet, I hope to show that this is a misleading approach, and
perhaps even dangerous. We shall see that the issue of German unity,
rooted in a clear sense of German identity, must be kept connected
with a consideration of Germany's power and its consequent role and
position in the Europe of tomorrow.
Broadly speaking, the essay's argument has two major components. First, we shall venture into an admittedly selective interpretation of modem German history, in order to delineate the principal
ways in which the German Question has evolved. We shall examine a
selection of developments in general culture and domestic politics in
the first section, and aspects of modem German foreign policy in the
second section. Second, we shall look closely at the turbulent events
of 1989-90 in the last three sections, surveying the major issues and
events, and evaluating the current status of the German Question as
Europe moves into the next phase of its history.
GERMANY, A DIFFICULT FATHERLAND: A NATION IN
SEARCH OF IDENTITY AND UNITY
Central to any discussion of the German Question should be a
consideration of what is German and what is Germany. Closer examination will show that the answers to this question are by no means
obvious. It is a question that is not only relevant to an analysis of the
divided Germany of the postwar era, but also to an understanding of
Germany's historically complex search for identity.
Integrally linked to the problem of German identity is the issue of
profound historical discontinuity in the German experience, and its
consequences. Richard Lowenthal has noted "a very special lack of
chronological continuity, geographic unity and spiritual form and coherence." He notes the crucial discontinuity of both state and nation
in the German historical experience and concludes that "[t]his lack of
unity across time, in space, and in spirit is in fact the central problem
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or if one wishes, the central secret - of German history."
The identity problem acquired additional significance due to the
fact that much of pre-1945 German society and culture were characterized by a basic ambivalence, if not enmity, vis-a-vis many of the
revolutionary ideas of the 17th and 18th centuries that shaped most
other Western nations. According to Lowenthal, we should remember
"that Germany in the age of the French Revolution was the great 'developing country' ofthe West." 2 The new ideas and discoveries of the
new age that came to Germany from outside at that time induced a
fundamental German ambivalence regarding the process of modernization in culture and politics. The weak or incomplete impact of the
Enlightenment on Germany had historical consequences. According
to George Bailey,
[h]istorians generally hold that German national resistance
on [sic] the Napoleonic invasion unfortunately evolved into
German nationalist rejection of the Enlightenment. It was
as if the whole ethical corpus of the Enlightenment had
stumbled into the line of fire and suffered mortal wounds.
The Prussians - and indeed the majority of Germans awakened into some sort of national consciousness by the French
invasion -threw out the Enlightenment with the invader
and persisted in rejecting most of what the Enlightenment
involved because it was French and therefore anti-German. 3
The German reaction to the Enlightenment became most clearly
embodied in Romanticism. 4 The differences between the two cultural
and philosophical movements were (and still are) profound. The Enlightenment gave expression to an optimistic sense of progress, worshiped human individuality, stressed a rationalist and empiricist
approach to life and its problems, and focused on human rights and
freedoms, as well as questions of basic human equality. The Romantics, however, were animated by a greater sense of pessimism and tragedy. At times such attitudes could be joined to a strong sense of
terror, excitement, and foreboding. Instead of rationalism and empiriI. Richard LOwenthal, "Geschichtszerrissenheit und Geschichtsbewusstsein in
Deutschland," Gesel/schaftswande/ und Kulturkrise, Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch
Verlag, 1979, pp. 240-42.
2. Lowenthal "Geschichtszerrissenheit und Geschichtsbewusstsein in Deutschland "
ibid, p. 247. See also Gordon A. Craig, The Germans, New York: G.P. Putnam's So;s,
1982, p. 26ff.
3. Bailey, Germans, New York: Avon Books, 1972, p. 188.
4. See, Craig, The Germans, supra, note 2, chapter 9, and also Hans Kohn, The Mind
of Germany, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, chapter 3.
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cism, Romantics tended to stress the irrational, the metaphysical, the
mysterious or mythical,· and the poetic.
The importance of the Romantic epoch for the historical German
world-view cannot be understood when divorced from the quest for
German unity and identity. Disunity and a lack of clear identity have
been mutually reinforcing aspects of the German experience. Bailey
suggests that
[i]dentity has always been the main aspect of the German
Problem. The Germans have shown a remarkable lack of the
sense of identity: they have fought each other in full enmity
down the ages. They have banded together with foreigners
against other German tribes as often as they have allied
themselves against foreigners: Germans have always been
more than willing to fight Germans. They have never been
united in the sense that the classic nation-states of Europe
were and remain united. 5
Initially, Romanticism was a largely cultural and intellectual phenomenon, and fairly apolitical in orientation. However, the Napoleonic wars caused a clear politicization of Romantic thinking. National
unity and identity were increasingly sought along Romantic lines.
Emphasis was placed on the importance of the Volk, a concept that
implied a mixture of "nation," "race," and "people." Insofar as a
sense of German identity was sought that was felt to be distinct from
the modernizing neighbors to the West, an often ill-defined, anti-modern, and "anti-Western" notion of Deutschtum ("Germanness") developed. The idea gradually took hold that Germany, as "land of the
middle," bearer of a higher form of Kultur, had the exceptional historical destiny of being either the bulwark against or the bridge between
the (decadent) West and the (uncivilized) East. 6 In this Central European geographic area, where the liberal bourgeoisie was particularly
conspicuous in its weakness, the mere achievement of national unity
became more important than the political nature of the regime that
would govern the new realm. This was especially true in the years
following the failed 1848 revolution. 7
5. Bailey, Germans, supra, note 3, p. 341.
6. Ibid., pp. 361-62, 425.
7. Discussions of 19th and early 20th century German history have in recent years
been influenced by the debate over modem Germany's alleged Sonderweg ("special path"),
that is, whether Germany's developmental flaws (including the political failures of its bourgeoisie) ultimately helped prepare the country for the Nazi disaster. I discuss this issue
more fully in a forthcoming book on the German Question. Interested readers may wish to
consult David Black bourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, Oxford/
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But the sense of German identity, as it developed in the 19th century, was fundamentally flawed, which itself had crucial consequences
for the German world-view. There were rather clear elements of artificiality, self-deception, and unreality in the search for identity. National unity was to be imposed on regions that had often markedly
different historical experiences, and that were by no means fully culturally homogeneous (language aside). Fundamental inspiration was
derived from the old ideal of the Reich, particularly the Holy Roman
Empire. Unfortunately, that ideal was as much (if not more) based on
fiction as on fact. Moreover, the Reich could never be a mere nation.
It stood for a larger vision. And even if it meant something more than
a nation, its geographic boundaries ·were fundamentally ambiguous.
Moreover, when it finally came, in 1871, national unity was achieved
along "small-German" (klein-deutsch) lines (that is, excluding the
German-speaking parts of the Austrian empire) and had little in common with the old Holy Roman Empire.
Thus unity was not achieved on the basis of an integrative national experience such as revolution, but rather in large measure by
force, conquest, and imposition. The problem of identity was never
fully resolved, and continues to play a central role in German politics
and culture to the present day. Bailey concludes:
This is the German Problem: what, where, and when is, was,
or will be Germany? "Germany" was never more or less
what it should have been; it was always less or more than it
should have been. The "Germans" have always been more
than a nation and therefore always less than one. They were,
in fact, many nations and tribes, but the whole was always
less than the sum of its parts. 8
Germany was late in achieving national unity, compared with
most other Western countries. Having come late as a nation-state and
sensing a continued degree of artificiality in their national identity,
many Germans developed some notable traits in their world-view.
There was a pervasive sense of failure. Bailey calls this the "almost
factor" in German history. "Except for Bismarck's half-century, German history is an unbroken chain of failures-by-a-hair, of maddeningly
New York: Oxford University Press, 1984; Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1988, especially chapter 4; Thomas Nipperdey,
Nachdenken iiber die deutsche Geschichte, Miinchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1986; Richard J.
Evans, Rethinking German History, London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, especially chapter 3.
8. Bailey, Germans, supra, note 3, p. 340.
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near misses and no cigars. " 9 Many Germans acquired an image of
their own history marked by a high degree of discontent and dissatisfaction. According to Alain Clement, "from the very beginning the
Germans were dissatisfied with Germany and, therefore, with themselves. From century to century drags this oppressive feeling, that
Germany falls short of its developmental potential, short of its duty of
self-determination." 10 One finds considerable evidence of pervasive
self-pity and a deep sense of inferiority. 11 At the same time, as we
shall see more fully below, much of German foreign policy came to be
marked by a compensatory nationalism, a desire to acquire the power
and status in international affairs that was felt to accompany Germany's rightful "place in the sun," as the Kaiser put it.
Aspects of this traditional preoccupation with German identity
and the country's place in Europe and the world at large remained
after 1945, and were, if anything, enhanced by the traumatic Third
Reich experience and the subsequent division of the nation.
The discussion thus far clearly suggests that problems of identity
and unity in the context of the general German Question center on the
problematic idea of nationhood in the German historical experience.
The uncertainty of what is and is not Germany, the persistent mystique of the Reich, and the delayed national unification of Germany
are issues that have shaped the destiny of the German-speaking peoples in the center of Europe.
Nationalism is probably the most decisive ideology in modern history. The impact of nationalist fervor on domestic political life and
foreign policy has not by any means been unique to the German experience. Yet there are aspects of traditional German nationalism that
clearly differentiated it from developments in neighboring Western
European nation-states.
In Germany, conservative, authoritarian nationalism prevailed,
and German national unity was established by means of warfare,
under the auspices of illiberal, reluctant Prussia. Germany's delayed
national unification separated the idea of nationhood and nationalism
from the Enlightenment. 12 The idea of the nation-state was gradually
9. Ibid., p. 32.
10. Gibt es ein deutsches Geschichtsbild?, Studien & Berichte der Katholischen
Akademie in Bayem, Heft #14, 1961, p. 17.
11. See, Fritz Stem, The Politics of Cultural Despair, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1963, pp. xi-xxx and 267-98.
12. See, Helmuth Plessner, Die verspti'tete Nation, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag,
1959; Kohn, The Mind of Germany, supra, note 5, chapter 4.
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emptied of any modern political connotations and infused with culturally anti-modern and anti-Western sentiments.
Ideologically, this resulted in a nationalism with a decidedly illiberal political content, implacably opposed to competing political ideologies, such as Liberalism or Socialism. It was a cultural nationalism
that stressed the purported virtues and mission of the German Kulturnation, leading to political intolerance towards those who were considered (potentially) un-deutsch. Also, as noted above, it was a
compensatory nationalism, dedicated to seeking Germany's rightful
"place in the sun." Together with the political irredentism of the incomplete Reich (especially after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire
in 1919) and the assertive messianism of the Kulturnation ideology,
this compensatory nationalism was a driving force behind Germany's
increasingly aggressive diplomatic behavior in the first half of the 20th
century.
The traumas of Nazism and World War II in numerous ways
produced a break with the past. After 1945, there was a widespread
desire to escape from history and its painful burdens. The old nationalism was one of the prime casualties of the war. It became a thoroughly discredited ideology, and a liability for a new West Germany
that sought reconciliation with victims and enemies, and acceptance in
the Western community of nations. 13 This does not mean, of course,
that nationalism has completely disappeared from German political
life.
However, the question of nationalism in today's Germany ought
to be seen in the broader context of the problem of German identity
after World War II. 14 Although identity crises have been experienced
by most, if not all, nations in our rapidly changing 20th century environment, Germany has faced (and still faces) some unique problems. 15
There have been three general and important aspects to the German
identity question since World War II.
First, German identity has been burdened by the traumas of Ger13. See, Louis L. Snyder, Roots of German Nationalism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, chapter 13.
14. See, Craig, The Germans, supra, note 2, chapter 13.
15. There is a massive quantity of literature on this question. See, for example, Werner
Weidenfeld, ed., Die Identitiit der Deutschen, Bonn: Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale ftir
politische Bildung, 1983; Karl Morsch, Sind wir denn eine Nation? Die Deutschen und ihr
Vaterland, Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1982; Steffen Kiiser, ed., "Denk' ich an Deutschland. .. ": Grundlagen eines Dia/oges beider deutscher Staaten, Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag,
1987; Die Frage nach der deutschen Identitti't, Bonn: Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale ftir
politische Bildung, 1985; Harold James, A German Identity, 1770-1990, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990, especially chapters 8 and 9.
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man national historical experience. The desire to leave behind the past
has produced a harmful, and some would say dangerous, "loss of historical consciousness." 16 Could it be that much, if not most, of German history has lost its functional utility for the creation of a modem
German identity? This may especially be the case because the traditional German approach to nationhood was so suffused with illiberal,
anti-Western elements. Certainly a national identity for a liberal-democratic, Western-oriented Federal Republic could only with great difficulty be rooted in such a heritage. 17
In the case of the German Democratic Republic, the "loss of historical consciousness" took another direction. 18 After its creation in
1949, the East German regime, controlled by the Communist SED
(German Socialist Unity Party), presented the new state as the logical
culmination of all progressive and revolutionary strands in German
national history, such as the anti-Hitler resistance. The official East
German interpretation of German history thus became noticeably selective, often serving the regime's consolidation and legitimation interests. In contrast to a West Germany allegedly controlled by ex-Nazis,
nationalist revanchists, and capitalist reactionaries, the GDR was defined as the vanguard of a future socialist and democratic Germany.
The East German regime then proceeded to disclaim any and all sense
of shared German responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era.
Yet no complete German identity could emerge in either German
state if national historical experiences were to be ignored or avoided,
while an attempt to focus on purely cultural aspects of German nationhood would only lead to an incomplete sense of identity, because it
would tend to be devoid of any firm political foundation. 19 What is
more, a preoccupation with a German Kulturnation could resuscitate
16. Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, Frankfurt: Fischer
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981, pp. 130-47; Christian Grafvon Krockow, "Tradition und Geschichtsbewusstsein im sozialen Wandel," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 25 April 1981.
17. Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, supra, note 16, pp. 34-44.
18. See, Hermann Rudolph, "Wie sieht das Selbstverstandnis der DDR-Gesellschaft
aus?," in Weidenfeld, ed., Die ldentitiit der Deutschen, supra, note 15, pp. 193-209; Giinther
Heydemann, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtsverstandnis in der DDR seit 1945,"
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 28 March 1987, pp. 15-26; Ronald Asmus, "The GDR and
the German nation: sole heir or socialist sibling?," International Affairs, Vol. 60, #3, Summer 1984, pp. 403-18; Karl-Ernst Jeismann, "Die Einheit der Nation im Geschichtsbild der
DDR," A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 13 August 1983, pp. 3-16; Ralf Dahrendorf, Society
and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979, chapter 26.
19. See, the argument made by M. Rainer Lepsius, "Die Teilung Deutschlands und die
deutsche Nation," in Lothar Albertin and Werner Link, eds., Politische Parteien auf dem
Weg zur parlamentarischen Demokratie in Deutschland, Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1981,
pp. 417-49.
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foreign concerns regarding culturally based political irredentism and a
new German unity-before-freedom mentality.
Second, the question of German identity was made even more
complicated by the nation's division into two ideologically competitive
republics. 20 The ideological hostility between the FRG and GDR
meant that any attempt to have both states share in a purportedly
common German Kulturnation would end up begging many political
questions. Yet, the Federal Republic was hesitant to claim to be a fullfledged German Staatsnation (nation-state). The West German selfunderstanding after 1949 was explicitly "provisional." The Federal
Republic claimed to be the legitimate successor of the old German
Reich, but destined to be dissolved once all Germans regained their
national unity. The preamble to the West German state's Basic Law
enjoined all federal governments to strive for the restoration of German unity. Attempts to eliminate this preamble in the face of the bitter reality of two independent German states were met by a mixture of
vigorous protest and deafening silence. This provisional West German
self-understanding produced an elaborate array of legal principles and
fictions that played a central role in the Federal Republic's foreign
policy. Unfortunately, as the French have reminded us, "il n'est que
le provisoire qui dure." As a result, a fairly explicit West German
Staatsbewusstsein ("state consciousness") did emerge (before 1989).
In a prominent study published in the 1970's, Gebhard
Schweigler noted that, although traditional national sentiment was
still quite pronounced in the 1950's, important shifts in public opinion
occurred during the 1960's. He suggested that popular expectations of
reunification had declined, and that the willingness to recognize the
GDR and the Oder-Neisse boundary with Poland had increased. He
argued that one could notice a strongly reduced sense of an all-German Staatsnation, and a growing national consciousness focused more
exclusively on the Federal Republic. However, he did not (yet) see
this increased West German Staatsbewusstsein translated into an explicit form of nationalism. He made a similar argument about developments inside the GDR. 21
In the years that followed Schweigler's important study, many
observers evinced considerably greater skepticism regarding an .actual
decline of all-German national consciousness, coupled with a rise of a
more distinct West German (and East German) sense of identity.
20. Ibid.
21. Nationa/bewusstsein in der BRD und der DDR, Dusseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitatsverlag, 1973.
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Most suggested that the German identity question remained wide
open, pointing, for example, at the noticeable interest in Prussia, Luther, Bismarck, and other facets of German history in both the FRG
and the GDR. 22 Furthermore, the increasing closeness between the
two states in the age of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik in the 1970's
and 1980's could only serve to heighten the sense of a shared German
security interest, particularly under circumstances of renewed EastWest Cold War tensions during the first Reagan administration. The
rush toward unity after November 1989 obviously rekindled a sense of
political German nationalism, but it is too early to know the likely
domestic and diplomatic consequences of this "new" German nationalism, although later sections of this essay will present some of the
speculations and concerns. 23
Third, postwar German identity has, to an important extent, been
dependent on the ebb and flow of world affairs in general and, in the
case of West Germany, on European integration in particular. A
product of the Cold War in many ways, and animated by a strong
sense of anti-Communism, due to the proximity of its East German
opponent, the Federal Republic's sense of identity was far more sensitive to changes in the international environment than any other Westem country. West Germany's identity today depends for a great deal
on the country's membership in and acceptance by the Western alliance and the general community of Western nations. The fear of being
the ultimate victim of an East-West political and military bargain produced a persistent strain of anxiety and insecurity, thereby heightening
the uncertainties of identity.
For much of the postwar period, it seemed that the Federal Republic's participation in the process of European integration would
provide it with an "ersatz," European identity. Many Germans eagerly supported this hopeful opportunity. Whenever the hopes of a
united Europe faded, however, and nationalist sentiments in Europe
showed their staying power, the Federal Republic's identity problems
returned. At the risk of generalization, it is possible to argue that
West Germany's quest for identity between 1949 and 1989 involved an
22. See, Martin Greiffenhagen, Die Aktualitiit Preussens, Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981; Rudolf von Thadden, "Preussen - Ein Weg in die Modeme?,"
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, December 26, 1981, pp. 3-11; Robert F. Goecke!, "The
Luther Anniversary in East Germany," World Politics, Vol. 37, #1, October 1984, pp. 11233.
23. The overall development of both West and East German identity is discussed at
greater length in my book on the German Question than can be done in this essay.
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attempt to focus on both the democratic values shared with the West
and the continued sense of German-ness shared with East Germany.
GERMANY, A POWERFUL FATHERLAND: DILEMMAS
AND TEMPTATIONS IN DIPLOMACY AND
SECURITY
Thus far, our focus has been primarily on the dimensions of identity and unity in the general German Question, with particular emphasis on their domestic consequences in modern German history. Yet it
is impossible to grasp the ultimate international significance and urgency of the German Question without connecting the twin issues of
identity and unity with Germany's search for a role in world affairs
and the resulting problem of German power. This implies a full shift
to an analysis of modern German foreign policy.
As a great power, Germany in the 19th and early 20th century
was a late-comer. It entered an international arena in which established powers had already staked out dominant positions, and in
which the new force of nationalism was adding dynamic vigor and
emotion to classical inter-state competition. Consequently, German
foreign policy after 1871 was frequently characterized by what may be
called a "compensatory" style or mentality, especially during the Wilhelmine era. A desire to conquer Germany's "place in the sun" led to
self-overestimation, excessive imperial dreams, and a constant preoccupation with German prestige and status. Gerhard Weinberg speaks
of an "adolescent assertiveness," a militant, bullying, and unpredictable style. Gordon Craig notes a tendency toward diplomatic maladroitness, amateurism, and parvenuism. 24 The role played by
warfare in Germany's unification, together with the militancy of German nationalism and the rather aggressive ethos of a powerful German military caste, produced unmistakable militarism in German
foreign policy.
One factor in German foreign policy of which virtually all German diplomats and politicians have been acutely conscious is Germany's central-European location. As we saw earlier, geographic
factors have played a crucial role in the problem of German identity:
cultural and political boundaries have never really coincided, and a
24. Weinberg, "National Style in Diplomacy: Germany," in Erich Angermann and
Marie-Luise Frings, eds., Oceans Apart?, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981, pp. 146-60; Craig,
"Germany and the United States: Some Historical Parallels and Differences and Their
Reflection in Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," in James A. Cooney, Gordon A. Craig,
Hans-Peter Schwarz, and Fritz Stern, eds., The Federal Republic of Germany and the
United States, Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1984, pp. 16-33.
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sense of fluidity (and inherent political revisionism) characterizes the
German sense of nationhood. Throughout modem history, this central continental location, conducive to feelings of vulnerability, insecurity, and lack of choice in foreign policy, has been a constant and
prominent factor in German diplomacy. There has been a persistent
fear of diplomatic isolation, a Bismarckian "nightmare of coalitions."
The power dimension of the German Question is rooted in the
unfortunate timing of Germany's development and unification. The
consolidation of German power in the center of Europe had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the 19th century balance of power, and
served to enhance the risk of conflict on the continent.25 A fragmented Germany had served as a useful buffer zone among various
powers, but now that "vacuum" had turned into a new competitor
with compensatory ambitions. All these various factors have historically contributed to the problem of Germany's role and position in
international affairs, a problem that runs as a red thread through German diplomatic history.
The sense of geographic weakness and comparative disadvantage,
the fear of isolation and encirclement, combined with mounting political ambitions and often romanticized dreams of empire, over time led
to the increasing popularity of geopolitical perspectives in German foreign policy. 26 To many Germans, the geopolitical perspective seemed
particularly suited to their country's political and economic predicament, and also compatible with the organic-biological and anthropomorphic conceptions of the State that had been popular in Germany
ever since the days of Herder and Hegel.
The political and ideological prominence of Geopolitik increased
after World War I in an atmosphere of revisionist anger and dreams
during the Weimar years. Particularly popular became the vision of a
German-dominated Grossraum in central Europe (the so-called Mitteleuropa idea), which mixed geographic considerations with economic, political, and cultural factors. Eastern Europe, seen as a
Teufe/sgiirtel (devil's belt) of unstable states that separated Germany
from the crucial Eurasian Heartland, was more and more considered
to be Germany's Schicksalsraum (area alotted by fate): hence the legendary German Drang nach Osten (push toward the East). Such antiSlavic and (in time) anti-Soviet imperialist Lebensraum ideas, mixed
25. This forms the core of the argument made by David Calleo, The German Problem
Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
26. Geoffrey Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the 20th Century, London:
Croom Helm, 1985, chapters 2 and 5.
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with explicitly racial elements, played a central role in Nazi foreign
policy.
As was true for many facets of German foreign policy thinking,
realist and romantic ingredients were combined in most geopolitical
visions: Macht (power) and military hard-headedness went hand-inhand with dreams about German Kultur and the old Holy Roman
Empire. Defeat in World War II and the subsequent division of Germany, plus the rise of the two superpowers, did much to eliminate any
and all ideas of Mitteleuropa in West or East German foreign policy.
This does not mean, however, that geopolitically based revisionism
was entirely absent from the Federal Republic's foreign policy debates
during the Cold War years.
Altogether, World War II turned into a watershed event in the
development of Germany's approach to foreign policy, as we shall see
presently. It ended the militarization of foreign policy and the illiberal
ideological aspects of the Realpolitik tradition, while giving rise to supranational visions that would have been unthinkable in the golden
age of Germany's nationalist foreign policy orientation.
In sum, factors of power, geography, identity, and developmental
timing have historically combined to tum the question of Germany's
place in the international arena into a fundamental problem for German foreign policy. In terms of its power, Germany has tended to be
either too weak to alleviate the perennial security fears that permeate
German foreign policy thinking, or too strong to leave wary neighbors
reassured about their own safety. Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger
have suggested that the historical "awkwardness" of German power
led to a lack of experience in dealing with international equals and a
profound uncertainty with respect to Germany's proper role in world
atfairs. 27
Since the 1860's, German foreign policy thinking has contained a
variety of strategic visions aimed at dealing with the problem of power
and role. 28 A consideration of these visions points up some interesting
elements of continuity and change in German foreign policy.
27. Deutsch and Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1959, p. 17ff.
28. See, Renata Fritsch-Boumazel, Andre Brigot, and Jim Cloos, Les Allemands au
Coeur de /'Europe, Paris: Fondation pour 1es Etudes de Defense Nationa1e, 1983, esp. "La
permanente quete d'une identite"' by Fritsch-Boumazel, pp. 253-59; Waldemar Besson,
"The Conflict of Traditions: The Historical Basis of West German Foreign Policy," in
Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., Britain and West Germany, London: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 61-80; Walter F. Hahn, Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik, Beverly
Hills/London: SAGE Publications, 1975, chapter 1.
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One vision, historically associated with Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and to a lesser extent with Gustav Stresemann during the
1920's, had as its point of departure the realization that Germany is
first and foremost a central-European state (Land in der Mitte; land in
the middle) in many ways located between East and West. 29 From
this vantage-point, Germany was seen at times as a "bridge" between
East and West, an entity with a balancing and mediating role. Close
attention was paid to the maintenance of a European balance of power
and the legitimate interests of other powers. Insofar as revisionist intentions entered German foreign policy, they were pursued with caution and considerable respect for the existing status-quo. Gern'lany
tended to avoid overly rigid alliances, aimed at keeping diplomatic options open.
While much of the Bismarck vision of Germany's position and
role in international politics was rendered obsolete in the context of
the Cold War and Germany's division, its influence could still be
noted in the postwar era. The idea of Germany as "bridge" between
East and West, as developed by (among others) the Christian Democrat Jakob Kaiser in the late 1940's, comes to mind. 30 One might also
consider the various plans that were developed by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats in the course ofthe 1950's, aimed at the
reunification of Germany based on German military neutrality, European military disengagement zones, and the creation of an all-European collective security system. 31 In addition, there was the idea of a
special German Sicherheits- or Friedenspartnerschaft (partnership for
security and peace) involving FRG and GDR, in the shadow of superpower bipolarity, as it emerged in the context of Ostpolitik and
Deutschlandpolitik during the 1970's and 1980's. 32 However, these visions were largely at odds with the Federal Republic's dominant foreign policy orientations, however. They were frequently denounced as
a dangerous revival of an obsolete German tradition of Schaukelpolitik
("switching policy") between East and West, based on the illusion of
some positive German Sonderweg ("special path") in international
affairs.
29. Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions,'' supra, note 28, pp. 63-70.
30. Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, eds., Die Linke und die nationale Frage, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981, pp. 76-80.
31. For illustrations, see Brandt and Ammon, eds., Die Linke und die nationale Frage,
ibid., pp. 132-34, 161-65, 177-78, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Otto Stenzl, eds., Deutschland und die Welt, Miinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1964, pp. 116-25, 132-37,
144-57.
32. Brandt and Ammon, eds., Die Linke und die nationale Frage, supra, note 30, pp.
280-87.
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Another foreign policy vision, associated with the militant great
power politics of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his entourage and the much
more extreme racial/geopolitical imperialism of Adolf Hitler, shared
with the first vision an essentially nationalist focus on Germany's position and role in international politics. However, the problems of Germany's international situation were not solved by cautious
revisionism, an avoidance of diplomatic isolation, and due regard for
the balance of power and the proper interests of others. Instead, there
was an aggressive revisionism, reckless power politics, and an expansionist behavior, all of it aimed at breaking the fetters imposed on Germany by geopolitical encirclement and disadvantage. The German
Sonderweg disintegrated into imperialism and war. Hitler stood
outside the German diplomatic tradition insofar as the racial elements
in his policies were of an entirely new kind and different magnitude
than anything that had existed in German foreign policy before. Fundamental philosophical rejection and lack of opportunity after 1945
rendered obsolete all these militant, imperialist perspectives, in spite of
repeated charges of "revanchism" levelled at the FRG by its various
neighbors to the East during the Cold War. A slight revival might
have occurred by means of some more extremist "roll-back" and "liberation" ideas at the height of the Cold War, but these never constituted a realistic option.
A third vision for German foreign policy has developed after
World War II, and is particularly associated with the legacy of Konrad Adenauer in the FRG's foreign policy. 33 The emergence of this
vision cannot be separated from the international setting in which
West German foreign policy had to be pursued. It is a setting that was
characterized by defeat and occupation, the division of Germany, the
integration of the two German states into Cold War alliances, West
German security dependence on the West (especially America), and
revisionism regarding the East European status-quo. The FRG could
only be understood as a product of the Cold War and as the rehabilitated opponent of a not-so-distant past: these two factors combined to
circumscribe the Federal Republic's diplomatic room for maneuver in
many decisive ways, often forestalling choices and imposing particular
needs. In addition, defeat, occupation, and subsequent security dependence in the Cold War made the FRG into a uniquely "penetrated"
political system, susceptible and sensitive to outside influences that
deeply affected policy conceptions and directions.
Any consideration of West Germany's role and position in post33. Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions,'" supra, note 28, p. 70ff.
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war international relations, while dependent on an understanding of
Germany's historical predicament and fate, cannot be separated from
the fate and destiny of Europe either. World War II and the eruption
of the Cold War had at least five fundamental effects on virtually all
(Western) European states.
First, the "displacement of the world power center from Europe,"
led to the rise of the two superpowers and the development of Cold
War bipolarity. Second, the "dismantling of the European empires,"
which became highly symbolic of Europe's reduced international role.
Third, a "European incapacity to guarantee their own national security,'' which led to the development of more Europeanist and/or Atlanticist perspectives on national defense, the creation of NATO, and a
profound dependence on the American security guarantee. Fourth, a
"European incapacity to promote their own national prosperity,"
which was conducive to the development of visions, plans, processes,
and institutions aimed at increased European economic cooperation
and integration. Fifth, a "European 'crisis of confidence'," which was
the cumulative result of the other four developments. 34
Although these five effects were strongest in the immediate postwar period and were to some extent "softened" by subsequent recovery and integration successes, and a mitigation of the Cold War, the
fundamental changes in Europe's international role and position to
which they point were quite decisive. The sense that the traditional
European nation-state is no longer an adequate framework for security, economic prosperity, and effective prestige and identity persists,
despite a partial resurgence of nationalism since the Gaullist 1960's.
At most there resulted a vacillation in policy between more Atlanticist
and/or Europeanist, and nationalist frames of orientation.
It is against this German and European postwar background that
one must evaluate two key facets of Adenauer's Westpolitik: the
"supranationalization" and the "westernization" (Verwestlichung) of
West Germany's foreign policy. 35 Supranationalization implied a basic abandonment of the almost exclusively nationalist thinking in earlier German foreign policy. The new West German state became a
leading champion of schemes for European and Atlantic integration.
34. See, the discussion in Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica, Cambridge
MA: MIT Press, 1969, p. 50 and chapters I, 2, and 10.
35. See, Josef Joffe, "Von Adenauer bis Schmidt: Grundziige der Aussenpolitik," in
Eckhard Jesse, ed., Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Deutsche Demokratische Republik,
Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1980, pp. 151-59; Klaus Epstein, "The Adenauer Era in Ger·
man History," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., A New Europe?, Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1964, pp. 105-39; Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions,'' supra, note 28, p. 70ff.
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In the context of the Cold War, these integration visions, whose pursuit was the result of a mixture of choice and necessity, were in unmistakable tension with the simultaneous pursuit of reunification, a fact
that led to bitter debate between Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats during the 1950's. 36 The interplay between national and
supranational perspectives constitutes a central theme in West Germany's postwar foreign policy.
"Westernization" aimed at a basic reconciliation of the historical
alienation between Germany and the West. The Verwestlichung
("westernization") of German foreign policy was aided by a number of
important factors, rooted in ideology and environmental compulsion.37 Among West German political parties, the CDU in particular
was animated by what may be called an Abendland ("Western civilization") ideology, stressing the political, philosophical, and religious beliefs and values that Germany was felt to share with the West. 38 There
was a strong Catholic and Carolingian component in the thinking of
Adenauer and many of his supporters. The Cold War division of Germany led to the creation of a Weststaat that contained regionally based
traditions of Liberalism and anti-nationalism, both of which were crucial for the supranationalization and westernization of German foreign
policy. In a Cold War environment marked by international ideological polarization, the FRO's security dependence on Western allies was
complemented by strong anti-Communism, pro-Europeanism, and
pro-Atlanticism.
Just as the supranationalism of Adenauer's Westpolitik constituted a sharp break with past nationalist traditions in German foreign
policy, so did the reorientation effected by Germany's westernization
imply an abandonment of older central-European geopolitical perspectives. In the context of the Cold War, Germany became the divided
heart of Europe, whereby each German state turned into the outer
rampart of its respective alliance system. Adenauer's Westpolitik was
animated by a persistent "Potsdam complex," based on the fear of
great power agreements at Germany's expense. 39 Only Western inte36. See, Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis, New York: Harper & Row, 1970,
pp. 129-46.
37. Frank R. Pfetsch, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik. 1949-1980, Miinchen:
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1981, p. 43ff.
38. Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Die westdeutsche Aussenpolitik - Historische Lektionen
und politische Generationen," in Walter Scheel, ed., Nach Dreissig Jahren, Stuttgart: KlettCotta Verlag, 1979, p. 164ff.
39. The term "Potsdam Complex" refers to the 1945 Conference of World War II
victors in this small town west of Berlin, where important decisions about the future of
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gration would prevent Germany from becoming or remaining a mere
pawn or object in international politics. Ideological inclinations and
environmental constraints combined to lead to the failure of reunification ideas offered by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats
based on some form of German neutrality. Growing numbers of West
Germans backed Adenauer in his rejection of new attempts at a German Schaukelpolitik between East and West. There was certainly in
many Western states a distinct "Rapallo complex," fed by fears regarding Germany's diplomatic and ideological reliability, although, as
Fritz Allemann tried to point out in the 1960's, the Cold War setting
differed so strongly from the 1920's that a new "Rapallo" was never a
real option in FRG foreign policy. 40 In the next sections, I will turn to
a discussion of the re-emergence of some basic questions about Germany's diplomatic course generated by the unification of the FRG and
the GDR.
Even a divided Germany, with two states firmly committed to
their respective "camps," was not able, however, to escape the geopolitical logic of its central-European location or the older, national
framework of thinking. The decisive problem here was, of course, the
issue of reunification. Both West German supranationalism and westernization had to be considered conditional to the extent that they had
to be reconciled with unavoidable nationalist, central-European West
German revisionism. In the era of the Cold War and successful Western integration, the inherent contradiction was "solved" through the
assumption that reunification would result from a Westpolitik based on
strength, although that assumption was attacked by many critics.
Increased detente after the late 1950's and a lack of progress
(even backsliding) in Western integration undermined earlier orientations and increased the FRG's uncertainty about its international role.
A resurgence of West German consciousness with respect to Germany's central-European fate, combined with fear of increased West
German international isolation, generated a considerably more active
Ostpolitik as a counterweight to the passive and rather negative
Ostpolitik that had accompanied the previous Westpolitik.
At the same time, these new openings in the East greatly helped
vanquished Gennany (especially the country's division into zones of occupation) were
made.
40. Allemann, "Rapallo: Myth and Reality," in Walter Stahl, ed., The Politics of Postwar Germany, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963, pp. 77-84. Rapallo is the Italian town
where diplomats of the Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic met in 1922 and concluded
a (surprise) treaty that heightened Western concerns about Gennany's course in foreign
policy.
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to expand the FRG's diplomatic room for maneuver. The framework
of thought in this new Ostpolitik was inherently more nationalist than
was officially acknowledged, but its recognition of the European status-quo also meant a mitigation of the more explicitly revisionist nationalism of the Cold War era. Both Westpolitik and Ostpolitik came
to symbolize the inevitably Janus-like nature of German foreign policy.41 As policies and as foreign policy orientations, they reflected the
imperatives that continued to be generated by Germany's geopolitical
location.
In the case of East Germany, developments occurred along a
somewhat different path. The initial, post-1949 vision of a reunited,
socialist Germany was replaced by a heightened sense of Abgrenzung
("isolation/consolidation") after the building of the Berlin Wall in
1961. Greater emphasis was placed on the development of a clearer
East German Staatsbewusstsein (state consciousness) on the part of a
population that could see no alternative but to reconcile itself with the
inevitability of a separate socialist state.
By the 1970's, attempts were even made under the leadership of
Erich Honecker to create an explicit sense of separate East German
nationhood. 42 And by the 1980's, a renewed appreciation of a possible
connection between East Germany and the legacy of Prussia could
even be noted in the GDR. 43 A Janus-like East German foreign policy
would thus become rather problematic, in view of such an explicit attempt to sever any basic sense of all-German national linkage with the
FRG. Yet, paradoxically, it could be argued that the simultaneous
East German interest in a special GDR-FRG "security partnership"
in Central Europe during the era of detente only served to reinforce a
continued shared political consciousness between the two German
"nations." In other words, the concurrent pursuit of both Abgrenzung
and inter-German detente contained inherent inconsistencies. Future
historians, looking back on the 1970's and the 1980's, may well conclude that, in view of the GDR's enduring legitimacy deficit and the
neighboring presence of an irresistible West German ideological and
41. See, Josef Joffe, "Westvertrage, Ostvertrage und die Kontinuitat der deutschen
Aussenpolitik," Europa-Archiv, #4, 1973, pp. 111-24; Peter H. Merkl, "The German Janus: From Westpolitik to Ostpolitik," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 89, #4, Winter
1974-75, pp. 803-24.
42. See, Jeismann, "Die Einheit der Nation im Geschichtsbild der DDR," supra, note
18, pp. 3-16.
43. Jorg Bernhard Bilke, "Preussentum und DDR-Sozialismus," Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, 26 December 1981, pp. 23-37.
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economic magnet, the era of detente did much to accelerate the ultimate demise of East Germany's stagnant Communist regime.
WINTER OF DISCONTENT AND TURBULENCE
The astounding events of the fall of 1989 completely shook just
about all of the German "certainties" of the past 40 years. Only
months before the Berlin Wall was breached, a prominent analyst of
German affairs like F. Stephen Larrabee had been essentially correct
when he wrote that
the real issue today is not reunification, though this still remains a residual issue, but how changes in the policies of the
two German states may affect European security in the next
decade, and in tum what impact changes in the postwar security order may have on the policies of the two German
states and their role in their respective alliances. It is this
question that forms the heart of the new German Question.
And it is on this problem, rather than the highly theoretical
and less politically relevant issue of reunification, that scholars and politicians should focus in the 1990s. 44
Yet events unfolded with a rapidity that left observers and policymakers alike breathless. Amid spreading political protest, the true
dimensions of the fundamental crisis of East Germany's socioeconomic and political system became fully manifest, as discussion and
recrimination began about its causes and who was to blame. 45 The
mass exodus of East Germans to the West led to the collapse of the
Honecker regime in November and the opening of the Berlin Wall. A
brief SED interregnum followed, led first by Egon Krenz and then by
Hans Modrow, with whom West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
clearly did not wish to deal in any serious longer-term way. As economic and political collapse became imminent, the days of Communist
rule in the GDR were clearly numbered. Free elections, the first in
that area of Germany since 1933, were scheduled for May 1990 and
then re-scheduled for mid-March 1990, in view of a worsening crisis.
Meanwhile, events in the GDR began to have their international
implications. Kohl offered a rather daring 10-point plan for German
confederation, with continued NATO membership, in November
44. Larrabee, "From Reunification to Reassociation: New Dimensions of the German
Question," in Larrabee, ed., The Two German States and European Security, New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1989, p. 29.
45. See, Gert-Joachim Glassner, "Yom 'realen Sozialismus' zur Selbstbestimmung,"
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 5 January 1990, pp. 3-20.
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1989, without consulting his closest allies. His go-it-alone assertiveness was a demonstration of West Germany's increased self-confidence
in an environment of collapsing Communist rule in Eastern Europe.
The Soviet Union was about to lose one of its closest allies in Eastern
Europe and made suggestions regarding a possible German confederation outside both NATO and Warsaw Pact in the hope of salvaging as
much of its position as possible. GDR leader Modrow echoed this
idea with a January 1990 proposal for a neutralized united Germany.
Both ideas were clearly reminiscent of various (Soviet) ideas of the
early 1950's, and were flatly rejected by a West German government
that had increasingly worried Western allies to contend with. The
FRG's allies were concerned about the Federal Republic's future in
both NATO and the EC, and it fell especially to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher to provide the needed assurances. It was also Genscher
who sought to break a deadlock over possible NATO membership of a
reunited Germany by suggesting that NATO forces should stay clear
of GDR territory in a united Germany and that the USSR should be
allowed to maintain a contingent of forces on East German territory
for a pre-arranged period after unification.
By early 1990, it was clear that full German reunification was all
but inevitable, and all confederation ideas, predicated on a continued
existence in some form of two separate German states, found their end
in history's dust bin. The rapidity of change rendered obsolete the
ideas of analysts like Anne-Marie Burley, who wrote in late 1989:
Stability in Europe means the maintenance of the existing
international structure: two superpowers and two Germanies. Stability in the G.D.R. means reform without the
threat of reunification.... (R]ecognizing the German division as permanent could be the final step toward overcoming
it.46
The human exodus from East to West Germany continued, economic conditions in the GDR worsened steadily, and East German
opinion swung clearly in the direction of unification with the West. In
November 1989, only 16% of GDR citizens expressed strong support
for unification, while 32% were moderately in favor, and 52% were
either moderately or strongly opposed to the idea. By February/
March 1990, however, 84% were moderately or strongly in favor of
unification, while only 16% remained moderately or strongly op46. Burley, "The Once and Future German Question," Foreign Affairs, Winter 198990, pp. 82, 83.
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posed.47 In addition, an interesting 60% of GDR citizens professed
support for the notion of a militarily neutral united Germany. 48
It is also worth noting that opinion polling in March 1990 in East
Germany detected an interesting difference among generations as far
as levels of identification with "Germany" and the "GDR" were concerned. Of those born before 1930, 74% professed a strong sense of
being German, with only 22% stressing a more primary GDR-identity. The respective percentages were as follows for the other generations: among those born between 1931 and 1945, 66% versus 28%;
among those born between 1946 and 1960, 55% versus 39%; and
among those born after 1960, 52% versus 37%. In other words, while
a strong sense of being "German" characterized all generations, a significant identification with the GDR was quite pronounced among
those who had been fully socialized by life in the GDR after 1949. In
addition, supporters of the SED overwhelmingly continued to identify
with the GDR, while clear majorities of the supporters of the other
major parties in East Germany professed a more primary "German"
identity. 49
A major breakthrough occurred in February 1990. Agreement
was reached in Ottawa between FRG and GDR representatives and
the former Allies of World War II (US, USSR, Great Britain, and
France) with their residual legal rights in Germany (including Berlin)
on the so-called "two-plus-four" formula: the two German states
would work out the internal modalities of unification, while they
would join the Four Powers to make the necessary international security adjustments. As far as the internal German process was concerned, the key issue quickly became the cost of what was no less than
a West German bailout of a collapsing GDR. East-West disagreement
over a possible NATO membership of the new Germany, plus the sensitive issue of the German-Polish border, clearly topped the agenda on
the international side of the bargaining process.
The internal German process was heavily colored by the fact that
1990 became a year of "siamese" German elections (March elections
47. For a discussion of the East Germans' unmistakably economic calculations in their
opinions regarding unification, see the discussion and data provided in Manfred Kuechler,
"Pocketbook Patriotism: Economic Expectations and the Pursuit of German Unity," pa·
per presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August
30 - September 2, 1990, San Francisco.
48. See, "Fremde Zahler," Der Spiegel, #II, 1990, p. 40 for poll results.
49. Data gathered by the Institut ftir Demoskopie Allensbach on March 8-15, 1990,
and reported in David P. Conradt, "German Unification and the Remade Political Culture," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 30-September 2, 1990, San Francisco.

CHAPTER

VII

141

in the GDR, December elections in the FRG). For the first time since
the creation of the two German states in 1949, free elections were to
take place on both sides of the intra-German dividing line. Needless
to say, reunification became the decisive campaign issue on both sides.
An additional "siamese" dimension of this joint German electoral process lay in the fact that in both German states, some of the principal
parties in the political contest came to coexist (and be allied) as "sister" parties. Thus one encountered the phenomenon of Christian
Democratic, Social Democratic, and Free Democratic parties on both
sides, in addition to parties or movements with "Green" or ecological
orientations.
The partially conflicting visions of West Germany's two key parties, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, in the area of
foreign policy were mentioned earlier. It became obvious rather
quickly that these differences would continue to play a significant role
in Germany's political future. The dynamic of "competitive nationalism" between these two large parties, aimed at proving one's nationalist credentials to the electorate, tends to be particularly dangerous.
Carried to an extreme, such a competition could be highly destabilizing for Germany's evolving democratic political culture, not to
mention the country's image in the rest of the world.
Chancellor Kohl's West German Christian Democrats sought to
position themselves as true guardians of the nation, but also as representatives of the Adenauer Westpolitik legacy with its strong emphasis
on both European integration and Atlantic partnership with the U.S.
The CDU's German nationalism has been primarily embedded in a
Europeanist, Atlanticist, and pro-capitalist ideological framework,
although older nationalist elements clearly survive in some sectors of
the CDU and its Bavarian sister-party, the CSU, and among some of
the expellees from former eastern German territories. Yet the possibility also presented itself that if East-West negotiations over NATO
membership of a future Germany would get seriously stalemated, the
CDU's Atlanticism could become a political liability. Insofar as
NATO's purpose has been not only the defense of Western Europe visa-vis the Warsaw Pact but also the control of German power, continued acceptance of NATO constraints (especially foreign troops on
German soil) by a CDU-led government could well turn into a deeply
emotional issue in a reunited Germany, an issue with considerable nationalist explosive potential, which the SPD, among others, could be
expected to exploit. This is why many argued that the transcendence
of both NATO and Warsaw Pact, legacies of a passing era, by means
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of the creation of a pan-European security order should receive urgent
attention.
The West German Social Democrats have tended to be less
strongly Atlanticist, and might be willing to re-examine Germany's
role (and membership) in NATO in the context of the overall reunification process, a fact that has led some to warn of a resurgence of
SPD-led German neutralism. Since the late 1950's, the SPD's support
of European integration has been quite genuine, although it is sensitive
to domination of the European Community by big business at the expense of social needs. After initial, and electorally costly, hesitation in
1989 about the reunification issue, the SPD endorsed the broad outlines of Kohl's confederation plan, before seeking to move ahead to
articulate its own policy preferences on the matter of national unity
amid rapidly evolving inter-German conditions. For the SPD, longstanding contacts with the disgraced and disintegrated East German
SED could be a political liability in the time ahead. The same could
be said of the SPD's historic alienation from German nationhood. 5°
The Free Democrats continue to be a crucial coalition partner for
either the CDU or the SPD, despite the party's small size. Although
more Atlanticist than the SPD, they did collaborate with the SocialDemocrats during the years after 1969 in formulating the basic reorientation of West German foreign policy known as Ostpolitik. For
the foreseeable future, the Free Democrats are expected to continue
their participation in the current coalition with the Christian Democrats. The Greens on the Left and the Republikaner on the Right did
not appear to be decisive players (yet).
Needless to say, the East German political scene was much more
turbulent. The Socialist Unity Party (SED), now renamed Party of
Democratic Socialism (PDS), continued to disintegrate as 1990
progressed, because it faced both a basic political credibility problem
and a noticeable fragmentation into more conservative and reformist
camps. Initial SED attempts to retain influence (if not power) by playing up an alleged neo-Nazi threat clearly backfired. The various opposition groups (New Forum, Democratic Awakening, and Democracy
Now) that emerged in the course of 1989 saw their political influence
weaken considerably by the beginning of 1990, despite their participation in Round Table talks with the caretaker government and subse50. See, the essay by Hellmuth Karasek, "Mit Kanonen auf Bananen?," Der Spiegel,

# 13, 1990, pp. 56-57. Karasek points to the "new gap" that has opened up in Germany
"between the Left and the national question." See also Michael Charlier, "Deutschland,
schwierig Vaterland," Bliitter fiir deutsche und internationale Politik, February 1990, pp.
179-87.
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quent participation in that government. Some have been heavily
dominated by groups of intellectuals, and many have had to struggle
hard to define an electoral identity, to decide whether they wished to
be a formal political party at all, and tQ delineate a position on the
twin questions of German unity and the GDR's future. 51 Initially
committed to the continued existence of a separate East German state,
they were all soon confronted with a seemingly uncontrollable popular
rush in the direction of reunification, and had to adjust their platforms
accordingly. Many developed a clearly enduring resentment against
what they saw as an East German "sell-out" to West German bourgeois capitalism. 52
The SED's former allies, "block parties" 53 like the East German
CDU and FOP, appeared to be severely affiicted by a basic credibility
problem in the eyes of the GDR's electorate. As a result, the West
German CDU and FOP were at first far from eager to lend electoral
support and endorsement to these "sister" parties. Faced with the
rapid growth of the SPD in the GDR, however, Chancellor Kohl's
CDU swung its support behind a small East German coalition of
center-right opposition groups (Allianz fiir Deutschland) that did include the GDR-CDU.
By the early months of 1990, East Germany's newly reconstituted
Social Democratic Party (SOP, subsequently renamed SPD) seemed to
emerge clearly as the major new force in GDR politics. This party
could not be tainted by the stigma of collaboration with the SED regime, and could tap the historic electoral strength of Social Democracy in the east of Germany. In addition, the party could present itself
as a credible defender of those social programs that the average East
51. On the various East German opposition groups that emerged in the course of 1989,
see Hubertus Knabe, ed., Aujbruch in eine andere DDR, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989; Gerhard Rein, ed., Die Opposition in der DDR, Berlin:
Wichern-Verlag, 1989; Hannes Bahrmann and Christoph Links, Wir sind das Volle. Die
DDR zwischen 7. Oktober und 17. Dezember 1989. Eine Chronik, Berlin/Weimar: AutbauVerlag Berlin, 1990; Charles Schiiddekopf, ed., "Wir sind das Volkl" Flugschriften,
Aufrufe und Texte einer deutschen Revolution, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990; Michael Naumann, ed., "Die Geschichte ist o./fen': DDR 1990:
Hoffnung auf eine neue Republik, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag,
1990.
52. See, for example, Jens Reich, "Germany- a Binary Poison," New Left Review,
January/February 1990, pp. 120-24; "Die Krake miissen wir sezieren," Der Spiegel, #31,
1990, p. 54ff.
53. The SED always governed as part of what was presented as a truly democratic
"coalition" of progressive parties. In reality, the SED has been essentially omnipotent, and
the "coalition" was really more like a "'monolith." See Wolfgang Mieczkowski,
"Bewegung im Monolith," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 21 April 1984, p. 3ff.
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German might not wish to see eliminated altogether after reunification
with the more prosperous Federal Republic.
Yet the GDR elections on March 18 defied all earlier forecasts,
turning into a triumph for the CDU-backed conservative Alliance.
Unlike a still hesitant SPD and PDS, the Alliance promised quick unification in the most unambiguous way, and clearly benefitted from its
closeness to a West German Chancellor who would be expected to
fulfill his promises of massive economic aid. The fact that the Alliance
fell just short of an absolute majority (circa 48%) necessitated the formation of a coalition. After a brief period of haggling, overshadowed
by allegations concerning collaboration with the former security police
(Stasi) by many of the GDR's new politicians, a Grand Coalition was
formed, including both the Alliance and the SPD, which had polled
22% of the vote. The PDS, which had scored a somewhat surprising
16% in the election, was excluded: Communist rule in East Germany
had formally come to an end.
With a freely elected East German government in place, the
"two-plus-four" process could now move forward in more decisive
fashion. We examine first the internal German process, and then tum
to the international ramifications of the resurgence of a united
Germany.
GERMANY REUNITES: ECONOMICS, ELECTIONS, AND
EMOTIONS
The intra-German process of unification focused on some crucial
constitutional, socioeconomic, financial, and political issues. As far as
the constitutional modalities of unity were concerned, several possibilities existed. Usage of Article 23 in West Germany's Basic Law
would necessitate a reconstitution of the original Liinder (states) in
East Germany, which could then vote one by one to accede to the
Federal Republic. 54 This was the formula preferred by the Christian
Democrats. Another possibility, favored by the Social Democrats,
would be to take the route of Article 146, which would involve the
drafting of an entirely new constitution by an all-German constituent
54. The exact text in Article 23 reads: "This Basic Law applies for the time being in the
area of the Lander Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Wiirttemberg-Baden
and Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollem. It will enter into force in other parts of Germany upon
their accession." Note that, given Germany's postwar fate and the loss of various territories, the phrase ·•other parts of Germany" is strikingly vague.
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assembly. 55 A third constitutional possibility, namely the continued
existence of two German states in a confederation of some kind,
quickly vanished from all official and scholarly discussion. Most observers came to see unification based on Article 23 as the best route,
also because it would be the easiest way to bring the GDR into the
European Community without elaborate negotiations. 56
The socioeconomic and financial aspects of unification generated
far more immediate controversy, particularly among the general public, than the more technical and even obscure constitutional modalities. The basic question quickly became: what would it cost and who
would pay? Estimates of the total (long-term) cost of unification
would ultimately range from 500 billion to 1 trillion D-mark. As 1990
progressed, popular pressure in the FRG grew to put an end to West
Germany's generous support of those who had left the GDR. It became clear that the emotional excitement of the fall of 1989 had been
replaced by outright worry over the economic and financial consequences of a West German "bail-out" of the GDR, in addition to
widespread concern about the need to absorb and integrate a seemingly endless number of "immigrants" (Ubersiedler) from the GDR.
As W.R. Smyser put it at the time, "[t]he unification of Germany is
only superficially a merger between a capitalist and a socialist economy. It is really a merger between rich and poor." 57
Predictions of increased inflation and higher taxes in the FRG
created visible uneasiness among the West German public, which in
turn was probably responsible for the CDU's loss in two important
state elections in West Germany in May, resulting in SPD control of
the Bundesrat (the upper house of the West German parliament).
While clear popular majorities continued to support the objective of
unification, matters of speed and cost became a source of noticeable
political divisiveness. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government favored a rapid pace and played down the possibility of adverse economic consequences, while the opposition SPD urged a slowing of the
pace and hoped to benefit politically from public anxiety over the high
55. Article 146 reads: "This Basic Law loses its legal validity on the day when a constitution enters into force which has been adopted by the German people in a free decision."
56. In this context, see the discussion by Werner Ungerer, "Die Europii.ische Gemeinschaft und die Einigung Deutschlands," Blo:tter fiir deutsche und internationale Politik,
April 1990, pp. 434-44; Marc Beise, "Die DDR und die europii.ische Gemeinschaft," Europa-Archiv, #4, 1990, pp. 149-58.
57. Smyser, "United Germany: A New Economic Miracle?," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990, p. 173.
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cost. 58 Concern over trends in West German public sentiment even
seemed to prompt Kohl to strive for earlier-than-planned all-German
elections, clearly hoping to cash in on his party's popularity in the
East and thereby offset possible voter losses in the West. 59
Anxiety was also easy to detect among the population in the
GDR, focused on fear over increased unemployment, an inability to
compete with the more powerful West Germans, the possibility of sudden property claims arising from past confiscations, and an elimination of numerous aspects of the GDR's relatively generous welfare
state provisions. Sadness among GDR citizens over the real prospect
of a noticeable loss of identity also began to surface, as ironic as that
may seem, in light of the overwhelming anti-SED and pro-unification
mood. 60 Yet the desire for rapid unity, coupled with the expectation
of massive West German economic assistance, was sufficient to bring
the CDU-dominated Alliance a ringing victory in the March elections,
although their electoral outlook for the longer term had to be considered uncertain at best.
Particular controversy was generated by Chancellor Kohl's desire
to bring about a quick monetary union between the two German
states, to be set up by means of a formal Staatsvertrag (state treaty).
Initial opposition by the FRG's Central Bank subsided, but uneasiness
over the monetary consequences clearly remained. East and West
German negotiators haggled over the conversion rate that would be
applied between the strong West German D-mark and the GDR's
very weak Ostmark. Popular anxiety in the East rose dramatically,
since an unfavorable rate could have a devastating impact on savings,
pensions, and purchasing power. 61 In the end, a 1-for-1 rate was
agreed upon, although a ceiling was set for the amounts that could be
converted at that rate. While early July was selected as the target date
for full monetary union, concerns and disagreements on related economic matters, particularly in the area of market-oriented reform,
continued to slow down the process.
58. The frequent fluidity in West German public opinion throughout late 1989 and
1990 is ably discussed and illustrated in Hans-Joachim Veen, "German Unity: Public
Opinion and Voting Trends," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990, pp. 177-89.
59. Poll data also showed a continued CDU/CSU-FDP lead in the West German campaign, however. See "Kohls zweiter Sieg schon sicher?," Der Spiegel, #14, 1990, p. 36ft".
60. "Der Heimatverlust schmerzt," Der Spiegel, #8, 1990, pp. 27-28.
61. Polls also reflected a continued West German optimism about the unification process as a whole, however, although mixed opinion about the FRG-GDR state treaty was
clearly evident (42% had a "good impression" of the treaty, 28% had "not a good impression," and a significant 30% were "undecided"). See Richard E. Meyer, "West Germans
Optimistic About Reunification, Poll Finds," Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1990, p. Al.
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But as the spring ended, considerable progress had been made.
FRG-GDR negotiations had resulted in a draft state treaty on economic and monetary union that was signed in May. After some complex political maneuvering within the West German SPD, involving
the (unsuccessful) demand by the party's Chancellor-candidate, Oskar
LaFontaine, that the SPD block the state treaty unless certain improvements were made in the text, the treaty was ratified by the parliaments of both German states in June. On July 1, 1990, amid
uncertainty, anxiety, and anticipation, the FRG-GDR economic and
monetary merger went into effect. 62 And now, more than ever before,
the likelihood of all-German elections in December 1990 came clearly
into view.
A $70 billion fund to finance the merger had meanwhile been created, coupled with a "no new taxes" promise from the Bonn government, although widespread skepticism persisted. The fund would
cover a 4-year period, with expenditures focused on the rebuilding of
the GDR's old industries and infrastructure, adjustments in the tax
system, and a much-needed clean-up of the heavily polluted environment in East Germany. Yet it was also significant that the state treaty
did not address some highly sensitive issues that would have to be
settled through separate negotiations, such as ownership of private
property in a de-socialized GDR and some of the basic aspects of reform of East German industry and agriculture, with a potential for a
level of unemployment that some felt might reach well beyond 1, 2, or
even 3 million (out of a population of 16 million).
Some, but by no means all, of these issues were decided in a second Staatsvertrag that was ratified by the parliaments of both German
states on the eve of the formal unification date (October 3, 1990), after
a turbulent negotiation process that saw continued political instability
and friction in the GDR's shaky "Grand Coalition" of conservative
Alliance, liberal FDP, and left-wing SPD. Yet property claims and
divergences in abortion legislation remained among the most important issues that promised continued controversy. The signing of the
second treaty, and the at times clearly subdued and noticeably nonnationalistic celebration of unification, were followed by elections in
the newly reconstituted Lander (states) in the GDR (and in Bavaria in
the FRG) on October 14. The Christian Democrats scored impressive
victories in four of the eastern Lil'nder (Saxony, Thuringia, Saxony62. See, the special report, "Germany Toward Unity," in Time, July 9, 1990, especially
pp. 76-78. For an excellent overview in English of the various financial, social, and economic aspects of the FRG-GDR monetary/economic union, see the 22-page special report
("Survey") entitled "The New Germany," The Economist, June 30, 1990.
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Anhalt, and Mecklenburg), while the SPD was only successful in gaining a majority of the vote in Brandenb_urg. The former Communist
party managed to gain an average of about 10-12% of the vote in each
GDR Land. The election results also brought a restoration of the
CDU/CSU-FDP majority in the Bundesrat.
Aside from the many economic difficulties faced by the new Germany in its internal affairs, such as unemployment, the risk of inflation, disputes over property claims, hesitation among potential
investors, and instances of criminal financial corruption in a collapsing
ex-GDR, political and basic social problems also came more strongly
to the fore. A fundamental revamping of educational policy and curricular content in the primary- and secondary-school system of the exGDR was among the urgent questions to be addressed, in addition to
much-needed reform of over-staffed academic institutions. Health
care and other social services were on the brink of full-scale collapse.
Instances of racism and/or violence by skin-heads and other disaffected and alienated groups, including squatters and anarchists in Berlin, emerged as an additional challenge to a virtually disintegrated
East German law enforcement apparatus. Tensions between East
Germans and the remaining groups of foreign "guest-workers," as
well as the thousands of Soviet soldiers, increased steadily.
Political debate over the appropriate policy to be pursued with
respect to former GDR spies, Stasi (secret police) employees, border
guards, and Communist officials, ranging from possible amnesty to
full-scale persecution and partial incarceration, continued to flare up
with predictable regularity. At the same time, controversy over exStasi files and their inherent potential for political embarrassment, if
not blackmail, persisted undiminished. Furthermore, former East
German political parties, especially the SED (renamed PDS), were
forced to surrender their extensive accumulations of capital and
property.
Meanwhile, the campaign for Germany's first truly national elections since the end of the war erupted in full force, with the governing
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in Bonn enjoying the clear status of virtually unbeatable favorite in the December 2 ballot-box contest. The
polls left little doubt about the likely outcome, especially in light of the
CDU's renewed successes in the October 14 GDR elections, and most
of the SPD appeared resigned to the inevitable: Helmut Kohl would
remain the new Germany's Einheitskanzler (chancellor of unity), a
new Bismarck in a democratic Germany. 63 Despite widespread West
63. Poll data can be found in "1st die Wahl schon entschieden?," Der Spiegel, #26,
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German worry about the costs of unification, the SPD proved incapable of using this issue to greater political benefit. Its political message
seemed to fall on deaf ears, especially in the East German area.
The SPD's prospects were further dampened by the decision of
West Germany's Federal Constitutional Court in September that mandated the use of separate 5% electoral thresholds in former East and
West Germany in the December balloting. This would benefit smaller
parties, especially in the East, that might not otherwise make it into
the new German parliament, but it also deprived the SPD of potential
cross-over votes from small East German left-wing parties and citizens' movements.
The results of the December 2 all-German vote were largely as
expected. Kohl's Christian Democrats, with their Bavarian CSU allies, captured about 44% of the total national electorate, as opposed to
the SPD's 33.5%, which amounted to the Social Democrats' worst
showing in 30 years. The Free Democrats succeeded in reaching 11%
of the vote and were widely expected to demand more ministerial posts
in the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government. Parties on the extreme right or left generally fared badly. In the West, the Greens
failed to surmount the 5% electoral threshold and would therefore not
return to the Bundestag. They had been alienated by the increasingly
patriotic mood after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and their ecological agenda had been largely adopted by the larger parties. Only in the
East did a coalition of environmental and peace groups known as Alliance '90 capture enough votes to gain representation in the Bundestag.
The PDS, successor of the discredited Communist SED, also gained a
sufficient number of votes in the East to enter the national parliament.
The far-right Republikaner received only a meager 2% of the vote,
well below the required 5% for Bundestag representation. Despite a
rather low 77% voter turnout, the message of the election was fairly
clear: no experiments, continuation of the current coalition, and a
strengthening of the center of Germany's political spectrum.
TOWARDS A PAX GERMANICA OR A PAX EUROPAEA?
It is in the international realm, however, rather than in the inter-

nal FRG-GDR sphere with its focus on sometimes bitter electoral
contests and the marks-and-pfennigs issues of socioeconomic merger,
that the German Question with its central dimensions of identity,
unity, and power has made itself felt most dramatically since Novem1990, p. 40ff.; "Nur jeder vierte glaubt an Wechsel," Der Spiegel, #31, 1990, p. 32ff.;
"Kohl dem Wahlsieg noch nilher," Der Spiegel, #35, 1990, p. 40ff.
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ber 1989. One analyst captured the essence of international concern as
follows:
There are only two real certainties in European politics today: Eastern Europe has been effectively liberated from Soviet domination, and the reunification of Germany is
approaching. For all their historic worth, these certainties,
in turn, create new uncertainties - after all, the postwar system of European stability, of deterrence and detente, was
based on the permanence of the Soviet threat and of the division of Europe and of Germany. Now that history has
turned the tables, it is the hitherto unquestioned structures
of European order that are entering a period of unpredictability: in the East, all structures - from the Warsaw Pact
to Comecon- set up to camouflage Soviet centralized control; in the West, the NATO alliance and the European
Community (EC); in Europe as a whole the familiar ways in
which East-West relations are conducted. Germany is at the
center of all these uncertainties, not only geographically but
politically. 64
He added that "Europe's two new certainties are interdependent: had
Eastern Europe not succeeded in slipping away from Soviet control,
there would be no chance for the reunification of Germany." 65
One basic and decisive question concerned the diplomatic intentions of the various players in this unfolding drama. 66 Perhaps most
importantly, was Moscow willing to abandon its East German ally and
permit reunification without major Western concessions? Soviet options were by no means clear, and neither were their ultimate objectives. 67 After its unsuccessful attempt to bring about an FRG-GDR
64. Christoph Bertram, "The German Question,'' Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990, p. 45.
65. Ibid.
66. Although Soviet objectives and interests were probably most affected by the rush
toward German unity, the other great powers with continued legal rights in the divided
Germany were also challenged to review and, if necessary, adjust their basic positions. For
further discussion, see Michael H. Haltzel, "Amerikanische Einstellungen zur deutschen
Wiedervereinigung" (pp. 127-32), Walter Schiitze, "Frankreich angesichts der deutschen
Einheit" (pp. 133-38) and Richard Davy, "Grossbritannien und die Deutsche Frage" (pp.
139-44), all in Europa-Archiv, #4, 1990.
67. For some speculation, see Wolfgang Seiffert, "Die Reformpolitik Gorbatschows
und die Deutsche Frage," Osteuropa, Vol. 39, #4, April1989, pp. 317-31; Fred Oldenburg,
"Sowjetische Deutschland-Politik nach der Oktober-Revolution in der DDR,'' Deutschland
Archiv, Vol. 23, # 1, January 1990, pp. 68-76. A general discussion of the evolution of
official Soviet attitudes regarding the question of German unification and security status is
provided by Hans-Peter Riese, "Die Geschichte hat sich ans Werk gemacht," Europa-
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confederation that would have preserved the Soviet position in Central
Europe to its maximum extent under already adverse circumstances,
Moscow appeared to accept full reunification as inevitable, but continued to oppose NATO membership of a united Germany, until a breakthrough was reached in July 1990, as we shall see below.
The Genscher proposal, discussed earlier, sought to break the
stalemate, whereupon the Soviets suggested a German membership in
both NATO and Warsaw Pact. But this idea was quickly rejected by
both Bonn and its allies. Serious limitations on German military
power as part of an East-West compromise remained likely, while
Western leaders expected Moscow to abandon its opposition to German NATO membership. Such expectation was fueled by a variety of
considerations, such as Gorbachev's growing preoccupation with domestic troubles, the steady disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and a
widespread Eastern European preference for a NATO-bound rather
than neutralized and possibly unpredictable and uncontrolled
Germany.
In addition, polls showed that NATO membership for a united
Germany remained clearly the preferred option among West
Germans. A June 1990 poll, for example, found that 51% of West
Germans interviewed preferred a united Germany in NATO, while
34% would opt for neutrality and 15% were undecided. In addition,
53% of the sample indicated willingness to "accept the presence of
foreign troops [on German soil] as part of [Germany's] NATO obligations," whereas 31% felt that "foreign troops should withdraw" (16%
were undecided). Attitudes on nuclear weapons were also interesting.
Of the interview sample, 54% agreed that nuclear weapons should
now be removed from German soil, but 37% argued that they should
remain, while 9% were undecided. When asked whether nuclear
weapons should be pulled out of Germany if "the Soviet Union made
its agreement to German unity conditional on [such a removal of nuclear weapons]," however, only 25% agreed with such a scenario,
while 65% felt that "we should not allow ourselves to be pressured in
the matter of German unity" and 10% declared themselves
undecided. 68
As the months passed, the likelihood emerged that NATO membership of a united Germany would be tied to an overall East-West
Archiv, #4, 1990, pp. 117-26. See also Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power,'' Problems of Communism, July-August 1990, pp. 1-23.
68. For poll results and discussion, see "The Germans give their answers," The Economist, June 30, 1990, pp. 45-46.
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agreement on conventional military power in Europe (resulting from
the negotiations in Vienna on Conventional Forces in Europe) plus
extensive Western economic and financial assistance to the struggling
Soviet economy. This latter approach, extending beyond the newly
created Bank for East European Development, was looked upon skeptically by the US and Great Britain, but favored by the other Western
allies, including especially the FRG, which had already promised
Moscow to assume the GDR's trading obligations vis-a-vis the USSR.
For many, Kohl's exceedingly clumsy handling of the GermanPolish border issue in early 1990 was unmistakable proof of the need
to anchor the new Germany firmly in the Western alliance. Allegedly
concerned over the potential loss of the West German bloc of expellee
votes to the far right, Kohl hesitated badly when asked to declare the
Oder-Neisse line as the definitive border between Germany and Poland. His argument that only a newly constituted German government and parliament could effectively make such a pledge was legally
correct but politically extremely ill-timed and unwise. Declarations by
both German parliaments, plus Allied assurances that Poland would
be allowed to participate in discussions regarding its border with Germany in the context of the "two-plus-four" talks, subsequently defused
the immediate controversy and anxiety, but the damage had been
done. By July, the two German states and Poland reached a full understanding about the finality of the current German-Polish border, to
be formalized in a treaty at the time of Germany's official reunification, and tied to plans for extensive German-Polish economic cooperation. In November, agreement on the formal German-Polish treaty
indeed became reality: the existing border was declared fixed once and
for all, although the fundamental challenge of reconciliation and cooperation would require more long-term effort on both sides.
However, the Polish-German border issue was illustrative of
more widespread anxiety among many of Germany's neighbors regarding the prospect of unification. A poll conducted in January of
1990 in 8 countries (Spain, Italy, FRG, Hungary, Britain, France,
USSR, and Poland) detected mixed feelings. "Roughly two out of
three Poles are opposed to the reunification of Germany, but a majority of Russians and Hungarians feel positively about the idea....
[W]hile a solid majority of those questioned in five Western European
countries favored a single German state, a significant number of
Britons and French - around one in four - were opposed." The poll
revealed "continuing uncertainty throughout Europe." For example,
"[a]mong the Western European countries polled, only Italy had a
majority that thought lasting peace was within reach. Forty-nine per-
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cent of Britons and 50 percent of French said a serious European conflict was still possible. " 69 As the months progressed, some of the
international worries seemed to ease, particularly as a result of a variety of diplomatic assurances made by the Bonn government. 70 Jewish
concerns frequently persisted, however, in part because no explicit allGerman admission of guilt for the Holocaust was included in the final
FRG-GDR unification treaty. The likelihood of claims made against
a reunited Germany by Jews and others also continued to loom as a
source of very probable controversy.
As Christoph Bertram pointed out, the basic international agenda
resulting from the inexorable drift toward German reunification involved "the security status of Germany, the cancellation of the remnants of Germany's now obsolete postwar legal regime, the special
rights of the Four Powers, the status of the city of Berlin, and the
finalization of Germany's external borders, particularly with Poland."
In addition, "the European Community will have to define the modalities of permitting one of its member states to be enlarged." 71
The exact ways in which this agenda would be managed, and the
various issues settled, could only become clearer as time passed, and
some aspects might not be fully settled for at least several years after
formal FRG-GDR unification. What became very obvious, however,
was that this agenda reflected the basic dimensions of an enduring
German Question with which Germans and non-Germans alike must
continue to contend. It is clear that one aspect of that Question,
namely national unity, has been at least formally "solved," although
lingering revisionism due to the loss of former Eastern territories
ought to be watched carefully.
But it is also important to remember that territorial and legal
69. "Survey Finds 2 in 3 Poles Opposed to German Unity,'' The New York Times,
February 20, 1990, p. AS. Additional poll results were published in "They like it and they
fear it," The Economist, January 27, 1990, pp. 29, 32.
70. "Europe's Fears of a United Germany Dissipate,'' Los Angeles Times, May 5, 1990,
p. A16; "From Germany's Neighbors, Respect and Then Acceptance," The New York
Times, September 27, 1990, pp. A1, A6. Evidence that worries nonetheless linger just below the surface was probably at no recent time clearer than during July 1990, when a
conservative British government minister resigned after inflammatory statements about the
Germans and their alleged behavioral inclinations and intentions. The uproar gathered
further momentum when a British government memo was subsequently leaked which contained very sharp and negative evocations of the Germans' purported "national character."
An abridged version of the memo was published by The New York Times, July 20, 1990, p.
A15. See also Dominic Lawson, "Saying the Unsayable," Orbis, Fall 1990, pp. 505-07;
David Wedgwood Benn, "Germany II: Britain and the 'enemy image'," The World Today,
October 1990, pp. 181-82.
71. Bertram, "The German Question," supra, note 64, pp. 50-51.
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German unification by itself has not yet by any means resulted in genuine East-West German cultural and psychological unity. Forty years
of political-ideological and psychological separation cannot and will
not be undone overnight. What is more, the dismal economic picture
in the former GDR all but guarantees that the population in "East"
Germany will for some years to come have to cope with a (perceived
as well as real) status as "second-class" citizens in the new Germany,
frequently subject to "West" German disdain, ridicule, and resentment.72 In fact, Michael Meyer has suggested that "[t]he German
Question has ... been reincarnated, in a new form," because "[t]he
new Germany will be one nation, but two peoples. " 73 Interesting in
this context of continued "disunity" is also the occasional discussion
of what the "eastern" part of the new Germany ought to be called in
political discourse: "the former GDR," "the new Federal Liinder,"
"eastern Germany?" For many conservatives who continue to harbor
revisionist dreams regarding the lost "eastern" territories in Poland
and the Soviet Union, of course, the former GDR will always remain
Mitteldeutsch/and. 74
Furthermore, there is absolutely no doubt that the two remaining
dimensions, identity and power (and, thus, Germany's role in world
affairs) will also continue to preoccupy scholars and policy-makers
alike for at least the foreseeable future. Beyond the concrete military,
political, and economic issues that the international community faces
as it strives to deal with the new Germany, the psychological aspects,
especially fear of a new German nationalism, are equally significant.
Western World and West German insistence on placing the new
German giant firmly in the Western community was and is the clear
outgrowth of perceived lessons of the German and European past.
Throughout its history, Germany's geopolitical location in the heart of
Europe, coupled with its growing power, have been the source of both
trauma and temptation, of insecurity and instability. Germany's alienation from the West was further enhanced by the at least partially
72. See, the interesting discussion in "Es ist ein anderes Leben,'" Der Spiegel, #39,
1990, p. 34lf. See also the useful poll data on this issue in "Zwei Klassen im einig Vaterland,'' Der Spiegel, #38, 1990, p. 28lf. Of East Germans polled, 78% expected to be second-class citizens for the foreseeable future, while only 21% anticipated equal treatment
and equal rights.
73. Meyer, "The Myth of German Unity," Newsweek, July 9, 1990, p. 37. See also, the
valuable discussion and polling data provided in "Den Neuen fehlt Selbstvertrauen," Der
Spiegel, #46, 1990, p. ll4lf. and "Frauen zuriick an den Herd?," Der Spiegel, #47, 1990,
p. 113lf.
74. See, the interesting discussion in "Aehm, also, sag doch mal," Der Spiegel, #42,
1990, pp. 51, 54.
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diverging cultural values and political traditions noted above. In this
respect, Germany's reconciliation with the West and the FRO's membership in both NATO and EC rank among the great success stories of
postwar Western, and West German, diplomacy. The steady democratization of West German political culture has been a source of reassurance to the country's traumatized neighbors.
In light of these considerations, Western and West German insistence on a Germany firmly tied to the West, militarily in NATO and
economically through the EC, has been and still is necessary, inevitable, and under current circumstances desirable. A reaffirmation of
Germany's Western identity, coupled with a well-defined role in multilateral (even supranational) Western institutions and organizations,
will provide the most appropriate basis for a solution to what is perhaps the most crucial dimension of the German Question: power. 75 In
fact, if this essay has proved anything, it is that what tends to be called
the German Question is not necessarily the problem of German
reunification but perhaps primarily the problem of German power.
History has given us ample indication that the effective management
of German power by the Germans themselves and by Germany's
neighbors is crucial to the creation of a stable European order. 76 The
Cold War "solution" to this problem, based on the division of Germany and the integration of both states into opposing alliance systems,
has come to an end. What lies ahead?
The management of the new Germany's power will be an international task, but, as Bertram stresses, the Germans themselves now face
perhaps the major responsibility:
Germany holds a pivotal role as a generator of policy. The
ideas, initiatives and commitments to shape a stable European future will now largely have to come from the Germans
themselves - not only because of their weight in Europe's
politics and economy, but also because, with the notable and
welcome exception of the United States, Germany's main
partners in the West have largely retreated into attentive
(France) or irritated (Britain) passivity. German politicians
must thus display an immense degree of statesmanship, not
only in order to manage the domestic process of reunification, but to pave the way for the international one as well.
75. See, "Germany Inc.: Awesome Power Might Be the Only Predictable Trait Of a
Unified Land," The New York Times, Section 4, February 18, 1990, p. 1; "The New Superpower," Newsweek, February 26, 1990, p. 16ff.
76. See, the discussion in Michael Lind, "German Fate and Allied Fears," The National Interest, Spring 1990, pp. 34-44.
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This is a tall order for any country. Germany must accommodate the concern of those worried about the German past
as well as that of those troubled by its new power; it must
reassure Soviet security interests without arousing suspicions
in the West; it must strengthen its Western ties through participation in the reform of NATO and through promotion of
political union in Western Europe. In short, Germany has
to use its weight and power wisely, considerately as well as
confidently. 77
International concern over German military power remains, particularly the scenario of a future revisionist German superpower armed
with nuclear weapons. Hence the increased effort on all sides to examine various possible security arrangements, including arms control
agreements, that might stabilize the emerging post-Cold War European continent. 78
Major breakthroughs on the security status of a united Germany
were finally achieved during the summer of 1990, after months of intense negotiations and posturing by the various parties. 79 In mid-July,
the Soviet Union removed its objection to the NATO membership of a
united Germany, in return for extensive Western (especially German)
77. Bertram, "The German Question," supra, note 64, pp. 61-62. As Bertram notes,
the U.S. has indicated that it intends to remain fully engaged in the future of Europe. To
some, the American presence in Europe is in fact a key stabilizing factor. See Josef Joffe,
"Europe's American Pacifier," Survival, July/August 1984, pp. 174-81; William E. Odom,
"Only Ties to America Provide the Answer,'· Orbis, Fall 1990, pp. 483-504.
78. This crucial issue can only be touched upon in the context of this study. For dis·
cussion, see Manfred Miiller, "Deutschlands Rolle in einem neugestalteten europaischen
Sicherheitssystem," Europa-Archiv, #6, 1990, pp. 221-24; Rupert Scholz, "Deutsche Frage
und europiiische Sicherheit," Europa-Archiv, #1, 1990, pp. 239-46; Robert E. Hunter,
"The Future of European Security" (pp. 55-68) and Joachim Krause and Peter Schmidt,
"The Evolving New European Architecture- Concepts, Problems, and Pitfalls" (pp. 7992), both in The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990; Pierre Hassner, "Europe beyond
partition and unity: disintegration or reconstitution," International Affairs, Vol. 66, #3,
1990, pp. 461-75; Ian Davidson, "The search for a new order in Europe,'' International
Affairs, vol. 66, #2, 1990, pp. 275-83; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,'· International Security, Spring 1990, pp. 5-41; Roger Morgan, "Germany in Europe," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990, pp. 147-57; Ole Waever, "Three
competing Europes: German, French, Russian," International Affairs, Vol. 66, #3, 1990,
pp. 477-93.
79. The important breakthrough was especially made possible by the results of the
summit meetings of the EC, NATO, and the G-7 (leading Western industrial nations) that
occurred in rapid succession during June and July 1990. West German success in getting
allied support for (its own or joint) economic and financial aid to the USSR, plus subtle but
significant shifts in NATO strategy and military /political posture, were particularly
decisive.
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aid for the faltering Soviet economy, a limit of 345,000 on the troop
strength of the all·German army, a German pledge not to acquire any
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and German agreement t~
help pay for the maintenance of Soviet troops on East German tern·
tory for a transitional period of 3 to 4 years as well as for their subse·
quent removal. The last obstacle to the rapid and successful
conclusion of the "two·plus·four" talks was definitively cleared, and
on September 12, the four wartime allies and the two German states
signed the agreement formally restoring full German sovereignty. The
Soviet-German breakthrough culminated in a formal treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two continental European giants in
November, whereupon a grand European/North American summit
meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
gave its formal endorsement to German unity, a far-reaching conventional arms control agreement between East and West, and the construction of a new European order beyond the Cold War in what
became known as the Charter of Paris.
Yet many of the more immediate and realistic considerations
have been focused, not on Germany's military power, but on its inevitable political and economic clout in a changing Europe. The following (estimated) figures give an indication of a united Germany's
projected economic power. Exports by the new united Germany might
total $354 billion a year, compared with $321 billion for the US, $265
billion for Japan, and $110 billion for the USSR. The new Germany's
balance of trade is projected to show a $74 billion surplus, compared
with Japan's $77 billion surplus, the Soviets' meager $3 billion surplus,
and America's $138 billion deficit. Per capita GNP is calculated at
$14,000 for a united Germany, nearly $20,000 for the US, $14,000 for
Japan, and less than $9,000 for the USSR. 80 Based on 1988 figures,
the united Germany has a GOP of about $1 trillion, compared to $4.8
trillion for the US, $2.5 trillion for the Soviet Union, $1.7 trillion for
Japan, $762 billion for France, $755 billion for the UK, and $754 billion for Italy. 81 Many have suggested that Germany's geographic location can be expected to be a key asset in that country's economic
future. W.R. Smyser, for example, suggests that "Germany [will] benefit from its central position in Europe, not only as a transportation
hub but also as a production center." 82
Some have sought to place the economic power of a united Ger80. Data adapted from "The New Superpower," Newsweek, February 26, 1990, pp. 18,
19, 21.
81. Figures in "Anything to Fear?," Time, March 26, 1990, p. 36.
82. Smyser, "United Germany: A New Economic Miracle?," supra, note 57, p. 173.
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many in Europe in context, however, attempting to counter undue
concerns. Thus John Roper, pointing to the widespread "speculation
of the role that a united Germany would play within the [European]
Community," wrote:
True, its population of some 78m [million] would be onethird greater than that of either Britain, France or Italy, and
twice that of Spain. But the change would be quantitative
rather than qualitative. West Germany is already the largest
member of the EC with just under 20 per cent of the Community's population and 24 per cent of its economic output
(gdp). A unified Germany would increase its share of the
EC's population to 22.7 per cent and initially to around 26
per cent of the Community's economic output, but this could
rise to 29 per cent if the labor productivity of the two
Germanies was equated. On the other hand, if eventually
the other five Eastern European countries were to join, the
united Germany's proportion of the total EC population
would be lower than that of West Germany - at present only 17 per cent. Its economic share is more difficult to calculate, but it is probable that it would also be less than the
present 24 per cent. 83
He concludes that "the idea that, by unification, Germany would automatically leap from a non-dominant to a dominant role is clearly misplaced." Roper adds that "[a]s to the political aspect, there are too
many hands on the levers of the Community for any single member
state to impose its will on the rest. " 84
Perhaps the hope that a German economic superpower will be
effectively tamed in a context of progressive European integration is
justified, but the fact also remains that the new Germany will wield
very significant influence in most areas of Central and Eastern Europe. 85 It will also be the European country most directly affected by
any turbulence in East-Central Europe in the wake of the collapse of
Communism and its socio-economic as well as ethno-nationalist consequences. For historical, geopolitical, and cultural reasons, it is inevi83. Roper, "Europe and the future of Germany- a British view," The World Today,
March 1990, p. 48.
84. Ibid.
85. In this connection, see "East, West Economies Join, New German Reich Begins,'·
Los Angeles Times, July l, 1990, p. Ml; "A Unified Germany's Foreign-Policy Mantra Will
Be: Go East, Young Germans," Los Angeles Times, July 15, 1990, p. Ml, explores the
inevitably eastward orientation in the new Germany's diplomacy. See also, the interview
with historian Gordon A. Craig, "Zu gross ftir Europa?," Der Spiegel, #46, 1989, p. 183ff.
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table that the united Germany will in the coming years and decades
once again occupy its Janus-like position as a multifaceted "bridge"
between the West and the East, with all the opportunities and liabilities that this entails, including pressures from an economically troubled Eastern Europe and USSR for economic and financial assistance.
In addition, it is an unmistakable fact that the process of German
unification has run ahead of the process of European integration,
which will pose particularly difficult challenges for the entire EC in
the time ahead. 86 In a changing world, where economic strength will
be as important as military capability, Germany will be a truly decisive actor on the world stage. Yet, as Fritz Stem points out, "[f]or
Germans more than for any other people in the Western world, both
the past and the future are unsettled, uncertain, open. " 87 Whether the
reunited Germans will manage their power responsibly and play their
new global as well as Central European roles effectively, with a solidly
anchored Western identity, that is clearly the essence of the enduring
German Question.

86. See, Henry A. Kissinger, "Joining Two Germanys," Los Angeles Times, January
14, 1990, P~· M1, M3. Or as Roper has put it, "Germans and other Europeans may appear
to be workmg on different timetables" ("Europe and the future of Germany - a British
view," supra, note 83, p. 48). See also Ungerer, "Die Europiiische Gemeinschaft und die
Einigung Deutschlands,'' supra, note 56.
87. Stern, f!reams and Delusions: National Socialism in the Drama of the German Past,
New York: Vmtage Books, 1989, p. 20. See also the commentary by A.M. Rosenthal
"The German Question Remains Open," The New York Times, April 26, 1990, p. A23. '

CHAPTER VIII
UNIFICATION AND THE DIALECTICS OF
(MAL)INTEGRATION IN VIETNAM
Gerard Mare

I. INTRODUCTION
Few people have sacrificed so much in the name of national unification as have the Vietnamese. Despite appalling casualties and a
savaged economy, the grand ideal of unification was sustained for
many years with unflinching intent. While the two decades of separation into North and South were marked by nearly constant war, these
same years also witnessed sweeping and rapid change in both societies.
In the North, the Communist regime carried out harsh campaigns of
land reform, collectivization, and economic socialization in an effort to
recast the society along Leninist lines. In the South, over half the population was uprooted; millions flooded the cities. The old rural social
structure was shattered, largely as a result of the Vietcong strategy of
commingling terror and land reform. By the early 70's, however, as
the war became stalemated and the Vietcong · threat subsided, economic progress began to take hold, in part due to vast infusions of
American financial and administrative assistance. When communist
forces captured Saigon in 1975 after a devastating six-week military
offensive, the stage was set for a collision of two disparate worlds.
Within several years Vietnam will have been reunified for as long
as it was separated. Yet a deep north/south cleavage continues to
skew and divide Vietnamese political life, and the two societies remain
distinct. The circumstances and principles under which unification
was carried out-the attempt at wholesale socialist transformation and
the blind disavowal of the South's unique historical experience-set in
motion a dialectic of malintegration which persists to this day. Presently the socializing drive is on the wane if not in retreat, particularly
in the South. The central issue confronting the regime is no longer
how to recast the South in the Northern mold but the obverse: how to
prevent changes occurring in the South-the rapid pullback from socialist forms, vocal disaffection, and cynicism-from creating too
wide a gap or too strong a pull vis-a-vis the North.
Regarding most divided nations, reflections on unification by the
(161)
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parties themselves or by outside observers tend to focus overwhelmingly on ways to achieve a grand national settlement. The Vietnamese
case suggests above all else the need to see unification as only the first
step towards the immensely complicated business of realizing political
reintegration, with all the difficult structural adjustments and inevitable political shocks that it entails. One could hypothesize that in national cases where one side engulfs the other, there is the tendency to
believe that lessons deemed successful can be applied wholesale, putting little store in the specific historical lessons or culture of the erstwhile alienated 'other'.
In analyzing the politics of national reintegration in Vietnam, several initial themes stand out. First, the very obsession to achieve unification blinded the regime to the bedeviling complexities in realizing
integration. In the euphoria of victory economic plans were laid
which forecast rapid recovery and astonishingly high output targets
over the following five year span. Hanoi's leaders spent little time
either reviewing the weaknesses inherent in its own socialization process or assessing the degree to which absorbing and restructuring the
South involved a great deal more than simply rooting out foreign influence. They were particularly blind to the consequences of their own
initiatives: how, for example, the Viet Cong, in pursuing a land war
strategy, had fostered dynamics of rural reform which left the Southern peasantry resistant to further transformation.
A second theme concerns both the ideological and international
context of Vietnamese unification. The war had always been cast as
part of a univeral struggle against colonialism and imperialism. As a
result, the ensuing debates about the nature and pace of socialization
and, subsequently, the need to accommodate policies to the distinct
conditions in the South became embroiled in ideological conflict and
distrust. There was a strong ideological linkage across policy fields,
especially in the initial post-1975 period. Only recently, as the policy
agenda has become increasingly dictated by the need to respond to
repeated economic failure, have these links begun to loosen.
Two arguments are woven in the discussion below, each stressing
the central role of political malintegration in the regime's evolution
since 1975. The first examines the problems of North/South integration in terms of evolving dynamics of state/society interaction. I argue that the regime's strength, effectiveness, and legitimacy have
steadily eroded over the last fifteen years as a result of both its economic incompetence and of its inability to penetrate and remold
Southern society. Having made critical macro-economic mistakes and
having failed to implant tenable socialist structures in the South, the
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regime had its legitimacy stripped down close to its founding nationalist core. Vietnamese socialism became a spent force as it progressed
ineffectually southwards.
These failures have in turn brewed discontent. In the last few
years, as the party loosened the strictures limiting criticism, a nascent
civil society has begun to take root primarily in the South,
spearheaded by a loosely knit association of former Southern revolutionary leaders of unassailable prestige who had been sidelined in the
intervening years. Tacit alliances with disaffected peasant groups and
among the small intellectual elite have begun to broaden. Within this
budding opposition-whose influence extends to the Fatherland
Front, to Southern branches of mass organizations, to scientific clubs
and other professional associations-the rejection of party dogma and
autocracy, incompetence and corruption, is expressed in ever more
trenchant tones. While Southern in origin, the dissenters' perspective
is essentially national in scope, not confined merely to Southern preoccupations or failures. Recent events in Eastern Europe have bolstered
their courage while at the same time inviting stern rebuff and admonition from the regime.
How easily these voices of dissent can be muzzled or how quickly
they will echo throughout the whole country are difficult questions to
answer. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese leadership, in failing the expectations of even its erstwhile allies and supporters in the South, has
fostered a dialectical response which makes it more vulnerable in the
long term than the leadership of other Asian socialist states.
Malintegration has abetted regime drift and decay, such that even in a
socialist state with low educational levels and a limited intellectual
elite, dissent is increasingly evident. 1 At present, despite having withdrawn most of its forces from Cambodia, the regime is paradoxically
more politically isolated than it has ever been as a result of changes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. At the same time the society is
increasingly open to outside influence through rapidly expanding external economic ties, through the overseas Vietnamese community in
the West, and through the 180,000 guest workers sojourning in the
East, presently trickling back to face severe unemployment at home.
l. Vietnam has a very low percentage of university student population, about I/ lOth
that of Cuba, l/3rd that of Mongolia. Secondary school percentages are less than one-third
those of the People's Republic of China, a startling figure even if secondary education is
defined differently. See Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes de Renouveau au Vietnam," Le
Monde Diplomatique, January 1988, p.l8. For comparisons with other Asian countries see,
Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1990 Yearbook, Hong Kong: Review Publishing, 1990,
pp. 7-8.
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Whether the regime can adapt and channel the pressures for radical
change is an open question.
My second main argument complements the first and asserts that
another distinguishing feature of postwar Vietnamese socialism is the
lack of regime goal integration. Before 1975 the regime pursued the
unification dream single-mindedly, effectively mobilizing all its resources to that end. In the wake of victory it became saddled with
conflicting priorities: socialist transformation and integration of the
South; economic reconstruction and development; and the perennial
goal of military struggle and defense which quickly drew it into the
Cambodian quagmire. The image that comes to mind for the first
post-1975 decade and beyond is of a regime caught in different and
contradictory phases of socialist development, unable to break
through or break out of any one phase. Both China and the Soviet
Union evolved through separate stages of war communism, socialist
transformation, and eventually some conjunction of reform and decay.
Identified with each phase was a central set of tasks, and a specific
hierarchy of skills and regime institutions. In Vietnam there was a
conflation of priorities weakening effectiveness on all three fronts.
War, radical social transformation, and economic development andreform are mutually exclusive tasks which simply could not be prosecuted successfully and simultaneously by a resource starved Third
World revolutionary regime in a downward economic spiral. Associated-part cause and part effect-with this triple and contradictory
regime profile is a collegial leadership style and an overwhelming emphasis on regime continuity and stability, such that even periods of
leadership succession have not yielded the kind of major break or realignment often witnessed in other socialist states.
Presently the socializing profile lives on primarily in a vestigial or
custodial capacity. The decades-long stress on military struggle has
also been subsiding. Thus for the first time in its post-war history the
leadership can marshal its attention and resources toward one strategic goal-salvaging and developing its tattered economy. The composition of key leadership organs has begun to reflect this change over
the last few years, though not without some lag. 2
2. The composition of the Central Committee, for instance, has been significantly altered since the 1982 Congress. Central party organs and the military are much more
weakly represented while provincial officials and state technocrats now comprise a majority. For a detailed review of these changes, see Carlyle Thayer, "The Regularization of
Politics: Continuity and Change in the Party's Central Committee, 1951-1986," in David
G. Marr & Christine P. White (eds.), Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988, p. 187. Military representation in the
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Both arguments briefly sketched above converge to highlight
Vietnam's integration problem and the long painful sequels to war and
separation. Unification threw the regime into contradiction and disarray from which it has only begun to emerge. But it has also created a
dynamic of change which in time might lead Vietnam to break out of
obdurate socialist orthodoxy.
II.

UNIFICATION: THE FIRST DECADE

Many of the problems of malintegration that Vietnam suffers today can be traced to the early post-unification years of 1975-1979.
During the war, when unification was still a grand ideal and a fighting
cause, little thought had been given to the concrete issues of planning
and administration in the post-war years. After an initial phase of
recovery and consolidation of control, unification was declared as a
fait accompli and the Hanoi-based regime changed its name from the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the present Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. Resettlement schemes were introduced affecting both the
North and South to relieve the bloated cities and regions of their burden of unemployed and underproductive population. In the lead up to
the 4th Party Congress held in December 1976, the first in sixteen
years, plans were drawn up for the wholesale but gradual transformation of Southern society. These plans, however, were based on a
number of flawed assumptions, chief of which was the belief that lessons derived in the wake of the collectivization campaigns, carried out
in the North two decades earlier, could usefully be put into practice in
a post-bellum South dramatically altered by the war.
Before 1954 South Vietnamese agriculture was essentially a wet
rice share-cropping system directed to the export market and characterized by a very unequal distribution of land, power, and status.
However, over the following two decades both sides in the war focused
great attention on gaining rural support, subjecting the peasantry to a
barrage, if not a crossfire, of land reform measures. Though much of
the undertaking was initiated piecemeal by the Viet Cong, the Thieu
government's Land-To-The-Tiller program of 1970-1973 nevertheless
consolidated and made official the changes accomplished to date. 3
Central Committee has been cut in half, down to 7% at present; yet party recruitment from
within the military is still 37.2% of the national total for the last year, according to Nhan
Dan (Hanoi) as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report East
Asia, (hereafter FBIS, DR/EA), March 13, 1989. While down from earlier figures (58% in
the 1976-1982 years according to Thayer) the high percentage reveals how the military is
still viewed as providing a key pool of dependable elite talent.
3. The discussion of the inherent contradictions in the collectivization policies applied
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The result was that by 1974 a largely middle peasant-farmer landholding agrarian structure had emerged from the ruins of war-tom rural
areas. Helped by effective extension services, credit availability, and
the introduction of miracle rice strains, rice paddy production rose
over 40% between 1969-1974, bringing South Vietnam to the verge of
rice self-sufficiency. 4 Thus, concomitant to twenty years of war and
destruction, steady and extraordinary improvements had been
achieved for the material welfare of the surviving Delta peasantry.
One can conjecture that the lower 40% of the agrarian population in
the Mekong Delta was materially better off in 1975 than the equivalent
population in any state in the region. One thing was certain: the vast
majority of middle peasant small-holders had acquired considerable
interests to protect. And their disposition and receptivity to further
transformation, especially in the Delta where over two-thirds of the
agricultural production was based, was at best doubtful.
In retrospect there seems to be a tragic inevitability to the collisions and failures of these fateful early post-war years. 5 That the regime would collectivize Southern agriculture and socialize the
Southern economy was inescapable. While acknowledging poor performance of cooperatives in the North and problems of implementation, the leadership had never seriously examined the classic economic
rationales for collectivization. Collectivization was furthermore part
of the effort to unify the country administratively and integrate it socially and economically. Collectivization, equally, served as a potential tool to remold the social and cultural underpinnings of Southern
society and to destroy potential bases of opposition-hence the parallel recourse to re-education camps, New Economic Zones, intense
political discrimination in jobs and education on the basis of family
background, and pervasive security controls-all aspects of an actively
socializing regime profile. 6
to the South is based on Gerard Mare, Socialist Transformation Drives in Southern
Vietnamese Agriculture: An Assessment Five years after 'Liberation,' UC-Berkeley M.A.
Thesis, 1981. For detailed information on the Thieu governments' Land-To-The-Tiller
program, see Charles S. Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social
and Political Effects of Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam, Cornell Ph.D.
Thesis, 1976.
4. Callison, ibid., pp. 60-65. These advances were buoyed by U.S. administrative and
financial aid and by the availability of cheap agriculture imports such as fuel, fertilizer,
pumps, etc.
5. This is true only in a broad sense. Many discrete policy failures and repressive or
discriminatory measures could hardly be called inevitable.
6. In the levelled Southern rural social context, expropriations were effected primarily
on the basis of ties to the former regime. They were hence perceived as punitive, not as acts
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The collectivization program that was launched simply sought to
apply Northern lessons-learned during the period of self-examination
following the Land Reform debacle of the mid-50's-in a vastly dissimilar Southern peasant setting. These lessons focused on the need to
proceed step by step with a carrot-and-stick approach as opposed to
relying exclusively on class warfare. But when applied to the South 20
years later these lessons proved anachronistic. The regime just did not
have the organizational and material resources, or the requisite cadre
talent, to penetrate and reweave the rural social fabric-at least not
without massive coercion, recourse to which had been resolutely ruled
out. Considerable pressure was applied and occasionally cadres were
rebuked for using coercion. Yet the pressure was mainly economic, in
the form of access to key agricultural inputs.
Initial efforts quickly led agriculture production into a steep decline. In 1977-78 the gradual approach was forsaken as the more radical wing of the party under Party Secretary General Le Duan, Truong
Chinh, and Le Due Tho came to the fore. 7 Faced with rapidly falling
grain procurements, the decision was reached to nationalize practically all commerce and industry in the South. Combined with a whole
panoply of repressive and discriminatory measures, this drove nearly a
half million people into exile, a disproportionate number of whom
came from the Chinese community.
Throughout 1978 and early 1979 the collectivization campaign
was in full swing. Successes were heralded and monthly tallies were
reported on the number of collectives established in each region. But
while the campaign did achieve some success in the central region,
barely 20% of the peasants in the Mekong Delta had been successfully
cajoled into joining by late spring 1979. 8
By 1979 the country was on the brink of economic collapse while
militarily committed in Cambodia and at war with China. It is at this
point that the ·reform' profile begins to appear with a series of liberalizing measures promoting the rural household economy, agricultural
of redistributive justice gaining legitimacy for the new order among the broad peasantry.
One can view this as evidence of the inherent weakness and ideological degeneration manifest in the Vietnamese Communists' reversion to socialist transformation after a twenty
year hiatus.
7. The shift to a harder line was prompted by a number of factors besides dire economic circumstances, such as increasing hostility with the PRC, Khmer Rouge armed incursions, the failure of normalizing efforts toward the U.S., and increasing dependence and
alliance with the Soviet Union. For a useful if brief account, see Nguyen Due Nhuan,
"Signes de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note I, p. 18.
8. Ho Chi Minh City Domestic Service reported in FBIS, Daily Report, Asia and Pacific, May 14, 1979, p. 47.
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markets, and small-scale industry. The results were quickly felt.
From 1981 to 1985 the regime enjoyed its best economic performance.
Agricultural production grew steadily, reaching a peak growth rate of
9.2% in 1982. 9 Small scale local industry for consumer goods developed at an average annual rate of over 14%. 10 Living standards improved markedly. In 1985, the leadership, facing massive deficits and
acute inflation, decided to adopt a series of further reforms to sharply
reduce state subsidies and usher in 'real' prices throughout the
economy.
However, against the advice of reform-minded leaders and after
secret deliberations, the government in the same year introduced a revamping of the dong monetary units with disastrous overall economic
effect. 11 The objective was to soak up the hoard of circulating cash
which had fueled the second economy and fallen outside the control of
the central bank. But contrary to expectations, the public sector enterprises bore the brunt of the blow. As is typical of all socialist
'shortage' economies, these enterprises had accumulated large piles of
cash to acquire goods on the secondary markets and to pay bonuses to
their employees. 12 However, most of the targeted 'speculators' and
'profiteers' had long since acquired the habit of dealing only in dollars,
gold, or bartered merchandise. The combined effect of the two policies was devastating: within a year inflation shot up to over 700% and
the stage was set for the severe crisis which persisted until 1988-89
when radical austerity measures were introduced. 13
I highlight this incident because it sharply reveals what can happen when different regime strains collide head on. More than any
other policy move in the 80's, the monetary disaster, in the words of a
Vietnamese commentator, "made it clear to all that our top leaders
were capable of the most egregious errors." 14 As an unanticipated
consequence, the fiasco aroused freer discussion and criticism in the
press, discrediting those responsible for the blunder.
After ten years of unification the regime, though secure in its rule,
9. Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note 1, p. 18.
10. Ibid., p. 18.

11. To Huu was the prime instigator of this move, with the blessings of both Le Duan
and Le Due Tho.
12. I use the term 'shortage economy' in the sense developed by Janos Komai. See,
among other writings, "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality,"
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIV, December 1986, pp. 1687-1737.
13. This account is derived from Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note 1, p. 18.
14. The commentator was Nguyen Khac Vien, as cited in Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes
de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note 1, p. 18.
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had neither implanted stable or workable collective structures in the
South nor effectively remolded Southern society. Malaise and alienation were endemic. Overseas remittances and a vast sub rosa economy
helped the bulk of the population to adapt and survive. State employees and cadres, among the worst hit by the accelerating inflation, became demoralized, easy prey to petty corruption. More disturbing for
the future was the profound disaffection among the veteran Southern
revolutionary elite. As Vietnam entered its second unification decade
and launched its own brand of perestroika and glasnost, Southern discontent would find its voice.
III.

DOl MOl [RENOVATION] AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE
SOUTH TAKES THE LEAD

Towards the end of 1985 the death of several of the 'old guard'
and the renewed economic chaos precipitated a political crisis culminating in the 6th Party Congress held in December 1986. A new party
secretary general, Nguyen Van Linh, a Southerner, was appointed
who quickly showed himself a proponent of further socioeconomic reforms and greater openness in the image of Gorbachev's glasnost.
Articles began appearing in the press, occasionally penned by
Nguyen Van Linh himself, which criticized previous policy and lamented inefficient bureaucracy, party arrogance, and corruption. Literary and film works appeared which greatly stretched the realm of
the permissible. Nguyen Van Linh, following Gorbachev, sought to
promote change and renewal by first building a strong constituency for
himself outside of the top political elite and the entrenched bureaucracy: the small intellectual class, youth, women, and Southern party
networks. While the change in public discourse has been dramatic,
Nguyen Van Linh unfortunately was not able to staunch the ravages
of inflation, which continued in the 700-1000% range until1989. Furthermore, in loosening the reigns over society, he unleashed a storm of
criticism which eventually frightened his neo-conservative opposition
into defensive reaction.
Still, new life has begun to spring in mass organizations and in the
National Assembly, and Southern members have taken the lead in registering vocal opposition to established practice or party dictates.
Yearly assemblies of youth organizations, journalists or writers unions, and professional associations have become turbulent affairs
where non-approved speakers come to the fore and rail against the
regime.
But the most significant development has been the creation of a
loosely knit association of elder veteran Southern revolutionaries of
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unassailable prestige who began to establish branches in many of the
Southern provincial capitals. 15 One of the first overt political acts of
the Club of Former Resistance Fighters was to send a letter to the
central committee and to the National Assembly in mid 1988 calling
for a genuinely democratic election and the right to choose a prime
minister by secret ballot without interference from the party. 16 Signed
by over 100 old revolutionaries, including a host of former top Provisional Revolutionary Government officials, the letter did not succeed
in preventing the party's official candidate for prime minister, Do
Muoi, from being elected. Nevertheless, through public meetings and
clandestine publications, the Club's influence began to spread. Its
members' critique was caustic. In the words of Nguyen Ho, a former
Ho Chi Minh City committee chairman and Club leader, "the American imperialists," could not achieve [i.e. wreak the kind of damage]
with all their troops, bombs, and money, what has been achieved in
the 13 years since victory. 17 Of particular note was their call for the
party to emulate the open proceedings of Soviet party conferences and
to grant more rigorous oversight powers to the national assembly.
Pervading much of the criticism was rancor at the rapid unification
and 'colonization' of the South after 1975, in the process of which
many of them were sidelined or retired.
It appears Club members were involved in the demonstrations
over land disputes which swept a number of Southern provincial
capitals in 1988. In April 1988 the government issued directives
downgrading the role of cooperatives. In doing so it revealed the
kinds of predicaments that can arise in reversing course. In many
Southern provinces cooperatives were essentially defunct. In trying to
officiate their demise and even grant quasi-titles to the land, vast pressures were created to return land to previous owners and not merely to
those, often local cadre families, who had best positioned themselves
in the new free-wheeling economic environment. In the course of
these disputes with local cadres, widespread abuse and graft came into
the open. The state system of taxation and materials supply was revealed to be a particularly severe source of corruption. 18
15. Le Thien Tung asserts that branches have been set up in at least half of the Southem provinces. "The North-South Cleavage: A New Pattern of Infighting," Vietnam Commentary, May-June 1989, p. 2.
16. See Nayan Chanda, "Force for Change," Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter
FEER), October 5, 1989, p. 24.
17. Ibid., p. 26. These comments, which Chanda, perhaps paraphrasing, relates without quotation marks, were delivered in a speech in December 1988 in Ho Chi Minh City.
18. The Economic Intelligence Unit, Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Country Report, No. 2, 1989, London: The Economist Newspaper.
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In this unsettled rural environment the state faces great problems
of contract and tax compliance. Government reports revealed that
Southern provinces paid only 54% of their grain tax in 1987. 19 Twoway contract commitments have often not been met as farmers prefer
to hold on to their grain as a hedge against inflation. They have been
emboldened to do so given the state's incapacity to meet its own contractual obligations to provide key agricultural inputs. On occasion
these problems have had a direct bearing on North/South issues. In
1988, when the North faced a severe famine, authorities met stolid
resistance in seeking greater grain procurements from the South.
Overall, the renovation era of the last five years and the more
open political climate have aggravated rather than defused political
tensions and anomie. Greater openness has allowed the latent discontent to find its voice in the stirrings of a civil society. Much central
authority has been lost to the provinces in the effort to deal with enduring if not widening interregional differences. Reversing previous
policies of socialization has tended to raise anew a host of problems
from the past. At the same time, inveterate attitudes and policy biases
within the party core are eroding, despite all the gainsaying by forestalling neo-conservatives. A tide has turned in Vietnam, and the
challenges spawned foremost in the South will not be easily checked.
IV.

PROSPECI'S

The foregoing discussion of doi moi and North/South integration
shows how the long shadow of the past complicates the many debates
enlivening political life in Vietnam today. What does the future hold?
Will a post-Cambodia era, with its promise of leadership turnover and
renewal, economic democracy, and a more outward looking economy,
herald greater political integration? Or will the diverging impact and
pace of these changes further intensify leadership tensions? The answer is mixed. As argued earlier, the greater integration problem has
been reconciling the regime's disparate strategic goals, resolving the
contradictory pulls of economic growth, military struggle, and socialization. At present, for the first time in its history, Vietnam is entering
an era in which economic development is a clear priority. On the
other hand, the regime still faces the enormous challenge of creating a
consensus around policy packages apt to have a diverging impact and
response from the country's two halves. The central dynamic, however, is no longer Southern resistance to Northern transformation attempts, but the opposite: how to prevent the different pace of
19. FEER Asia Yearbook 1989, Hong Kong: Review Publishing, p. 252.
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economic liberalization from overwhelming or disrupting the North,
all in a period of socialist dissolution in Eastern Europe and in the
Soviet Union.
The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the jettisoning even in the Soviet Union - of the Communist party's leading role
have given rise to sharply different interpretations. In the South,
younger party members and veteran revolutionaries, disaffected by the
ruin and poverty of the last fifteen years, see in these events confirmation of their own disillusionment. Articles and commentary by Resistance Club members highlight party arrogance, corruption and lack of
concern for the people as chief causes. 20 They thus strongly hint that
the Vietnamese party should draw positive lessons from the socialist
debacle in Eastern Europe. Conversely, official commentary in Hanoi
stresses the negative, warning of "imperialist sabotage" and insidious
"peaceful evolution" tactics by the West. 21 General Secretary Nguyen
Van Linh, alarmed by the divisiveness engendered by these debates
and personally closer to his erstwhile allies in the South than any other
figure among the top leadership, did seek to carve out a compromise.
While acknowledging internal weaknesses and failures in other socialist regimes and by implication in Vietnam, Linh also has stressed the
present need for party discipline and unity, warning equally against
'voluntarism and stagnation' and 'overhastyness and demagogy'. 22
But in the years ahead even greater strains will arise from the
anticipated expansion of foreign economic contacts and deepening of
economic restructuring, whose pace and impact are bound to differ
sharply along North/South lines. To date the expected increase in foreign investments and contacts in the wake of the Cambodian withdrawal has been slow to materialize. 23 If anything there has been a
20. Jacques Bakaert, "Eye on Indochina," Bangkok Post, Jan. 12, 1990, reported in
FBIS.DR!EA, Jan. 17, 1990, pp. 67-69.
21. A recent Hanoi Domestic Service broadcast intoned: "The so-called peace, democracy, and right of self-determination serve as a length of red silk hiding the sinister dagger
of pluralism with its tip aimed at the socialist countries," reported in FBIS,DR/EA, Jan.22,
1990, p. 58, under the rubric "Article explains history, nature of Pluralism."
22. See, for instance, "Nguyen Van Linh Article on Revolutionary Tasks," FBIS.DRI
EA, Jan. 26, 1990, p. 70. "Voluntarism" in this context refers to authoritarian and arbitrary tendencies. In the summer of 1989, however, Nguyen Van Linh, in responding to
events in Poland, decried the 'wolfish nature' of imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, in
seeking to affect change in socialist countries. Further changes intervening in Eastern Europe as well as the complicated dynamics of response domestically appear to have led him
to a more tempered and sober view. See Murray Hiebert, "Against the tide," FEER, Sept.
14, 1989, pp. 28-30.
23. Recent reports indicate 151 foreign investment projects have proceeded to date for
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decline in foreign trade in 1989. The lack of foreign exchange, the
continued U.S. blocking of aid and credit by multilateral funding institutions, as well as the confusion and competition among different bureaucratic entities at central and local levels have all played a part.
Much remains to be done to develop the country's commercial, legal,
and financial infrastructure to favor better integration in the world
economy.
Yet as these obstacles diminish, the South is expected to play a
leading role for a number of reasons, including its broader urban middle class, entrepreneurial experience, and greater availability of capital. Overseas Vietnamese remittances, which help to support
anywhere from one quarter to one third of Ho Chi Minh City's population, already reach an estimated US$ 200-300 million. 24 Approximately two-thirds of foreign investment licenses to date have been
granted to companies investing in the South. Perhaps a quarter of
these have gone to overseas Vietnamese. 25 At least so far, traders from
ASEAN countries have shown a decided preference to go through Ho
Chi Minh City, where there is less red tape and where barter arrangements can. be more quickly brokered. 26
Projections of increasing North/South differentiation vis-a-vis the
international economy parallel domestic trends regarding economic
restructuring. While the success of recent anti-inflation austerity
measures have given government officials fresh confidence, there remains a sense of central drift and loss of control to local actors, as well
as a weakening of organizational integrity as the party and the market
a combined estimated value of US$ 1.07 billion. "Vietnam Projects- Heartbreak hotel,"
FEER, September 6, 1990, p. 62. Latest information is presented in note 25 below.
24. Murray Hiebert, "Looking Outward," FEER, April 27, 1989, p. 70. The $300
million figure was quoted for 1986, as reported in FEER Asia 1988 Yearbook, Hong Kong:
Review Publishing, p. 256.
25. Murray Hiebert gives the total as of last spring at 43 out of 48 licenses going to the
South, and 11 to overseas Vietnamese. See "The toughest battle," FEER, April27, 1989, p.
69. According to an official Vietnamese source, as of October 1989, 70 foreign investment
projects totaling $600 million have been approved, 80% concentrating in the South. See
FEER Asia 1990 Yearbook, supra, note 19, p. 246. The latest information, as this volume
goes to press, raises the number of licenses to 273 projects for a total possible of US $2.1
billion, two-thirds destined to the former capitalistic South. This demonstrates a very recent surge in foreign investments. Yet the frustration and obstacles notes above continue to
prevail. See, Murray Hiebert, "The Rise of Saigon," FEER, September 5, 1991, p. 62.
26. The argument for foreign preference towards investments and trade in the South
should not be overstressed. Central authorities will certainly seek to maintain some balance where they can. Further, at present over half of Vietnam's foreign trade goes through
the port of Haiphong, and this city as well as Danang on the central coast are likely to play
a major role.
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interact. Greater decentralization translates into more rapid adaptation to a mixed economy in the southern provinces. The disastrous
currency reforms of the mid 1980's, the ensuing years of 1000% inflation, and the present drastic cutbacks in subsidies have hit the state
sector particularly hard. State enterprises still in operation have been
forced to develop alternate sources of supplies, to adapt their products,
and to depend on unofficial commercial networking. These adaptations are occurring more rapidly in the South. The pattern emerging,
in terms of different pace of adaptation to measures of reform, to some
degree parallels what occurred in China during the 1980's, when
Guangdong and the southeast coastal provinces adapted and developed much more quickly than the rest of the country. 27 As with
China, one can predict that such trends will give rise to alternating
periods of decentralization and central drift followed by retrenchment
and strident debate about the 'negative social phenomena' concomitant to reform. Needless to add, China, in dealing with growing regional disparities in the 1980's did not face the immediate legacies of
war, isolation, or harsh and inept recent socialization drives.
How do these prospects of increased North/South differentiation
continue to affect regime politics? In the short-run, they complicate
policy deliberations and exacerbate political tensions. Economic conditions, especially in the overpopulated Red River Delta, are more
precarious in the North, and encroaching commercialization tied to
changes in the South could seriously disrupt the flow of key inputs.
Orchestrating change in such disparate contexts will be fraught with
peril, especially as problems are voiced in conflicting ideological tones.
It would be simplistic to assert that there is a Northern and a
Southern line in Vietnamese political life. But the regime's failures are
more palpable in the South: the gap between state and society is more
evident with every passing year. And it is in the South that a vigorous
inner opposition has more resolutely developed, gaining ground and
converts throughout the apparat and beyond. Disillusionment with
what the transition to socialism has achieved to date, coupled with a
greater awareness of the dynamism of surrounding economies, have
now been reinforced by events in Eastern Europe. Conversely, one
can sketch an opposite, conservative syndrome, more prevalent in the
North. In all evidence, the leadership is entering the new decade
under great internal strain.
27. For an in-depth study, see Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong
under Reform, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
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V. ENDURING POLmCAL BOTILENECKS
At this juncture it appears doubtful that these tensions will soon
be resolved. While leadership renewal and turnover will surely continue from the bottom up, the Politburo remains in a logjam. It is at
this level that Vietnamese political traditions conspire to block decisive change, in a way unique among socialist regimes.
Collegial rule has been a characteristic of Vietnamese politics ever
since the death of Ho Chi Minh. The stamp of authority of the party
secretary general is no where near as dominant as that of top leaders in
any other socialist state today. If this feature guarantees a greater
level of c6mpromise among competing interests and priorities, it nevertheless inhibits dramatic shifts such as those that have occurred in
both China and in the Soviet Union. Only in Vietnam could you have
simultaneously a party secretary championing price reforms, private
small-scale enterprise, and glasnost; and a Prime Minister, Do Muoi,
known at least previously as a ·pure Stalinist' and as one of the prime
architects of the brutal collectivization of industry and commerce in
the South. 28
Related is the extraordinary emphasis placed on leadership continuity and political stability, inhibiting the role of succession dynamics as a factor for change. The post of Party Secretary General passed
from Le Duan to Truong Chinh (briefly), then to Nguyen Van Linh
and very recently to Do Muoi in less than a decade. Nguyen Van
Linh, from 1985 to early 1989, sought to emulate Gorbachev and use
the politics of glasnost to build a constituency for change. But the rest
of the leadership could not tolerate the unleashing of criticism that
ensued, and they have sought to curb dissent in the last two years.
Finally there is what could be termed the curse of victory and the
tradition of 'struggle' which make a wholesale disavowal of the past
difficult if not unlikely. Breakthrough changes in the PRC as well as
in the Soviet Union were accompanied with a perception of deep crisis
and an escalating attack of past policies and of the preceding leadership. In discrediting the past, new leaders were able to mandate a
fresh start, outflank their more orthodox colleagues, and instill new
hope in constituencies of the discontent. While economic failure and
28. The 7th Party congress was just held in June 1991, at which Do Muoi was designated as the new party chairman. Weeks later Yo Van Kiet, one of the top leaders more
open to reforms, was elected as Premier. Thus the same argument of conflicting priorities
at the top still applies. Many new faces were elected to the new Politburo, but it is still too
early to predict the fall-out from the congress - or from post-coup transformations in the
Soviet Union.
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social alienation are all too evident in Vietnam, new leaders have yet
to exploit these as possible levers for change. Thus, prevailing crisis
and economic urgency have been singularly ineffective in initiating a
break, despite the accepted slogan of 'renewal or death.' A worldview
forged in decades of struggle and that gravest of crises-all out warhave made the top leadership obdurate and defensive. The collapse of
socialism in Eastern Europe and presently in the Soviet Union only
reinforces this trend.
These patterns-smooth successions, collegial rule, traditions of
inner leadership compromise and continuity-are usually associated
with strong regimes. But, ironically, in Vietnam these very traits have
had a perverse impact. Smooth succession has been like a prison:
leadership changes have not provided the points of departure many
might have hoped for. 29 At present there is a widening gap between
regime and society, with the result that the Vietnamese state, heralded
as one of the strongest in the Third World by some observers, has
become in fact considerably weaker, weighed down by external exhaustion and internal decay. 30 One senses diminished strength in the
regime's web of accommodation to local actors and to non state-directed economic forces. Indeed, there is evidence of weakness in the
state's declining extractive (tax), regulative (cadre corruption), distributive, and symbolic capacities.
Even if the logjam at the top has not been resolved at the 1991
party Congress, there will nevertheless be a broad renewal in the leadership ranks. Perhaps two thirds of the Central Committee elected at
this Congress are either new or incumbents of the last Congress of
1986. One suspects that the new leadership stratum, while hardly uniform in point of view, nevertheless will be generally more sensitive to
the failures of the past, and more apt to borrow new ideas from the
ambitious experiments in economic liberalization initiated by former
bloc allies. Thus over the long run the possibility of breakthrough
change exists, even if the immediate reaction to the collapse of the
Soviet Union is bitterly defensive.
It is a good thing that Vietnam was separated for only 22 years
and that North/South cleavages have not been aggravated by ethnic
29. By speaking of the curse of victory and the ironies of strong regimes I am not
suggesting that either defeat, political instability, or chaotic transitions would have been
preferable for Vietnam. I simply stress that obdurate resilience over decades has not made
the regime adaptable, a strength it sorely lacks.
30. Joel S. Migdal, for example, places Vietnam on the upper end of the scale of strong
states. See his recent Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State
Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
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tensions. Already awareness of regional differences among those
originating from the north, south, and center is intense and deeply
rooted. 31 Yet, if the regime's socializing mission ran aground in its
disastrously inept application in the South, at least the dream of a
strong independent nation remains whole. Disillusioned Resistance
Club members still wrapped themselves in the nationalist mantle of
Ho Chi Minh in disparaging the party's policies towards the South. 32
One finds little evidence for any groundswell towards Southern independence. Therein lies hope for Vietnam in the long run. For it is in
the South that forces for ANTITHETICAL change will more forcefully
gather and develop, casting aside long-standing obstacles in their nation-wide sweep.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly all the other unification cases examined in this volume are
very different from Vietnam. Vietnamese unification was brought
about through military conquest after decades of war. There was no
antecedent period of protracted negotiation to define a settlement.
The less democratic and economically developed half simply prevailed
militarily over the other. Furthermore, unification was achieved in a
hostile international environment that forced the country to increasingly depend on Moscow and its allies.
However, the Vietnamese case does have broader implications.
For one, the strong commitment to a unification ideal does not necessarily imply that national reintegration can be easily achieved. In
Vietnam, it masked considerable ignorance about the distinct historical experience marking 'the other'. As a result, despite the North's
powerful and engulfing sweep southwards, unification led to a momentous collision in which the lasting effects of separation and war were
deepened by policy failure, yielding prolonged malintegration.
The only other unification case today that remotely parallels Vietnam is Germany, where one side has engulfed the other. Certainly
circumstances in the German case are far more propitious. Unification was self-determined by the East Germans. No war preceded the
process, only a shared awareness of the liabilities of being front line
states in the Cold War. The Federal Republic's economic power and
resilience nearly guarantee economic betterment for the majority of
31. One analyst, Douglas Pike, sees regionalism in Vietnam as entrenched as the caste
system in India. See his "Origins of Leadership Change in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," Raymond Taras (ed.) Leadership Change in Communist States, London: Unwin
Hyman, 1989, p. 112.
32. Murray Hiebert, "Not resting in piece?" FEER, September 14, 1989, p. 30.
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East Germans-in time. In addition, the democratic process will provide the necessary framework to cushion the collision and to work out
the mutual adaptations. Nevertheless, I would still predict a long process of entangling adjustment and a political restructuring that will in
time utterly transform German parliamentary politics. In this very
early phase, far too many believe that integration will simply be a matter of stretching West German political and economic structures to
spread over the East, a perception abetted by recent electoral results.
A much more likely scenario is a long period of self-absorption, frustration, dialectical adjustment, and electoral volatility which, eventually, will profoundly alter the German political map and perhaps its
regional and international orientation as well.
The above analysis on post-unification politics in Vietnam stresses
the inevitably bedeviling sequels to national division. The passage
from unification towards reintegration has been marked by ironies.
Strong, resolute yet tactically flexible in war, the regime has not shown
the same adaptiveness or resolve in charting out a developmental path.
Its enviable record of political stability and continuity masks an inability to confront a rapidly changing domestic and international environment. Southern society, defeated and exhausted after a long war,
stands presently as the vanguard to national renewal. Yet despite
these bitter ironies, for the past fifteen years the attachment to a national ideal has been extraordinarily persistent. One can hope that in
the long run this enduring consciousness of the nation could usher in a
true renovation in Vietnamese political life.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY*
Robert Sutter

The current or formerly divided nations treated in this volume
have been at the center of the major national security crises faced by
the United States in the post war period. In the recent atmosphere of
growing U.S.-Soviet collaboration in world affairs, it is easy to forget
the enormous U.S. effort that lay behind the western containment of
Soviet-backed communist expansion. The divided countries were literally and figuratively the battle-lines of this struggle. The Berlin airlift,
the Korean War, the Taiwan Straits crises, the Berlin Wall and the
U.S. war in Vietnam are the highlights of the enormous East-West
struggle that shaped four decades of post war world history.
As a result, the thaw in the Cold War has fundamentally changed
the way that the United States policy-makers view these divided countries. Their importance as symbols or outposts in the post war effort
to contain communist expansion has faded or is fading fast. Under
these circumstances, American decision-makers need to look more
carefully at longstanding American interests in these countries and to
assess developing international trends and trends within the respective
countries in order to prepare for possible contingencies. It seems clear
that there are more opportunities than difficulties for the United States
posed by recent trends; conventional opinion tends to be optimistic
about the future. But prudent policy-making requires a careful weighing of U.S. interests in the context of new conditions and possible outcomes. That is the goal of this chapter.
In a broad sense, each of these divided countries has fit into U.S.
policy which, when defined broadly, has focused on several major
goals:
(1) U.S. political-security interests have seen American
national security as dependent on an ability to sustain a
favorable balance of power in both Europe and Asia. U.S.
• The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
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security has been thought to be fundamentally threatened by
any one power that would be able to dominate either Europe
or Asia. The collective security arrangements seen in NATO
and in various U.S. bilateral security agreements with Asian
countries were the foundation of this post war balance. In
the late 1960s, the United States recognized that it could no
longer bear the major burden of security arrangements in
Asia. It began a large-scale withdrawal from Vietnam and
other parts of Asia. U.S. leaders used diplomacy, especially
the U.S. opening to China and the subsequent close SinoAmerican cooperation against Soviet expansion in Asia, in
order to sustain a balance of power in Asia conducive to
American interests.
(2) U.S. economic interests have stressed the development of free trade and economic exchange, unencumbered
by protectionist barriers and political or other systematic
constraints. As the United States has become increasingly
interdependent with others in the world trading system, it
has shown great sensitivity to those forces that would
threaten access to critical resources or undermine the world
trading system that benefits the United States along with
others. Indeed, the Bush administration's strong actions in
1990 against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and threat to Persian
Gulf oil fields seem to underline this major concern in American policy.
(3) U.S. political-ideological interests have focused on
promoting political pluralism, greater democratization and
human rights. Although these objectives are often seen to
get less priority than U.S. national security or economic
goals, they are often decisive in determining U.S. policy.
This is so especially when basic national security-economic
goals have already been met, or when they are split in such a
way that political-ideological interests hold the balance in
the minds of U.S. decision-makers.
The post World War II period saw U.S. policy toward divided
nations as heavily influenced by the national security dimensions of
U.S. policy. Divided Germany remained the front line of U.S.-backed
NATO's containment of Soviet power in Europe for over forty years.
American interest in endeavors designed to promote economic recovery in Western Europe had this security dimension very much in
mind. American interest in seeing a continuation or revival of democratic practices and trends in Western Europe did not extend to foster-
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ing a political environment in which pro-Soviet communist parties
could rise to power. United States policy repeatedly took action
designed to promote political trends that would check the power of
these suspected pro-Soviet forces.
In the three Asian countries, the dominance of the national security dimension in American policy was even more clear. United States
policy-makers judged that the aggressive policies of North Vietnam
gave them little choice or opportunity to deal much with other aspects
of U.S. interests in South Vietnam. In the cases of Korea and China,
U.S. policy succeeded - at great cost - in stabilizing the security
situation. This allowed for greater emphasis on helping the U.S. allies
in Seoul and Taipei to develop economically, so that they would become better positioned to deal with pressures from their adversaries,
and this would require relatively less support from the United States.
United States political goals of liberalization and human rights were
often mentioned by U.S. officials but their relatively weak position visa-vis national security concerns was repeatedly seen in U.S. policy.
Thus, U.S. officials tended to avoid applying too much pressure on its
authoritarian allies for fear of promoting an unstable situation that
could be exploited by communist adversaries in Pyongyang and Beijing. By the 1970s, the improvement in U.S.-PRC relations was accompanied by PRC gestures toward Taiwan that reduced markedly
U.S. concern over possible PRC aggression against Taiwan. Nonetheless, United States policy remained concerned that instability on the
island could lead to outcomes (e.g., a declaration of independence)
that would add tension to the PRC-Taiwan relationship and seriously
upset the delicate balance in the U.S. relationship with both Beijing
and Taipei.
The collapse of the U.S.-supported government in South Vietnam
in the face of the communist offensive in 1975 represented the most
serious reversal in U.S. interests in these divided countries since the
"loss" of the China mainland in 1949. The defeat did not fundamentally affect the balance of power in Asia, as the Nixon administration a
few years earlier had adroitly positioned the United States to take full
advantage of the Sino-Soviet split as a means to preserve a balance in
Asia. The fact nonetheless remained that the way was now open to
Soviet expansion in Indochina, which resulted in the SovietVietnamese friendship treaty of 1978, the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia and Soviet military deployments to former U.S. bases in
South Vietnam.
The unification of Vietnam under communist rule also clearly
represented a setback to U.S. economic interests, although it is obvi-
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ously arguable how much the United States expected Vietnam to contribute to world prosperity and the international trading system. By
far the greatest setback to U.S. interests came in the political-ideological arena. The unification under communist rule saw massive repression of potential political opposition, forced relocation of urban
populations, discrimination against ethnic minorities, and the outflow
of millions of refugees fleeing from harsh political or economic conditions. Because of a number of factors, notably the close U.S. involvement with Vietnam up to 1975, the United States government took the
lead in international efforts to deal with the protracted refugee crisis in
a humanitarian way. The perceived U.S. need to pressure Vietnam to
withdraw from Cambodia caused U.S. policy to continue an economic
embargo and diplomatic restrictions against Vietnam - an approach
that seemed to worsen economic conditions in the country and promote the outflow of refugees.
In contrast to the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam in 1975, the
move toward the reunification of Germany in 1989-90 can be seen as
the greatest victory for U.S. interests in divided countries after World
War II. Soviet-backed communist expansion was successfully contained and rolled back. The need for the expensive U.S. military presence in Europe was reduced. The political system of democracy and
pluralism spread from West to East. The Soviet-occupied part of Germany was now free to choose national unification. Economic trends in
eastern Germany remain bleak in the near term, but there is considerable optimism that the vibrant West German economy will provide
ample support to pull the more backward eastern sector toward modernization and development.
In looking to the future, it appeared clear, in late 1990 that international politics would remain fluid. The outlines of the world order
that would replace the Cold War dominated system of the past four
decades remained unclear. Nevertheless, several broad trends were evident that would have important influence in general on U.S. policy
and in particular on U.S. policy toward the current and former divided countries considered in this study. Those trends are as follows:
(1) Soviet backed communism has failed. The Soviet
empire in Eastern Europe has collapsed. The Soviet Union
has entered a series of profound economic and political crises. It was unclear what kind of a Soviet Union would
emerge from these crises. For the time being at least, Soviet
leaders placed emphasis on gaining much needed economic
support from the West and other developed countries. For
the sake of economizing and other interests, they cut back
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sharply on expensive commitments to Third World and
other client regimes. Soviet leaders were more accommodating in seeking resolution of regional conflicts, arms control
issues and other disputes with the West.
(2) Political legitimacy was seen to rest increasingly on
a government's ability to sustain the political support of its
people and to meet popular economic needs through effective
policies fostering modernization. Although there remained
many exceptions in the Third World, nations and their governments appeared to be placing greater emphasis on democracy and the free market economic system as the most
effective means to insure political legitimacy and related economic modernization.
(3) Because of the end of the Cold War and the greater
emphasis on economic modernization as a source of legitimacy, governments focused more on international economic
competition. Such emphasis often superceded past concern
with political-military competition, which had appeared to
be dominant during the Cold War. As a result, even countries with relatively weak military structures like Japan enjoyed much greater international influence and were courted
by all sides, including the superpowers, on account of their
need for economic support.
Some of these broad world trends had an important impact on
U.S. foreign policy-making. Policy-makers in the United States do not
make foreign policy decisions in a vacuum. They are often heavily
influenced by public opinion, the media, interests groups and representatives in the Congress. These groups traditionally place a strong
emphasis on morality or values as well as realpolitik or national interest in American foreign policy. Thus, when the United States changes
policy in a significant way, these U.S. groups want to see the righteousness of this move, hopefully in terms of values like freedom, democracy and free enterprise that are fundamental to the American
experience.
The collapse of the Soviet empire and decline of the Cold War
have raised the importance of these groups and their emphasis on values in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, officials in the
executive branch had been able to argue, on many occasions quite persuasively, that such domestic U.S. concerns with values should not be
permitted to override or seriously complicate realpolitik U.S. interests
in the protracted struggle and rivalry with the U.S.S.R. Or they attempted to cloak U.S. realpolitik goals in terms of moral values of
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freedom against the immoral oppression of Soviet communism. Now
that the Cold War appeared to be ending and with it the sense of danger that accompanied the Soviet "threat," the administration's ability
to control the course of U.S. policy appeared to be reduced. It had to
take more account of the values held by domestic American constituencies, which tended to be reflected in the opinion of the Congress.
A challenge for U.S. policy-makers was to find ways to channel
American enthusiasm for certain values into avenues that supported
or at least did no harm to the national interest. American history is
littered with instances where U.S. officials attempted in sometimes
grandiose, patronizing or self-righteous ways to impose American values on unreceptive foreign societies. The stalemate in the Korean conflict and especially the failure of U.S. policy during the Vietnam War
had a salutary effect on this American tendency to overemphasize the
righteousness of America's cause in world affairs. The wars gave
Americans a sense of tragedy and self-doubt which helped to promote
greater sensitivity to other countries' perspectives and interests in
world affairs.
The danger was that this self examination would sap American
vitality and optimism. President Reagan set about to reverse a seeming decline in American hopefulness and succeeded in giving the
American people a greater sense of confidence about themselves and
their values than had prevailed for many years. Indeed, the triumph
of traditional U.S. goals such as democracy and free enterprise economics in various parts of the world, and the collapse of the Soviet
communist system in the late 1980s reinforced American determination to foster and pursue their values in world affairs.
The recent international trends and changes in priorities in U.S.
foreign policy-making appeared in 1990 to support the non-communist
side of the two divided countries, Korea and China. Seoul and Taipei
had long followed policies that fostered remarkable economic development and growth. Over the past few years, both governments have
liberalized politically and become more truly representative of their
people. Although some in the United States complained about trade
and other economic disputes with South Korea and Taiwan, the
American impression of both governments and peoples have become
more positive as a result of economic and political changes in recent
years.
American opinion also was becoming increasingly positive about
the reforming government of the PRC, until the bloody Tiananmen
massacre shocked American opinion. As a result, Beijing was subject
to U.S.-backed international sanctions. One year later, the PRC gov-
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ernment regained a modicum of world support; and entrepreneurs in
Taiwan and other parts of Asia were keenly interested in exploiting
economic opportunities on the mainland. However, the Chinese leaders in Beijing still faced serious internal problems and a crisis of confidence that sapped the legitimacy of the current communist dominated
political system.
North Korea appeared to be even more beleaguered by recent
world trends. Falling behind in competition with the dynamic South,
pressed by declining support from the U.S.S.R. and China, and confronting serious economic and political problems at home, Pyongyang
leaders seemed to be trying to find a way out of their current predicament. Few abroad wanted or needed closer contacts with the North.
In a sense, the North Koreans were fortunate that Korean nationalism
remained a potent force in the South, and prompted the South Korean
government and its international allies and associates to make efforts
to seek compromise and accommodation with the North.
If one views the interplay of divided countries as a zero-sum
game, it would probably be fair to say that recent trends in the post
cold war world give Seoul a dominant hand vis-a-vis Pyongyang, and
strengthen Taipei's position markedly in the face of the militarily more
powerful mainland. Both Seoul and Taipei would appear to be well
positioned to parry demands of the communist side and wait until
their basic conditions are met before considering compromise leading
to progress toward reunification.
Those who see the interplay as more of a positive-sum game also
would probably tend to see trends moving toward the direction of policies pursued by Seoul and Taipei. That is, movement toward political
reunification would be likely to be accompanied by political and economic reforms in the communist areas, that would make them more
open, pluralistic and dynamic.
Whether an American policy-maker takes the zero-sum or positive sum perspective, it appears likely that recent trends would be seen
as supportive of U.S. interests. In particular, they would serve to ease
tension in these traditional international "hot spots;" broaden opportunity for economic development and trade; and appear to hold the
promise of greater political liberalization and human rights on both
the communist and non-communist sides. Meanwhile, the recent
world trends were also having a profound effect on the previously divided Vietnam. Declining Soviet support, a military stalemate in
Cambodia and enormous economic problems at home caused the communist ~eaders in Hanoi to acknowledge past failures and to experiment wtth more open market oriented economic policies. The result
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was a decided Vietnamese "outreach" to the developed world. This
change was not yet accompanied by any political changes that directly
challenged the monopoly of power of the communist party. Nevertheless, there was considerable optimism voiced by those who judged that
economic needs would require openness to the outside world and more
effective and pluralistic political organizations that would ultimately
lead to the end of repressive communist rule.
In short, when viewed from the perspective of U.S. interests and
policy, the favorable trends seen reinforcing the movement toward the
reunification of Germany were also likely to result in developments in
current and formerly divided countries in Asia that are conducive to
American interests. As noted above, it is even possible to foresee developments in the next decade that may result in a more market-oriented, politically pluralistic system in Vietnam - a change that would
in effect reverse the major failure ofthe U.S. policy there in the 1970s.
Issues for U.S. policy under these optimistic conditions tend to
focus on sustaining an atmosphere in which favorable world trends
would move these nations in policy directions conducive to American
interests. Thus, the United States would appear prudent in avoiding
sharp changes in security or economic policies such as a unilateral
pullback of forces from Europe or Asia, or a shift toward greater trade
protectionism. U.S. diplomats would appear well served by being well
informed about progress being made toward reunification, reform and
pluralism in these countries, and by offering political or more substantive support in order to enhance prospects for successful outcomes.
Of course, prudent analysis requires that analysts do not overemphasize the positive trends in the current world situation or their likely
effects on the four countries considered here. Indeed, the 1990s may
not see developments favorable to U.S. interests. U.S. policy-makers
need to prepare for possible adverse contingencies.
Militarily, the situation along with the DMZ in Korea remains
volatile. North Korea has the ability, on it own, to provoke a major
conflict. Decision-making in Pyongyang rests ultimately with Kim 11sung. He is approaching 80 and his succession is unclear. Meanwhile,
the domestic economic situation in North Korea is bleak. Few westem analysts judge that North Korea could win an all out conflict with
the South, but the decision-making process in Pyongyang may not be
based on western premises, may not require a full scale victory, and/or
may be based on North Korean internal issues of political succession
or other factors about which the outside world is only dimly aware.
Beijing maintains dominant military power over Taipei. The
communist government in China is also in the midst of a succession
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crisis of major proportions where domestic factors unappreciated by
the outside world could result in seemingly provocative a,ction. Because of recent changes in Soviet policy, Beijing's attention to Taipei is
no longer diverted as much as in the past by the need to protect
against the national security threat posed by the Soviet Union.
On the non-communist side of this equation, in Seoul and Taipei,
it is also possible to conceive of scenarios where officials would take
actions adverse to U.S. interests in stability and development. A few
well placed disgruntled elements in the South Korean security forces
could precipitate a major conflict with the North along the DMZ.
And Taipei's leaders could initiate a crisis by following through with
demands by some that Taiwan establish a de jure independent status in
world affairs.
Politically and economically, there is no guarantee that reform
initiatives and signs of greater openness to outside contacts will persist
in the Asian communist capitals. Leaders in Pyongyang, Beijing and
Hanoi face major economic development problems that would be
solved to a certain degree, by greater contact with the West and other
developed countries. But the leaders there are also well aware of the
line of argument in the West that greater economic contact will lead to
the exchange of political ideas that will ultimately subvert the communist systems in Asia. These Asian communist leaders do not appear
ready to give up their monopoly of power. If they are forced to
choose, they may cut back on economic exchange in the interest of
preserving their monopoly of power.
Over the longer term, perhaps the greatest challenge to U.S. policy lies in the area of greatest victory in the current period - Germany. Although the Bush administration has been determined to
support German reunification and works closely with Chancellor
Kohl, many in the United States are skeptical that American interests
will be served by future trends. Various perspectives prevail in this
formative period determining a new Europe. One skeptical view holds
that after a few years Germany will succeed in incorporating the East
and will move with new vigor to dominate Europe. Some judge that
this will occur within the framework of European institutions such as
the European Community. The net effect thereof will make U.S. influence on the continent increasingly marginal. U.S. options under those
circumstances would boil down to acceptance of German dominance
or resistance. Although the German-dominated Europe would not
fundamentally challenge U.S. interests in democracy or human rights,
it could hamper the United States eco-nomically, and undermine U.S.
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power and influence militarily by calling for a complete U.S. military
withdrawal from Europe.
Perhaps the most important lesson for U.S. policy seen in these
and other possible adverse trends is to remind U.S. policy-makers that
while they could happen, they probably don't have to. Any U.S. policy that appears to be premised on a hostile or worsening relationship
with any of these countries could become a self fulfilling prophecy. A
more prudent course would appear to keep available enough American
strength to deal with possible contingencies; to carefully assess changing trends and their possible implications for U.S. interests; and to
adjust U.S. policy in ways designed to check potentially adverse
trends, before they become major crises, thereby preserving American
interest in a balanced security environment and economic and political
trends fostering greater outreach, interdependence and pluralism.
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